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Genealogy of the puzzle. A personal story 
“This is the hour of Europe” said Jacques Poos, former President of the Council of the 
European Union in 1992, at the beginning of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, indicating 
that this is a European problem, thus requires a European solution. What followed in former 
Yugoslavia throughout the 90s and whose hour was it really, is less important in this part. 
Important to note is that the events of the 90s have made former Yugoslavia and to some 
extent the Balkans, a European matter. Since then, the idea of interventions and missions in 
the region was never off the table. What followed in the aftermath of Yugoslavia’s breakup 
and NATO intervention was a sequence of peace agreements, territorial arrangements, 
instalment of NATO forces, United Nations missions and agencies, EU missions and 
altogether a structural approach from the Western structures in changing the situation in the 
region.  
Growing up in a setting where discrimination towards certain groups was an established way 
of living, had influenced me to think of war, uprising and resisting as a form of liberation. 
During the war in Kosovo between what was then the third military power of Europe – 
Serbia - and a porous Albanian guerrilla movement, the very idea of military intervention  
was seen as salvation, as the right hand of God. I remember being thrilled the night NATO 
started bombing Serbia’s military sites. In my understanding of a 12 year old, that was 
something that would stop the massive flow of refugees, the abandoned, ghost cities and the 
bestial images of killings. The intervention did eventually ‘save’ my life and the lives of my 
family. The entrance of NATO soldiers after Milosević surrendered was followed by an 
unprecedented welcome of the remaining local Albanians in Kosovo. It was a sort of bestial 
happiness – as if God had landed in front of us. And there I was! Covering NATO tanks 
with flowers, thinking that they were there because my life mattered, like all human life 
should mater. What followed was the ‘making’ of Kosovo as a church or a worship site 
where everybody came to light a candle to clean their souls. Agencies, donors, sponsors, 
NGOs, humanitarian organisations, human rights groups, academics, volunteers of various 
causes were coming to Kosovo to help these poor people. The notion of a poor victim 
became statutory in our new social identity.   
 
It was later in high school during the philosophy classes that the notion of liberty had 
infected me with the very questions of what was really happening there. Later in Tirana, at an 
American university, what may seem ironic, surrounded by critical professors and literature, 
the rosy picture of those brave soldiers who saved me and my family was further 
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contextualized and de-mythicized. It took me years to understand the perverse nature of 
(non)interventions albeit with the right cause, after being acquainted with Rwanda 1994, 
Somalia 1993, the Kurdish issue, the Palestinian question and other places plagued by 
calamities like my own. In the late 90s, an anecdote was circulating that during the war in 
Kosovo the former Italian defence minister, while having dinner, saw footage of Kosovo 
refugees in peril and exclaimed “Oh my god, they are blonde”!. And this is perverse not just 
in the Freudian way but in its very concept, where the narrative of intervention is not just 
legitimized to save these human lives but how much their coloured eyes and blondish hair 
have moved you. Oversimplified,  I was back in understanding that while humanitarian cause 
and intervention were a given, this was after all a struggle of ‘whose hour was it going to be’.  
What the intervention brought in Kosovo was an installation of two consequent foreign 
missions that de facto set the country’s path and its political choices to date. We were asked 
not to talk about the war, because that was not politically correct towards the ‘other’ (i.e. the 
Serbs). The word conflict was instilled instead. History was asked to be rewritten in ‘neutral’ 
and ‘objective’ tones. The ‘year zero’ had started for Kosovo, where memory, history, culture 
did not matter much before the democratic future awaiting us. I realised that if I was 
interested in any kind of question on freedom and liberation they would have to take a deep 
intellectual and epistemological question. It was a personal conflict in trying to find the 
balance how does one sees intervention as a human who was saved by it and by somebody 
who wants to go deeper in understanding how does intervention work? For whom there is 
an intervention? When does the intervention stop? What turns interventions into missions? 
How long do missions stay? Do they ever go away? Who signs their time frame?  
Later in Leuven, studying at a typical Western European university, a whole more complete 
picture of my emotional and intellectual puzzle with interventions and missions was revealed. 
Dots were connected between, on the one hand pathologizing the ‘other’ (the Balkans) as 
something intrinsically troubled due to regional deep seated, irrational hatred in the 
mainstream academic narrative, and having that narrative calling, justifying and legitimizing 
‘interventions’ on the other hand. Nonetheless, this is not, and should be not read as a story 
for Kosovo. It is rather a story of the oppressed. The oppressed, the marginal silenced and 
tucked in, be that in faculties of knowledge, theoretical assumptions or the narrative of 
interventions itself.  
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Abstract 
This thesis offers a Derridean perspective to the notion of international interventions and 
missions by focusing on the case of Kosovo. It argues on a reconceptualization of ethics as 
foreign policy, interrogating questions of how to rethink ethics as justice and how to rethink 
the notion of (non)intervention. The structure is built around four primary questions that are 
dealt with in four consecutive articles utilizing four of Derrida’s concept: deconstruction, 
hospitality, autoimmunity and home respectively. The thesis is divided into three parts. The first 
part is dedicated to the introduction of the thesis, a theoretical and methodological 
discussion, data generation and interpretation and an overview of thesis’ structure. The 
second part is reserved for the four articles, each employing a particular concept of Derrida, 
to shed light on the dynamics of Western/EU missions in Kosovo. Part three provides a 
summary of main issues covered in the thesis,  concluding remarks and a debate for further 
research. In its final part, the thesis calls for de-missionizing of the spread of democracy, be that 
as an aim to civilize, modernize or, Europeanize, others. De-missionizing is essentially related 
to de-pathologizing the other as something intrinsically corrupt and de-objectifying the other 
as a structure in need for intervention. This would in turn lead to a more democratic way to 
construct relations with others.   
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PART I 
 
Part I is dedicated to the introduction of the thesis, a theoretical and methodological 
discussion, data generation and data interpretation, and an overview of the thesis’ 
structure.  
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1. The narrative of the puzzle   
This research puzzle was initially conceptualized to look for aspects of compatibility between 
what the EU mission does in Kosovo on the one hand with the sociological reality in 
Kosovo on the other. After the first PhD year, I realized that the problem I was interested 
in, stretched out all the way to the very concept of international missions. The aim was in 
turn re-contextualized to analyse the concept of having mission(s) in Kosovo and how this is 
related to the political and social context on the ground. Using post-structuralist theories - 
deconstruction as conceptualized and practiced by Derrida - integrated into an interpretivist 
research framework, the topic is in the contours of EU external relations/EU enlargement, 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and ethics in foreign policy. At its outset, the focus was 
strictly on the EU mission deployed in Kosovo. However, during the field work, coming to 
the bottom of how intervention and mission were perceived by locals in Kosovo, the 
concept of the mission itself was deconstructed for me from the interviewees. Their discourse 
would see the missions, interventions, structural and non-structural presence in a linear 
format of ‘Western mission structure’. Consequently, the research puzzle also grew bigger. It 
made no sense to look at the EU in a vacuum, without seeing it contextualized in this 
broader missionizing structure.   
Kosovo was subjected to the whole package of Western/international mission, first with 
military/humanitarian intervention from NATO, the post-conflict peace building with the 
UN mission, the set of agencies for human rights, free trade and liberal economy with the 
OSCE, IMF, World Bank and finally, strengthening democracy and the rule of law from the 
EU agencies and the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). Observing the 
performance and state of the art of the international missions in Kosovo, I was systematically 
provoked by the gratitude and humbleness of the Kosovo Albanians (primarily) for the 
international intervention on the one hand, and an overall dissatisfaction and agitation of 
Kosovars in general towards the international missions within Kosovo on the other. The 
streets around most Kosovar cities are named after signatories of American interveners such 
as William Walker, Madeleine Albright; one of Pristina’s main squares has Bill Clinton’s 
statue. This gratitude cohabitated well with street art and graffiti displaying utter 
dissatisfaction with the missions as non-responsive and neo-colonial. The first step to 
understand this relationship was during my master thesis (2009-2010) where I analysed the 
EU funds per sector given to Kosovo and compared it with Kosovars estimated needs and 
necessities (calculated and measured through the statistical research of the UNDP and a set 
of interviews conducted in Pristina that same year). I discovered a mismatch between on the 
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one hand what the EU spends on Kosovo and how it allocates its funds and what the 
Kosovar society feels to be needing on the other. The findings of the research were relatively 
expected given the research’s nature of looking for a binary opposites answer whether the 
mission is compatible or not.  
Reading on other interventions and missions primarily in former Yugoslavia, it became clear 
that the incompatible relationship between the intervener and the subject of intervention is 
not exclusive either for Kosovo or for the Western Balkans in general. In fact, research on 
interventions and foreign missions reveals an uneasy/asymmetric relationship between the 
intervener, missionizer and the subject of the intervention.1 However, the very qualitative 
dimension of how this relationship is incompatible was missing in the overall literature. For 
whom was it first incompatible? Was this who relevant in the way how missions are given? The 
‘overlooking’ of these questions,  appeared to be more of a result of the approach in the 
study field itself. By and large, EU studies – and more importantly studies on EU’s relations 
with third countries (non-EU) – tend to be euro-centric.2 There exists significant literature 
indicating what the EU’s the policies/programs are for instance in Sierra Leone or East 
Timor. Yet, little is known about what happens with these programs in the ground; what is 
the share/opinion/ownership of the locals on these projects. 
Motivated by the normative assumption that when missions are put forward as ‘responsibility 
to help the locals’, they ought to represent (as in be compatible with) what the locals need to 
be ‘helped’ with. I problematize this throughout four main questions that are dealt with in this 
thesis separately in four articles:  
                                                          
1 Paris, R. (2002). "International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'." Review of International Studies, 
28(4): 637-656. 
 
Koskenniemi, M. (2004). The Civilising Mission: International Law and the Colonial Encounter in the Late 19th 
Century. Rechtshistorikertag. Bonn. 
 
Pomeranz, K. (2005). "Empire & 'Civilizing' Missions, past and present." Daedalus 
 134(2). 
 
Debnath, M. (2011). "The invisible agenda: civilisng mission or missionizing civilisation." The International 
Journal of Human Rights 16(3): 461-473. 
 
Dimitris Papadimitriou & Petar Petrov (2012). "Whose Rule, Whose Law? Contested Statehood, External 
Leverage and the European Union's Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo." Journal of Common Market Studies 
50(5): 746-763. 
  
2 Kanth, R. (2003). Eurocentrism, realism and the anthropic cartography of emancipation. Realism Discourse 
and Deconstruction. a. J. M. R. Jonathan Joseph. 
Knud Eric Jorgensen (2013). Research on IR, Political Science and EU Studies. Gent-Kent Workshop, Brussels. 
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1. What is the concept of mission in Western metaphysics and how does that play out in 
the case of Kosovo?  
2. How is the interplay of the EU mission with the locals in Kosovo on the one hand, 
and in what way that influences the process of enlargement for Kosovo?  
3. How is the relationship between the broader missionizing structure deployed in 
Kosovo on the hand, and the local Kosovar on the other? 
4. How is the local identified in Kosovo and who is local and international in Kosovo?  
Each of these questions are dealt with in the consequent articles using four of Derrida’s 
concepts: deconstruction, hospitality, autoimmunity and home respectively. The thesis relies in 
gathering and articulating evidence from field work (interviews with local and international 
actors in Kosovo), text as discourse (modes of communication from the international 
structures in Kosovo and modes of communication from the locals).  The overall aim of this 
thesis is to argue on the reconceptualization of ethics as foreign policy, how to rethink ethics 
as justice and the notion of (non)intervention, and lastly how to rethink ethics as respect and 
dignity in how ‘other’ is pathologized, objectified and dominated.     
 
2. Beyond narratives in EU studies and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
In this part I situate my research in the broader realm of literature of international 
interventions and missions focusing on international interventions, EU interventions and missions, 
and EU interventions in the Western Balkans. I conclude this part with a discussion on the 
theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this research with regard to the broad 
tendencies in the EU and FPA literature.  
2.1 International Interventions 
The scholarship in international interventions and missions falls in a broad range of 
literature, including democracy promotion, development aid, security studies, humanitarian 
intervention, peace-building, conflict resolution state-building, peace studies etc. The 
mainstream literature operates within the frame of liberal peacebuilding and as such is 
preoccupied with the ‘lessons learned’ from the missions deployed and how future 
interventions can be improved. Most of these studies show a tendency of ‘fixing’ the 
intervening agent, strengthening its agency and capabilities to do more and to do better. 3 
                                                          
3 Karin Arts & Anna Dickson (2004). EU Development Co-operation from Model to Symbol. Manchester, 
Manchester University Press. 
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Autesserre, Benner and Rotmann, Howard focus on how the international bureaucratic 
procedures affect the deployed UN peace operations.4 Knoll, Outi focus on the legitimacy of 
missions in the settings where they deployed and question whether co-government models 
between the local and the intervener would increase missions’ legitimacy. 5 Focusing on the 
case of Kosovo and East Timor, Herbert analyses how mandates of UN missions in 
different geo-political contexts affect the performance of UN mission;6 somewhere else, he 
questions whether the large deployment of these missions will create a social gap between 
the international and local ‘worlds’, which will in turn become a target of narratives of local 
actors.7 Pickering, Fridl focus on UN missions with regard to mediation and peacebuilding.8  
Edelman looks at UN missions with lenses of development aid and argues that by the logic ‘do 
no harm’, the UN learns through practice.9 Wolfgram analyses the peculiarities of the UN 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Karen E. Smith (2008). EU Foreign Policy in 2008. CIDOB Yearbook 2009. London, London School of 
Economics  
  
Carbone, M. (2008). "Mission impossible: the European Union and policy coherence for development." Journal 
of European Integration 30(3): 323-342. 
  
Roland Paris & Tim Sisk (2007). Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding. 
International Peace Academy. 
  
4 Howard, M. (2007). UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
   
Thorsten Benner & Philip Rotmann (2008). "Learning to learn? UN peacebuilding and the challewnges of 
building a learning organization." Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2(1): 43-62. 
  
Autessere, S. (2010). The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Peacebuilding. Cambridge Cambridge University Press. 
  
5Outi, K. (2001). "International Governance in Post-Conflict Situations." Leiden Journal of International Law 
14: 495-529. 
   
Knoll, B. (2006) Legitimacy through defiance: the UN and local institutions in Kosovo. Helsinki Monitor   
  
6 Nicolas Lemay-Hebert (2012). "Coerced transitions in Timor-Leste and Kosovo: managing competing 
objectives of institution-building and local empowerment " Democratization 19(3): 465-485. 
  
7 Nicolas Lemay-Hebert (2011). "The Bifurcation of the Two Worlds: assesing the gap between internationals 
and locals in state-building processes." Third World Quarterly 32(10): 1823-1841. 
  
8 Fridl, D. D. (2009). "Kosovo Negotiations: Re-visiting the Role of Mediation." International Negotiation 14: 
71-93. 
  
9 Edelmann, F. (2014). The power of the Social in International Politics: displacing the spaces of governing 55th 
Annual ISA Convention. Toronto. 
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missions within the realm of humanitarian interventions, and argues that the failure to establish 
security first creates serious credibility burden for the international missions.10  
 
The scholarly work who embarks on a critique of international interventions is torn between 
scholars for whom the act of immanent critique and the promotion of emancipation in 
academic discourse seem to provide sufficient level of resistance, and those critics who 
demand the production of alternative solutions to resolve the unfulfilled potential of 
mainstream approaches. In other words, on the one hand there are scholars who in response 
to the shortcomings, failures and consequences of the practice of liberal peace-building, 
interrogate the performance, effectiveness and implications of mainstream peace-building 
praxis.11 Here attention is given to the local level of analysis, which in mainstream realist-
liberal terms denotes that of civil society.12 On the other hand, there are scholars who reject 
or modify the propositions made by mainstream scholars who predominantly employ 
problem-solving and a positivist logic of inference in their analysis.13  
2.2 EU interventions and missions  
From the end of World War II, the European security was defined, organized and handled 
by external superpowers (the USA in the West, and the Soviet Union in Eastern and Central 
Europe). Throughout this period, the security of Europe was mainly thought of in terms of 
military structures (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), and in a very classical (realist) way where a 
balance of power, the arms race and alliances were the key concepts to be found at the heart 
                                                          
10 Wolfgram, M. A. (2008). "When the Men with Guns Rule: Explaining Human Rights Failures in Kosovo 
since 1999." Political Science Quarterly 123(3). 
  
11 See the work of Channell, W. (2005). Lessons not learned: Problems with Western Aid for Law Reform in 
Postcommunist Countries. Rule of Law Series. Washington, Carnegie Endowment. 57. 
 
Stefan Wolff & Annemarie Peen Rodt (2007). Lessons from the Balkans? The ENP as Conflict Management 
and Prevention. The Study of European Neighbourhood Policy: Methodological, Theoretical and Empirical 
Challenges. Nottingham. 
 
Keohane, D. (2011). "Lessons from EU Peace Operations." Journal of International Peacekeeping 15: 200-217. 
  
12 Richmond, O. P. (2009). "The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare, Culture and Peacebuilding." The 
international Spectator: Italian journal of International Affairs 44(1): 149-169. 
  
13 See the work of Visoka, G. (2011). "International Governance and Local Resistance in Kosovo: the Thin 
Line between Ethical, Emancipatory and Exclusionary Politics." Irish Studies in International Affairs 22: 99-
125. 
 
Linklater, A. (1996). The achievements of critical theory. International theory: positivism and beyond. S. S. e. al. 
Cambridge  
 
Steve Smith et. al., Ed. (1996). International theory: positivism and beyond. Cambridge  
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of security considerations. Filtenborg et al. claim that “during the Cold War period, the 
European Community (EC) abstained from developing any common policies towards its 
Northern and Eastern periphery owing to the constraints imposed by the bipolarity of the 
world system”.14 Wolff and Rodt explain that NATO, OSCE, WEU, UN and Council of 
Europe—the main building blocks of Europe’s Cold War security architecture—survived 
easily into the 1990s, but they needed to reinvent themselves and develop new and more 
effective instruments and policies to address the challenges of a changed security situation.15 
At that time, much debate has centred around the developing architecture of the European 
Union’s (EU) relations with its ‘near abroad’. The fall of the Iron Curtain opened up new 
possibilities for the EU to exert increasing influence over a range of countries which have 
gravitated strongly towards the economic power of the Single European market (SEM) and 
the political discourse on Europe’s (re) unification. In addition, it also led for a new realist – 
more liberal conception of security, such as human security, societal security among others.  
 
From the early 1990s, the characteristics of the European security debate changed 
dramatically and so did the perceived role of the EU and its relations with its third parties. 
The end of the Cold War, the successive conflicts in the Balkans, the attacks of 9/11 and the 
decision of the US to wage international war on terror, reshaped the role of the EU as a 
security actor in the world. For Wolff and Rodt, the perception of far graver threats in post-
communist Europe, large parts of which had aspired to EU membership since the early 
1990s, prompted the EU to adopt a much more pro-active policy of managing ethno-
political conflicts outside its boundaries than within them. This approach, they add, was 
deemed necessary because of the greater risk posed by such actual and potential conflicts in 
likely new member states and the EU’s ‘new neighbourhood’.16 It was the launch of CSDP 
shortly after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in June 1999, the momentum to ensure that 
Europeans could respond to international crises, including launching operations, without 
depending on the US (via NATO). The creation of ESDP paved the way for EU’s first crisis 
management missions abroad. Since 2003, the EU has launched over 20 missions and 
operations, among which missions of police, Security Sector Reform missions, border, 
                                                          
14 M.S. Filtenborg et.al. (2002). "An alternative theoretical approach to EU foreign policy 'network governance' 
and the case of the Northern Dimensions Initiative." Cooperation and Conflict 37(4): 387-407. 
  
15 Stefan Wolff & Annemarie Peen Rodt (2007). Lessons from the Balkans? The ENP as Conflict Management 
and Prevention. The Study of European Neighbourhood Policy: Methodological, Theoretical and Empirical 
Challenges. Nottingham. 
  
16 Ibid. 
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monitoring and rule of law missions. Missions were spread in diverse geographic and 
political areas such as Macedonia (EUFOR Concordia2003, Proxima 2004-5, EUPAT 2006), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina ( EU Police Mission 2003-present; EUFOR Althea 2004-present), 
Moldova (EU Border Assistance Mission 2005-present), Kosovo (EULEX Rule of Law 
Mission 2008-present), Congo (Military Mission Artemis 2003; Security Sector Reform and 
EU Police Mission 2005), Iraq (EU Rule of Law Mission EUJUST LEXIRAQ, 2005-2012), 
Sudan (2004-2007) etc.17  
 
The different nature of EU missions deployed, was also followed with a wide range of 
definitions and approaches in how the EU was to be defined. As such a significant debate 
focused on the nature of EU’s power. In the 1970s, Francois Duchêne coined the term 
civilian power for this new role - a power that would be based on non-military means but 
would also pursue the civilisation of international politics.18 In line with that, Ian Manners 
talked about Normative Power Europe (NPE), in which the EU shapes conceptions of what is 
‘normal’, binds itself to international norms and pursues these norms even against its own 
material (i.e. mostly economic interests).19 Aggestam talked about ethical power Europe, a power 
that would see itself bound by ethical standards that are traditionally seen as standing outside 
of foreign considerations.20 Zimmerman called it a realist power21, while Sangiovanni, Treacher 
coined it an emerging civilian power.22 For Hettne and Söderbaum the changing Europe was soft 
imperialist;23 for Charillon, the EU was a security regime.24 Wood called it pragmatic power Europe, 
                                                          
17 Directorate-General for External Policies (2012). CSDP Missions and Operations. Lessons Learned. 
Processes Brussels European Parliament. 
  
18 Cited in Orbie, J. (2006). "Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates." Cooperation 
and Conflict 41(123). 
  
19 Manners, I. (2008). "The normative ethics of the European Union." International Affairs 84(1). 
  
20 Aggestam, L. Ibid."Introduction: ethical power Europe? ." 1-11. 
  
21 Zimmermann, H. (2007). "Realist Power Europe? The EU in the Negotiations about China's and Russia's 
WTO Accession." Journal of Common Market Studies 45(4): 813-832. 
  
22 Treacher, A. (2004). "From Civilian Power to Military Actor: the EU's Resistable Transformation " European 
Foreign Affairs Review 9: 49-66. 
  
Mette Eilstrup Sangiovanni (2003). "Why a Common Security and Defence Policy is bad for Europe." Survival 
45(3): 193-206. 
  
23 Björn Hettne & Fredrik Söderbaum (2005). "Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? EU as a Global Actor and 
the Role of Interregionalism." European Foreign Affairs Review 10(4): 535-552. 
  
24 Charillon, F. Ibid."The EU as a Security Regime." 517-533. 
  
20 
 
to explain that when external actors resist its normative agenda and have substantial leverage, 
member states tend to impede the composite arrangements they are integral to.25 Klasnja 
argued on soft power Europe when talking about EU’s ability to build political, economic, legal, 
and social institutions cause changes at the domestic level with regard to enlargement.26 In 
reading these identifications for the EU, Thomas Diez argued that a prominent strand in the 
literature is that the EU’s role is seen as being different – better! – than that of traditional 
great or superpowers.27  
 
The debate on the nature of EU’s power and its power towards others became topical in a 
number of fields among which foreign policy, crisis management, conflict resolution, state-
building to name a few, embarked on the wave of studying the new role of the EU. With 
regard to literature on EU as an external actor,  significant attention is given both 
descriptively (what the EU is and what it does. See the work of Keukeleire, Smith, Hill, 
Laidi)28 and prescriptively (what it should do. See for more Orbie and Wetzel, Gloanec and 
Rupnik, Lavenex).29 A third group of scholarly work takes a fundamental and conceptual 
questioning and critique of the intrinsic features of missions and missionizing of the EU. 
Instead of looking for ways how the EU should do more and better, this strand questions the 
entire idea of EU involvement in third countries. This grouping of literature is not 
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exhaustive, rather a simple guideline in mapping the strands in literature. Below I will briefly 
discuss the first two groups to further conclude the section with a small overview of 
literature in the third group, where this thesis is also positioned.  
 
Literature on EU interventions stretches out from studies in CFSP, EU external relations, 
Europeanization, EU integration, democracy promotion, conflict resolution among others.  
With regard to CFSP operations, Grevi, Helly and Keohane, Asseburg and Kempin, Bossong, 
among others, commented on the peculiarities and experiences of these operations for the 
first two decades.30 Focusing on the EU as a civilization, Adler argued that CFSP can in fact 
be interpreted as a set of practices (such as multilateralism, co-operative security, preventive 
diplomacy, political dialogues, etc.), as can the EU more generally, especially when 
considering it in the guise of a ‘normative power’.31 On an institutionalist analysis, Breuer, 
Juncos and Pomorska, focus mainly on the socialization dynamics that influence political 
decision making with regard to CFSP operations.32 Recent rational institutionalist studies of 
Dijkstra, Klein, analysed the level of agency of the Council Secretariat and the Commission 
vis-à-vis the member states.33 Asseburg and Kempin, Emerson and Gross, Grevi, analyse 
case studies of missions to provide snapshots of the EU’s problems with regard to planning, 
financing and staffing of civilian CSDP missions.34 Keohane argues that stronger and more 
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coherent institutions and better coordination of member states, better coordination between 
Brussels and the deployed team, as well as better partnership between the UN, the EU, 
NATO, OSCE  are determinant to the success of the missions.35 With his ‘public 
administration turn’ in CSDP studies, Trondal addresses the executive role of bureaucracies 
and their impact on the deployed missions.36 Bicchi’s sociological analysis focuses on the EU 
as a community of practice, i.e. a group of people who routinely get together on a common 
or similar enterprise with the aim of developing and sharing practical knowledge. 37  
 
With regard to the EU missions, the belief holds that the EU can and/or should 
export/impose its values and be a ‘force for the good’, be it as a military force or otherwise. 
The deployment of the EU missions, is also looked with lenses of Europeanization, democracy 
promotion, European integration. A number of concepts have been deployed in order to frame 
the essence of this process. Grabbe, Goetz, Fischer, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, Bauer 
et.al. have sought to conceptualise it as exporting Europeanization beyond the territorial 
confines of the EU.38 For Olsen, Hix and Goetz, the European version, which is to say the 
spread of EU rules, political organisation and modes of governance beyond its territory and 
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‘a process of change in national institutional and policy practices that can be attributed to 
European integration’, can then be called Europeanization.39 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
explain that successful rule adaptation of the EU’s external governance, where the EU 
applies a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, through which it provides external 
incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions.40  
 
Other scholars like, Lavenex, Lavenex and Wichmann, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
Dimitrova and Dragneva have argued of a process of external governance, that is the ability of 
the EU to project certain aspects of its own governance regime to its neighbours.41 Orbie 
and Wetzel focus on the substance of democracy promotion the EU is involved with, discussing the 
advantages and the disadvantages of development aid, foreign policy, Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and Enlargement. 42 On a similar account, Makinda focuses on EU 
democracy promotion in Africa.43 Different authors have embarked on democracy 
promotion as democratization by extension;44 a discursive battleground between the perception of the 
intervener and the intervened.45  
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Keukeleire with his Structural Foreign Policy, argues that when thinking about EU foreign 
policy, researchers and practitioners need to be thinking less about the ‘EU’ and European 
rules of the game, and more about the ‘foreign’, pointing out that the ‘Brussels agenda’ 
should be more synchronized with ‘third country’ agenda.46 Mayer and Vogt embark on 
finding ‘moral and ethical arguments’ and justifications on which the Union ought to base its 
global policies asking what ethical foundations might there be for developing a larger role for 
the EU in regional politics and global governance, or what moral factors could potentially 
limit the scope of the EU’s external ambitions?47.  
 
What is peculiar in the consulted literature above, which is the mainstream literature in 
academic curricula of EU studies, is that it focuses exclusively on the process of ‘EU learning 
lessons’.48 Like the EU itself, this literature is in the search for ‘best examples’ and ‘lessons 
learned’ in how the EU should do more and better next time.49 Observing the temptation of 
academics and practitioners for the EU to play a greater role in world politics, Diez argued 
on a EU superpower temptation. This paradigm is not only evidenced in scholarly work who is 
more in tune with the technicalities of EU’s deployed mission, but it is also evidenced in 
more conceptual discussions on the role of the EU. For instance, Manners’ Normative Power 
Europe (NPE), which claims to have given the field of study a more distinctive voice, is 
nonetheless entrenched in this Eurocentrism. On the one hand, there the (self)ascribed identity 
of the EU, which conceptualizes itself as an ideal, superior agent endowed with a set of 
normative values. On the other hand, there is academic scholarship which codifies this self-
perception of the EU into a faculty. However, this is not pertinent to positivist inquiries 
only, nor only to scholarly work engaging with problem solving analyses.   
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In her critique to the international and EU intervention in Africa, Rutazibwa notices that few 
studies underline assumptions that guide contemporary ethical involvement, to explain its 
failure; consequently, very little scholarly energy has been put in the study of the possibility 
that the involvement as such might be problematic, and not just the way we go about it”.50 
Examples of these works are spread in different schools and methods. On a Gramscian 
approach, Turkes and Gokgoz, talk about EU’s strategy towards the Western Balkans as a 
hegemonic project arguing that EU’s aim is to restructure the Western Balkans in line with 
neoliberalism.51 On a poststructuralist inquiry Münever Gebeci coined the Ideal Power 
Europe - the meta-narrative produced and reproduced in EU Foreign Policy literature –  in 
which the others are supposed to imitate it, the ideal, desirable, superior model. For her, this 
neglects local particularities giving legitimacy to the EU to create the normal, the superior, 
valid interventions.52 For Diez, there is a need to focus less on the core norms of the EU and 
how they are pursued through EU foreign policy, however worthwhile this may also be. 
Instead, he adds, we need to recognise that these ‘European’ values and norms are 
themselves contested and fraught with tensions.53  With a post-colonial gaze, Rutazibwa 
argues for an ethical retreat of the EU from Africa.54 Oliver P. Richmond, Chandler and the 
rest in the critical camp argue on how liberal peace-building (as intervention) facilitates a 
counter-productive environment that ultimately develops a weak and unaccountable local 
polity, fragments local sovereignty and maintains fragile peace.55   
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2.3 Interventions in the Balkans  
A similar trend of literature is evidenced with regard to the EU – Kosovo, the EU – Western 
Balkans relations. In 2009, the Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, devoted a special issue to 
matters of intervention and missions in the tenth anniversary of NATO intervention in 
Kosovo. In his introductory article Alex Bellamy wrote that with the beginning of NATO’s 
intervention, Kosovo has served as a stage for the interplay and clash of post-Cold War 
trends and interests, in international law, security studies, diplomatic history, military strategy, 
area studies, international relations (IR) theory, media studies and many other disciplines.56 
Particularly with regard to EU missions in the Western Balkans in general and Kosovo in 
particular, the plethora of literature includes strands from Europeanization and EU 
enlargement, crisis management, democracy promotion, state-building, CFPS etc.  
 
The first bulk of literature is largely descriptive, in that it analyses what the EU is and what it 
does with others. Drawing on rationalist approaches, Sedelmeier explained the 
Europeanization of candidate countries with the so called external incentives model, foreseeing 
that the conditionality as a strategy is only effective under clearly defined conditions, a 
credible membership perspective, and that domestic adjustment costs are not prohibitively 
high for incumbent governments and do not threaten their power base.57 Those analysing 
Europeanization with constructivist/sociological institutionalist lenses such as Noutcheva, 
Freyburg and Richter have highlighted the importance of factors such as legitimacy and 
identity.58 Bauer analyses the processes of domestic, institutional and political changes in 
third countries.59  
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A solid amount of literature has embarked with lenses of democracy promotion in the 
Western Balkans. Lavenex has looked at democracy promotion as external governance60; 
Borocosz and Kovacs have approached it as “adaptation of internal modes as a condition to 
join the Union”;61 on a similar take Vachudova, Dzihic and Wieser have argued about 
democratization as enlargement; 62 Fagan has looked at democracy promotion programs in the 
development of civil society;63 Wolff and Rodt, Lyon, Szocsik have analysed democratization 
via ethnic accommodation and decentralization policies sponsored by the EU.64 For Le 
Gloannec and Rupnik, rather than democracy promotion, the Balkans is receiving democratic 
security.65  
 
Other widespread grounds in studying EU missions in the Western Balkans include gazes 
from state building with Juncos, Bieber, Greiçevci analysing patterns of EU efforts to state-
building its future member states;66 Papadimitrou and Petrov, Koeth highlight on the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
  
60 Lavenex, S. (2004). "EU External governance in 'wider Europe'." Journal of European Public Policy 11(4): 
680-700. 
  
61 Jozef Borocz & Melinda Kovacs, Ed. (2001). Empire's New Clothes. Unveiling EU Enlargement. Shorpshire, 
Central Europe Review Ltd., . 
  
62 Vachudova, M. (2003). Strategies for Democratization and European Integration in the Balkans. The 
Enlargement of the European Union. M. Cremona. UK, Oxford Scholarship Online. 
 
 Vedran Dzihic & Angela Wieser (2011). "Incentives for Democratisation? Effects of EU Conditionality on 
Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina." Europe-Asia Studies 63(10): 1803-1825. 
  
63 Adam Fagan & Indraneel Sircar (2012) Promoting Democracy in the Western Balkans after the Global 
Financial Crisis. LSE - Research on South Eastern Europe   
  
64 Stefan Wolff & Annemarie Peen Rodt (2007). Lessons from the Balkans? The ENP as Conflict Management 
and Prevention. The Study of European Neighbourhood Policy: Methodological, Theoretical and Empirical 
Challenges. Nottingham. 
  
Lyon, A. (2013). "Between Integration and Accomodation of Ethnic Difference: Decentralization in the 
Republic of Macedonia." Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 11(3): 80-103. 
   
Szocsik, E. Ibid."The EU Accession Criteria in the Field of Minority Protection and the Demands of Ethnic 
Minority Parties." (2): 104-127. 
  
65 Anne-Marie Le Gloannec & Jacques Rupnik (2008). Democratization by Extension. EU Foreign Policy in a 
Globalized World: Normative Power and Social Preferences. Z. Laidi. USA, Routledge. 
  
66 See for more: Greiçevci, L. (2012). The European Union's role in the process of state-building in Kosovo 
(1999-2008). Centre for EU Studies. Ghent, Ghent University. PhD. 
  
Bieber, F. (2011). "Building Impossible States? State-Building Strategies and EU Membership in the Western 
Balkans." Europe-Asia Studies 63(10): 1783-1802. 
 
Ana E. Juncos (2012). "Member state-building versus peacebuilding: the contradictions of EU state-building in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina." East European Politics 28(1): 58-75. 
28 
 
difficulties of EU’s involvement in contested states taking Kosovo as an example; 67 Kasapas 
has analysed EU’s transitional justice efforts in the Western Balkans.68 In lenses of crisis 
management the EU involvement is seen as “the most proper tool to stabilize the Balkans”.69  
EU crisis management and coherence/efficiency studies point to institutional design 
problems and are characterized by a neo-liberal dimension. Tocci argues that the EU has 
emerged as an actor in conflict resolution beyond its borders at the turn of the twentieth 
century, concomitantly with the development of its fledging foreign policy, shaped by 
Union’s self-perception and nature as a ‘peace through integration project’ within its 
frontiers.70 Emerson and Gross have looked at the EU crisis management missions in the 
Western Balkans as a tripartite program Europeanization, EU Enlargement and conflict 
management.71 
 
A second bulk of literature has embarked on with prescriptive analysis – what the EU should 
do. Fawn and Richmond proposed ‘shared sovereignty’, in which the relation of local actors 
with internationals should be conditional upon shared governance.72 In the study of EULEX, 
Malesic analyses how the participation of judges and personnel affect the performance of the 
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mission in the ground.73 Keukeleiere advocates for a more bottom-up approach when 
studying EU’s missions pointing that the focus on the ‘local agenda’ as opposed to ‘Brussels 
agenda’ can provide greater insight to evaluate the relevance, effectiveness and impact of the 
EU’s foreign policy on missions.74 
 
In contrast to the scholarly work discussed above, which focus on an epistemological 
paradigm of improving missions to achieve better policy outcomes or focus on the political 
and institutional structures to explain the failure of them, a third bulk of literature takes a 
fundamental conceptual questioning  of the intrinsic features of missions and missionizing. 
Embarking on critical theory, Chandler talks about the creation of a hyper reality in the 
Western Balkans where the discursive language of choice is that of crisis.75  Turning the 
focus to the local as subject of intervention, Visoka examines the emergence and 
implications of local resistance against the practice of liberal peace-building in post-conflict 
Kosovo, as pursued by the international community and local authorities.76 Bulley has taken 
Derrida and the concept of hospitality to explain EU enlargement packages for the Western 
Balkans and the countries of ENP.77  Comparing the EU to the comparatively nation state 
examples in foreign policy (Great Britain), Bulley argues that “EU foreign policy enacts 
responsibility by offering hospitality to the countries and regions surrounding it though three 
policies: the policy of enlargement, the policy towards the Balkan countries and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy”.78 
 
The research puzzle in this thesis is traced and conceptualized in two streams. The first one 
is rather methodological, in that it seeks to turn to the subject of missions to understand the 
mission and its relation to the local Kosovars (the subject of the mission). The stories of the 
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locals are quite the marginalized narrative in informing the studies on missions. This is 
particularly the case on missions deployed in Kosovo. Due to two unprecedented missions’ 
status – UNMIK operating in a semi-protectorate system in a de facto newly emerging 
political entity and the EU with its first and greatest CFSP mission deployed to date – the 
focus stretches on the peculiarities of the missions,79  technical/sui generis arrangements,80  
the mission’s mandate in a non-fully fledged country etc.81  As such, on a methodological level, I 
have sought to conduct interpretivist research to focus more on the local’s narrative by 
engaging in a more inter-subjective conceptualization. These intellectual inquiries are largely 
stumbled with the question of why the local is important? Why mapping the discourse of 
locals in Kosovo with regard to EU and international presence in general should be of 
concern here? I always find a logical fallacy in the rhetoric of similar questions. In studying 
the existence and materialization of interventions and missions for the locals, to bring 
democracy and prosperity to the locals, why the question of ‘why the local’ should be posed 
after all? Unless we silently subordinate and objectify the local as a subject to be intervened 
on, shouldn’t the question of this relationship be (primarily) addressed to the local? Or why a 
rather more ‘equal’ relationship between the intervener and the subject of intervention is 
important, for whom and why. For Spivak, giving the voice to the people concerned, limited 
by all the elements that get lost in translation, due to language or the different power 
positions between ‘subaltern’82 and western researcher. In her fieldwork in Somaliland, 
Rutazibwa provided the decolonized western ethical foreign policy research agenda would 
greatly benefit from an ample and systematic participation of non-western researchers in the 
non-west.83 
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Here, to understand these foundational problems, I first sought to analyse the history and 
the logic of intervention in the Western historical trajectory, deconstruct the intervener and 
interpret who intervenes, on what grounds and how. In this realm of deconstruction, I posit 
the international missions in Kosovo and try to interpret their existence and role in the 
broader conceptualization of Western metaphysics. In addition , I also engage in interviews 
with local and international actors in Kosovo to hear their stories from the field and to see 
how do their narratives play out in the broader picture of intervention and missionizing. This 
elucidates how the subject of intervention (the local population) understands, conceptualizes 
and relates to the mission. In my understanding how the locals perceive themselves in 
relation to the mission, how do they define their needs, what is their system of values, on 
what historical, social, political grounds we could contextualize their needs, hence their 
perception towards the mission, requires an interpretive approach to inter-subjectivity.  
The second stream is rather theoretical, in that it seeks to displace this comfort how 
interventions, missions are studied in FPA. To do this, I will use deconstruction as 
conceptualized by Jacques Derrida to deconstruct the very genealogy of interventions and 
missions and how does this plays out in a contemporary context and in its interplay with 
Kosovo. Deconstruction is thought of as a rethinking of Eurocentrism and Western 
metaphysics, and it sheds light on marginal and marginalized discourses and narratives by 
bringing them to the fore. This methodologico-theoretical symbiosis provides this niche of 
an epistemological retreat in studying settings of interventions and missions. Finally, as far as 
the area of study is concerned, this is one of the few deconstructivist/interpretivist accounts 
on Kosovo as a case study and as such is a contribution in a stylized dichotomy of positivist 
and constructivist research.  
The thesis is seen as a contribution on two main levels. First, on a rather theoretical level it 
speaks to decolonization of knowledge and engages with knowledge production from 
different spectrums while avoiding putting political/imperial hierarchies of core/periphery, 
centre/backyard etc. Second, looking at intervention and mission as foreign policy tools in 
EU studies, the thesis builds the critique of how the subject of intervention is viewed, in 
what ways it is objectified, and what happens to its agency.  
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3. Methods and methodology: interpretivism and deconstruction 
What follows is an overview of the thesis,  theories and methodological choices used and 
finally an overview of the four articles. In this part (‘part 3’), I explain the emergence of 
interpretative research first by elaborating on its definition and second by proceeding with 
the major ontological ‘misunderstandings’ on it as a method.  
‘Part 4’ and ‘Part 5’ are dedicated to the methodological choices of data gathering and data 
generation methods. Evidence is given with regard to field work and how the data gathered 
will be read with four concepts of Derrida 1) deconstruction; 2) hospitality; 3) autoimmunity 
and 4) home and how they will be used in the thesis.  
In ‘part 6’ I explain the major concepts used and the philosophical stances I embark on when 
writing.  
3.1 Overview 
The history of social science evolution is a history of ideas on how to engage with knowledge 
and what paths of knowledge production we take. Throughout the 60s-70s, there is the first 
schematic division in behavioural sciences between quantitative and qualitative methods.84  
The first is the positivist strand identified by objective reality – the belief that there is a reality 
outside of us that can be verified through scientific methods. It holds to the belief that like 
the physical world, society is governed by general laws and the intuitive knowledge is utterly 
rejected. Thus, quantitative – positivist methods are ontologically (theory of existing) realist, 
and epistemologically (theory of knowledge) objectivist.85  Throughout this period, the 
qualitative methods albeit different, were still developed within a positivist framework. 
Pressured to resemble the quantitative methods - to fit/resemble the ‘known’ - the strand 
was later called qualitative positivism.86  In the early 70s, interpretivism and interpretivist methods 
came out primarily identified as a strand which refused to resemble positivist methods.87 
Interpretivism is ontologically constructivist (our reality is socially constructed and as such it 
does not just exist governed by general laws), epistemologically it is interpretivist  - anchoring 
in the logic that there is no such thing as objective reality in social sciences but it is prone of 
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interpretations and inter-subjective evaluation.88  The work of the American anthropologist, 
Clifford Geertz and his book The interpretivist turn (1973) had further impact in bringing 
interpretive ethnographic studies from anthropology to public administration, policy analysis, 
organizational studies etc.89  For D’Cruz, the entry of area studies such as Women’s/Gender 
Studies, Minority Studies pushed for a more “multicultural based curriculum and critique of 
academic scholarship regarding patriarchal and monoculturalist bias in the university in 
particular and the operation of reason more generally”.90  
Literature studies have had a similar development parallel to the methods. The cognitive turn 
with the study of metaphors and categories was a breakthrough in acknowledging that 
language is not transparent.91  For instance, we have agreed to call this ‘table’ but the word in 
itself designates nothing. The example of ‘table’ is rather simple, but when we have to deal 
with less ‘consensual’ terms in studying social phenomena like ‘reality’, ‘values’, ‘needs’, we 
engage more fundamentally with ‘interpretation’. One of the myriad of ways to intervene in 
text is deconstruction. Like all other approaches, it interprets. At the same time, like in all 
studying inquiries we deconstruct – we look beneath; we try to find explanations. In mapping 
the interpretive research methods, Yanow and Shea provide deconstruction as one of the 
interpretive methods along with metaphor analysis, (critical) discourse analysis, narrative 
analysis and post-structuralist analysis.92  Like interpretivists, post-structuralists believe that it 
is useful to focus on contenxtualized meaning making, rather than on universal truths or an 
all-encompassing reality. In this meaning-focused approach, culture, language, and discourse 
are explored in terms of how they contribute to the experience and identity of people in 
context.93 The ‘problem’ with transferring methods from different disciplines is the question 
of what is brought in the new field, and what elements are potentially 
lost/modified/overlooked throughout the way. That is, what aspect of deconstruction will I 
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end up taking – once I decided to bring it into IR (broadly speaking) from literature studies. 
Geertz called this interpretation of interpretation, or what we commonly refer to as 
hermeneutics, in which there is the layer of the research setting, the meaning the researcher 
gives to it, the meaning the third reader gives etc.94  This is what French literary critic Roland 
Barthes  has called “the death of the author” arguing against the practice of incorporating the 
intentions and biographical context of an author in an interpretation of a text, and instead 
establishing that writing and creator are unrelated. Rather than problems to be tackled and 
solved throughout the way, this is more of a ‘problem’ to be aware of. 95  
 
3.2 Interpretivist Research  
To its great extent, this research relies on gathering, understanding and explaining the text - 
from discourse, documents, speech acts and interviews – in the interpretivist method 
informed by the work of Yanow, Edkins, Campbell and Shea. Interpretative research96 is 
based on the presupposition that we live in a social world characterized by the possibilities of 
multiple interpretations. In this world, there are no “brute data” whose meaning is beyond 
dispute.97 Dispassionate, rigorous science is possible – but not the neutral, objective science 
stipulated by traditional analytic methods (as represented by the scientific method).98  
Holding that stories are as valid as science, the interpretive research strand seeks synthesis 
and interpretation to analysis.99 Toning down the positivist mania for ‘scientific’, ‘objective’, 
‘valid and reliable’ research, is what distinguishes most interpretivist from the positivist 
strand.  According to the wide range of post-positivists authors, these research methods are 
particularly suitable to research questions that explore discrepancy between word and deeds; 
contrasts between policy meanings as intended by policymakers – “authored” texts – and the 
possibly variant and even incommensurable meanings – “constructed” texts – made of them 
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by other policy relevant groups.100  Thus, when engaging with research and knowledge 
production, I (as an author) am not detached, unaffected, non-present in the writing. Quite 
the contrary, personal background, life experience, ideological stance, sexual orientation, 
living style are all to a large extent present in the knowledge production the researcher 
engages with. In his account Thus Spoke Franco: the place of history in the making of foreign policy, 
Quero argues that identities and memories are not merely things we think about but things 
we think with and they have no existence beyond our polities, or existence, or social relations 
and our histories. “We write and speak our histories by fitting words to world, world to 
world and word to worlds, and foreign policy is no exception in this”.101  
In the past decade an increased contribution of interpretive methods has been sought in 
many social science fields such as communication sciences, anthropology, sociology, political 
science etc.102  While positivist research argues that we can know only things that are made 
explicit,103  in interpretive research the analysis of implementation is typically presented as a set 
of factual prepositions, where those facts are treated as explicit and objective realities that 
can be discovered by direct observation and participation.104  
 
In her essay Practices of Policy Interpretation, Dvora Yanow explains that until the early 2000s, 
“the inner interpretive debate was a continuous argumentation in opposition to/in defence 
to positivism”.105 Along with other ‘post positivistic’ strands like hermeneutics, 
phenomenology, social constructivism, critical theory, discourse analysis and deconstruction, 
interpretive research shares the same tenet that meaning as such cannot be taken for granted 
but requires attention.106  “We no longer have to fight against a crude positivism, but at the 
same time there seems to be a growing resistance against theoretical positions which 
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emphasize the interpretive nature of knowledge”.107  This PhD thesis is no exception in that 
it has to clarify its stance, structure and philosophy of engaging with knowledge production 
in response to the mainstream – the positivist strand. If written on an orthodox positivist 
fashion (statistical analysis of surveys or the like), it would have been unnecessary to  explain 
what positivist research is all about and how does statistics really work in explaining  social 
science phenomena, even less in ‘justifying’ its meta-scientific merits. I do not necessarily 
empathize with the defensive/conflict of identities in defining what interpretivism is. I 
maintain it is a strand on its own right and integrity whose legitimacy does not derive in 
explaining it within the positivist framework and epistemology. However, throughout this 
research, working with marginal and marginalized theories and methodologies, one gets 
closer to this hierarchical explanation by understanding what Yanow has explained as “to 
educate, not to defend”.108  In order to elucidate the differences between positivist and 
interpretivist research I will position them in their ‘traditional’ corners and focus primarily on 
where they differ, even though social sciences is not a domain of such a dichotomous 
division given that a lot of mixed methods and methodologies are narrowing the gap. 
 
Before proceeding with a discussion on the ontological and epistemological premises of 
interpretivist research, it is imperative to point out though, that while in certain academic 
environments, this debate will not be necessary and, more importantly, would be considered 
outdated, in others, justifying the scientificity of interpretivist research and proving its 
scientific personality is necessary. Study fields are crowded with debates that disqualify 
theories on grounds of scientific fallacies. In his account on the relation of critical theory and 
international relations, Roach argues that similar debates have been present in IR as well, 
with discussions questioning whether Marxism was or was not a science.109  For him, in these 
scenarios questions should be posed as to “what types of knowledge do you want to 
disqualify in the very instant of your demand: Is it science?”.110 
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3.2.1 Epistemological and Ontological ‘misunderstandings’ on interpretive methods  
Challenging the positivist approach that there is no objective truth, interpretivist methods 
counter the behaviourist hegemony and advocate a plurality of approaches highlighting 
interpretative approaches.111  Ontologically, they challenge the rationalist conception of human 
nature: interests and actions are not always rational. Instead, they emphasize the social 
construction of actors’ identities in shaping interests and actions. In what follows, I first start 
with a macro or philosophical discussion of what both research strands are all about. I  
continue with the methodological differences and finally I will situate these differences in the 
case of this particular study.  
 
All science, including the social – be it positivist or post-positivist – is based on natural 
science. However, when transferring the natural/scientific methods into social sciences they 
have not properly adjusted to the subject of study. Controlled scientific/quantitative studies 
and laboratory like experiments are not necessarily/not always the best to study social 
phenomena. Thus, the way positivism has conceptualized social science in some cases is not 
only implausible but lacks the human touch as well.112  For example, the study of 
‘psychology’ as we know it in the Western tradition is the parsimonious case of ‘lab’ scientific 
study canonized as science to study the human mental functions and behaviours. Studies of 
depression in psychology trace their ‘foundations’ in a series of animal laboratory 
experiments.113  Breeding argues that 85% of studies in behavioural psychology are with mice 
and rats which are then extrapolated to human beings. “Although humans and mice share a 
lot in common, the limitations of the later do not provide sufficient evidence to generalize to 
human beings”.114  The rest of the experiments (15%) are reported to be done with 
chimpanzees, dogs and other animals.115  The very notion of depression and learned 
helplessness in human psychology relies on a chain of studies conducted on dogs in which 
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dogs are consequently shocked on a wired environment until they give up and go to 
apathy.116  This was then generalized to human depression called helplessness – according to 
which a person, when he enters a depression, goes through the same ‘trauma’ and shock for 
a couple of times. Other similar examples include lab experiments where mice are 
continuously attacked and defeated and the observed reaction is anxiety. That in turn is also 
the foundation of psychological definition of anxiety in humans.117  Apart from the obvious 
ethical problem with the study, in another section, we will discuss how objectifying the 
subject of study and thinking less of it in social sciences is also a problem transferred from 
this methodological philosophy. Richardson argues that most of the social sciences we know 
of today were born out of the European Enlightenment with the goal of understanding 
human social behaviour to quell social conflict; later with the rising importance of the 
scientific method as a basis of doing all science the idea of doing science for social change 
was repressed and positivist perspectives of understanding social science took over.118  
 
What follows the controlled, experimental approach of an objectified subject of study in 
front of a detached, neutral scientist is allegedly producing neutral, scientific and objective 
results. Postcolonial scholar Ramon Grosfoguel clearly situates the dialectics of positivism 
and post-positivism on a more ideological discussion by looking at it in the paradigms of 
Western metaphysics and how post-positivism is essentially what Derrida would call “its 
binary opposite”. Grosfoguel argues that Rene Decartes - I think, therefore I am - is the 
Western foundation of science  and it came up as a challenge to the Church’s monopoly of 
knowledge production when ‘God becomes I’ and ‘I’ becomes the viewpoint of all 
viewpoints; of all particularities. “There is the production of all Christian attributes just in a 
secular way. Knowledge is universal in time and space. Objective in terms of neutrality”.119   
The “I” here (the researcher) does not exist, he is not present. He is detached and is writing 
from an objective – neutral position. He is not situated. He , the author, is generally the 
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empirical, male, Western, heterosexual, producing knowledge. In this hegemony one is not 
supposed to be particular – to be subjective (i.e. interpretivist); subjectivity is orientalised, 
downgraded into perceptionism, emotion and academic invaluability. This is what 
Grosfoguel calls espistemicide – the destruction of all knowledge that is  ‘particular’ – Islamic, 
non-hetero, Hindu, Maya, women etc. “This idolatry universalism is inherently racist, 
because rationality is only in the hands of certain human beings”.120  That is why in social 
sciences nowadays the researcher who is personally involved with his subject of study is 
always questionable in terms of objectivity and neutrality as if other researchers who are 
‘detached’ from the case they are studying are able to conduct rigorously objective research. 
For Koukkanen, this is “epistemic ignorance” in that indigenous people are too quickly 
interpreted as not more than a ‘difference’.121   He does not question whether indigenous 
people are being allowed to speak or not in the academy. He argues that quite the contrary, 
the situation is the opposite. “They are not only ‘given’ a voice but urged to speak and 
express their views and perspectives in the name of diversity and decolonization, yet 
remaining in the fashion of ‘‘one indigenous person per event/publication’’.122 This of course 
stretches out beyond meta theoretical discussions. Provoking with his question Can Non-
Europeans Think? in 2013, Dabashi asks why is European philosophy philosophy, but African 
philosophy ethno philosophy, the way Indian music is ethno music and European music is music? 
Why museums in New York, London, Paris etc. are filled with animals and non-white 
peoples and their cultures featured inside glass cages, but no cage is in sight for white people 
and their cultures?123 
 
I maintain that both positivism and West/Eurocentrism are the two cornerstones of Western 
metaphysics. With regard to IR and FPA scholarship this has led to the hegemony of 
Westphalian approach. From the treaty of Westphalia, this approach spread throughout the 
five centuries of colonialism and imperialism. It is based on three premises: 1) that the 
international system is made up of state; 2) sovereignty is the main principle by which states 
interact with one another; 3) trade or commerce is the legitimate venue for inter-state 
interactions. For Ling, the hegemony of Westphalia approach as a singular logic of violence 
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in world politics has determined both in what we do in wards and in knowledge and what 
qualifies as knowledge.124  In 2001, Derrida called for the New Humanities – the need for 
enlarging and re-elaborating the concept of Humanities. “The opening of the university on 
its outside, on its other, on the future and the otherness of the future”.125  With 
interpretivism, the aim is to open the studies in foreign policy in particular and social science 
at large; to humanize social sciences by developing a respectful relationship between the 
researcher and the study subject by engaging in an equal, non-hierarchical relationship. As 
such, I (as researcher) am not operating in a ‘laboratory’ where I observe monkeys being 
tested with experiments, note down their reactions, draw categories and models of what I 
observe and test it in further laboratories for generalization. In studying social phenomena, 
the interpretivist researcher engages with people (morally and ethically in the human form and 
acknowledging their subjectivity and agency in the sociological form). However, in criticising 
eurocentrism and positivism, it cannot be maintained that all interpretivist research is 
necessarily post-positivist. The same applies for deconstruction too. For Haverland and 
Yanow, both positivism and post-positivism are ontologies and as such interpretivism is a 
methodology which can fit in each of these.126  
 
In the following section I elaborate on the differences of the two strands on methodological 
lines. Consider ordinal categories in quantitative research where the question is as follows “are 
you pregnant?” In all sorts of research there is a dichotomous/mutually exclusive choice in 
how to respond to that. One is either pregnant or not. One cannot be halfway, almost, not 
quite, or quite pregnant. Thus, some questions fit better to positivist methods. Now, let us 
consider that we are researching the relationship between depression and pregnancy. A first 
difference in how both research strands would embark is methodological. For the positivist 
project there is a definition of ‘depression’ and ‘pregnancy’ that is beyond dispute and it 
looks for questions of the sort: Does pregnancy cause depression? What causes depression in pregnant 
women etc. The interpretivist project is first and foremost interested in deconstructing 
(deconstructing as in critically looking at the concept, not necessarily Derridean 
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deconstructing) the concept of depression and contextualizing (socially, politically, 
economically) the issue of pregnancy. Typically this project asks “how do pregnancy and depression 
relate? In what way is pregnancy related with depression?” The second difference is that of methods 
employed. In the first project,  typically there is a written survey127 where there is no 
interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. The questions need to be as 
accurate, direct and as unambiguous as possible. Examples of these questions could include 
“a) why do you feel depressed? a) do you feel depressed because of pregnancy etc. An interpretivist 
researcher would engage in this study first by understanding what the medical, biological, 
psychological, cultural, economical and religious understandings are of depression and 
pregnancy. Which of these ‘understandings’ is more dominant for the group of women 
under study and why. Second, there is step down into treating ‘depression’ cases and 
pregnant women not as patients who are given a piece of paper to circle alternatives, but 
rather to engage into conversational interviews and understand first how they define 
depression? What does it mean for them to be pregnant socially, psychologically? etc. The 
research then builds the study synthesizing on the one hand, the way the interviewees 
construct their discourse when answering, the state of being they are in at that moment, the 
place where the interview happens, the way they interact with the researcher, their willingness 
to talk in the beginning and throughout the interview, their body language, mimic and on the 
other hand, the researcher’s own understanding of the issue from literature review, 
background, knowledge and other ‘particularities’.   
 
Finally, let me contextualize this discussion in the case of my thesis. First, whatever the 
methodological and ideological choice, my guess/hypothesis is that there is some sort of 
asymmetry between the EU missions and the countries/societies needs where they deploy. 
One way to embark on this study is taking the EU funds per sector on Kosovo on the one 
hand and compare it with the available data that UN agencies conduct in every country – 
what societies feel to be the most urgent need, what is the most important security issue, 
what do they think of inter-ethnic policies, how satisfied are they with EU funds, etc. In this 
model, I will not be questioning any establishment. I am accepting the terms and conditions 
of why there is a EU mission, how does the EU mission define its priorities in Kosovo and I 
am drawing a conclusion based on a set of surveys. In this case however, I do not know how 
do the locals define what ‘need’ is, which inter-ethnic policies they are more satisfied with 
and why and most important of all,  I as a researcher am not engaging in a critical 
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understanding of the entire concept of how the mission came to existence, who gets to 
design the funds per sector, for whom are these sectors important etc. The other way to 
engage with this puzzle is first and foremost, to interrogate and deconstruct the puzzle itself. 
What is the philosophy behind the puzzle? Why and how should we be preoccupied with 
posing questions about interventions in general? Further, to understand the metaphysical, not 
merely the factual evidences how the mission came to exist? That would require an 
understanding of who gets to missionize and who or what is the subject of missionizing? This 
interrogation or deconstruction is extended to all parts of puzzle, the EU, West, the local, Kosovo to 
unravel their underlying stories before dwelling in drawing conclusions on their relationship.    
 
 
3.2.2 Reliability and Validity 
It is important to clarify that ‘interpretive’ does not mean ‘impressionistic’. Even though they 
emphasize the centrality of interpretation and, hence, subjective meaning, they are 
nonetheless, methods: systematic, rigorous, methodical.128  The steps of these methods 
typically cannot be set out as in discrete and regularized fashion as those of cost benefit, or 
regression analysis and their counterparts.129  In a typical positivist research, one would be 
concerned with writing the surveys, setting the sample, writing the questions, categorizing 
them etc. A good study in this case needs to reliable, valid and generalizable. In an 
interpretivist research, there is selecting the interviewees/texts, designing the questions, 
deciding on how to ‘read’ the data etc. A good study in this case is denoted by two principles. 
First,  trustworthiness130 – has the researcher been able to gather and understand all data in 
the proposed research puzzle; and second, positionalilty131 – how has the researcher built its 
relationship with the interviewees. Thus, both interpretivist and positivist research (albeit 
different inquiries in knowledge production) have a systematic/organized way of data 
collection. The main difference, however, lies in the process of data analysis and 
interpretation. In the first case, the researcher is detached from the findings and is 
preoccupied with maintaining its objectivity assuming that there is an objective reality out 
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there which can be understood with careful, scientific research. In the second case, the 
researcher admits first that there is no objective reality (or objective, or reality) to begin with, 
and second what Yanow has called accepting the humiliation that even if it exists it can never be 
captured. As such, this research is conscious of being ontologically fragmented, 
epistemologically interpretative but methodologically trustworthy.132  
 
Another ‘misunderstanding’ of the interpretivist approach is the issue of validity of knowledge 
production. Because narratives and stories of the interviewees are central to this thesis, we 
will discuss the notion of validity in terms of on the one hand, the status and the nature of 
stories interviewees tell and on the other hand, the role of the researcher in engaging with 
these stories. While the second researcher seeks ‘explanation’ – seeks casual statements that 
can be proven or disproven. Hummel reminds us that when people tell their stories, they 
construct their world.133 Etymologically, validity means justifiable –  having a solid 
foundation or justification.134  The concept of validity is a ‘prototype’ concept rather than a 
definitional one.  Both validity and reliability are statistical terms. When brought into social 
sciences they have not necessarily adjusted to the field of study of the non-physical world. 
The same applies to the concept of generalizability. For an interpretivist researcher, validity is 
seen more as a ‘proper understanding’ concept rather than as a purely methodologically 
proven stage. “The fundamental criterion for a story is the ability of the listener to literally 
recognize in the original sense of knowing the familiar and even the unfamiliar story”.135  
That way, the conception for the validity standards, relevance comes first and factual 
standards come second. This principle seems to favour and value more the ability of the 
researcher to go deeper into the inner structure of understanding people’s stories, rather than 
having a ‘neutral’ passive listener who would try to ‘understand’ the stories yet not as an 
integral part of a reality ‘going on’ there. In the first case, the interpretative researcher is 
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concerned with understanding the “outcome of organizing and contextualizing essentially 
contestable, incompletely verifiable prepositions in a disciplined way”.136  
 
Validating stories (knowledge) is not a mechanical process rather than an argumentative 
practice. Validation of claims about understandings experience requires evidence in the form 
of personally reflective descriptions in ordinary language and analysis using inductive 
processes that capture commonalities across individual experiences.137  Elliot Mishler argues 
that in interpretivist research “we do not find stories, we make stories”.138  The way the 
interviewees argue about processes in the local setting reveals to a great extent their cognitive 
structures of what constitutes a problem, an advantage and/or an achievement. As such, the 
fidelity of ‘political narratives’ does not indicate that narratives are representable for the 
entire society.139  It is an indication of their mental frameworks in how they perceive issues 
and how they choose to deal with them. While looking at the interviewee as a part of a 
‘conceived’ reality, Hummel argues that this is not an individual by himself, rather, he/she 
lives already in a pre-existing context.140  
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4. Data Generation  
The research puzzle of this thesis is not easily solved by applying one single and clear 
research method, given the relatively high theoretical nature of the inquiry. As mentioned 
previously, I rely on qualitative research to deconstruct and interpret the existing literature on 
EU external relations with the Western Balkans, Western literature on Western Balkan 
studies, literature on Western and Christian metaphysics, text from the EU and its 
institutions, and 34 semi-structured interviews conducted in Kosovo with locals and 
internationals. According to Mason, the term data ‘generation’ rather than ‘collection’ is 
intended to encapsulate the much wider range of relationships between researcher, social 
world and data which qualitative research spans. He explains that it is more accurate to speak 
of generation than collection of data, “precisely because most qualitative perspectives would 
reject the idea that a researcher can be a completely neutral collector of information about 
the social world. Instead the researcher is seen as actively constructing knowledge about that 
world according to certain principles and using certain methods which express, their 
epistemological position”.141  Interviews, observation, and document analysis constitute the 
central interpretive methods for accessing local knowledge and identifying communities of 
meaning and their symbolic artefacts. Interpretive policy analysis often begins with document 
analysis, focusing initially on newspaper (and other media) coverage and extending to 
transcripts of committee hearings, various reports, legislation, or agency documents. These 
provide background information for conversational interviews with key actors. Document 
analysis and interviews may be preceded by or supplemented with observation or 
ethnography.142  
Foreign policy has been defined and redefined by different authors. Bulley argues that any 
attempt to define what foreign policy is will always be insufficient because whatever we 
understand by ‘foreign policy’ must be interpreted, relayed and described through 
discourse.143 Bulley looks at foreign policy as text144 that can be read and interpreted. That is, I 
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acknowledge that ‘foreign policy’ as such cannot be present and studied, but what we engage 
with in here is studying and interpreting it through text/language representation. In looking 
foreign policy as text, I gather my data in modes of communication primarily in: 1) 
interviews; 2) official documents, reports, spoken and written discourse. Although not 
forming a methodical part in this thesis, special attention during the field work has been 
given to visual modes of communication such as billboards, leaflets and graffiti used both by 
international structures and local Kosovaars too. In his account on political cartoons, 
Danjoux argues that they provide a safe haven for latent fears, unfounded beliefs, and 
opinions too extreme, or socially unacceptable, to be openly expressed.145 
4.1 Interviewing  
In this study, 34 semi-structured interviews were conducted in Kosovo. This was seen as the 
best method to hear and understand the stories, and narratives of the research participants. 
Semi-structured interviews have a combination of a list of closed and open-ended questions. 
In contrast with the informal conversational interview, the semi-structured interview is 
‘structured’ to make sure that essentially the same information is obtained from a number of 
people by covering the same issues.146  Billiet argues that topics in semi-structured interviews 
are not to be taken in a strict order and the exact detailed wording of the questions to elicit 
responses about those issues is not determined in advance. “The interviewer is thus required 
to adapt both the concrete wording and the sequence of the questions to the specific 
respondents in the context of the actual interview”.147  According to him, this gives the 
interviewer the freedom to build a conversation within a particular subject area, to word 
questions spontaneously and to establish a conversational style. In light to reflexivity and 
positionality,148  all interviewees were acknowledged of my research and the topic in broad 
terms.149  Being myself a ‘local’, I deliberately choose not to be ‘detached’, ‘objective and 
neutral’ (whatever that would mean) to the stories they were telling, although it is 
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understandable that there is a (slight) difference between a local who has lived there all the 
time and me as a researcher who has not been physically present in Kosovo for the past ten 
years. In deconstructing and understanding the interviews I tend to be more conscious about 
this (slight) difference of me and the interviewees as locals perceiving things rather 
differently.  
The interviews were conducted in Kosovo between 2012-2013 with experts, practitioners 
and scholars of rule of law, human rights, political science, practitioners and implementers of 
EU programs for Kosovo, academics and researchers, civil society activists, art workers and 
journalists. On average, there were two interviews per day and I tried to cover a set of 
background questions for all the local interviewees a) what is that persons’ wartime 
experience – are there human casualties within the close family b) has the person an 
international working/studying experience c) is the person employed by international and 
donor organizations and d) would the person want to leave Kosovo. The aim was to set a 
contextual basis which will be helpful to read the interviews. The first 10 interviews were 
chosen based on the previous experience during the Master thesis and the network created 
while working as a journalist in the region. The rest of the interviews were chosen through 
the snowball technique – recommended people from the initial interviewees. A standard 
email was drafted and distributed one month in advance to the interviewees, although it 
became clear to me they were preferring less formal and long ago planned arrangements. 
With most of them I had to ‘re-arrange’ one day before the interview. Even though people in 
Kosovo have been ‘researched’, ‘interviewed’ and ‘asked’ on political issues, they were 
nonetheless still very willing to meet and discuss. 
The interviewees were men and women of 25 – 45 years old, from different parts of Kosovo, 
yet the vast majority actively engaged in Pristina. The interviews were spread throughout two 
years (November 14 – 30, 2012; April 03-18, 2013; October 05 – 21, 2013), followed with 
two visits at EULEX headquarters, one visit at the EU Office in Pristina, one visit in the EU 
office in Northern Mitrovica, and one visit to the Mitrovica’s Municipality situated between 
the northern and southern part of the city. 25 interviews were conducted with Albanians in 
Pristina, Gjilan, South Mitrovica. 4 interviews were conducted with Serbs in Gračanica and 
North Mitrovica. 5 interviews were conducted with international officials working with the 
EU and residing in Kosovo.  Four out of thirty interviews were conducted off record with 
48 
 
the request of the interviewees.150  Being the capital, Pristina was chosen due to the high 
concentration of the ‘target group’ I interviewed. South Mitrovica was chosen as a case 
where the international structures of intervention are perceived to have failed so far, with the 
divided city into the Northern part with the Serbs and the Southern part with the Albanians. 
The city of Gjilan is considered the only in Kosovo not to have experienced a frontal war 
within the city in 1999 and to this day has a comparatively larger concentration of Serbs in 
comparison to other cities with Albanian majority. Gračanica is the second most important 
city for the Serbs in Kosovo after North Mitrovica, while the later was chosen given its 
importance for Kosovo Serbs in general, the high concentration of Serbs and also because 
since 1999, it has acted as a parallel capital city of Kosovo, for Kosovo Serbs. Interviews 
with the locals (both Albanians and the Serbs) were typically conducted in the outer 
environment, usually a coffee place, while all but one interview with EU officials were 
conducted within their personal offices. The interviews typically lasted for one hour. I relied 
in taking notes while revising and creating a ‘conceptual scheme’ after each interview. 
Although 34 interviews is a relatively low number, after the second round, the element of 
saturation point was evident.151  
Methodologically, the interviewees were considered as ‘storytellers’. As a researcher I have 
been concerned with understanding, conceptualizing and operationalizing their ‘frames of 
reference’. In his field study in New Zealand, Swaffield defines ‘frame of reference’ as an 
analytical model representing the attitudes (beliefs, feelings, opinions) expressed by a policy 
actor  when discussing a particular issue”.152 According to Yanow, frames are often expressed 
through language, cognition (or perception), and action. It is not entirely clear which one 
shapes (or causes) the other.153  The interviews could be summarized around  three main 
topics 1) the story of Kosovo as they define it 2) how do they see the international presence 
in Kosovo (the UN and the EU); 3) what do they think about their relationship with the 
locals; 4) how do they define themselves as locals; 4) what do they think of the EU’s 
presence and its policies in Kosovo. It is important to note that the timing of the interviews 
coincided with several political developments both within Kosovo and with regard to 
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Kosovo-EU relations. First, in November 2012, Albania celebrated its 100th anniversary, a 
feast which was extended to the Kosovo Albanians. Cities around Kosovo were covered 
with elements of banal nationalism (Albanian national flags, slogans and other national 
symbols), in addition to the new Kosovar flag. The anniversary seemed to have re-brought 
the debate of what is Kosovo’s identity now, in relation to Albania, in relation to the new 
Kosovar state etc. Second, the EU mediated negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade were 
continuing, on issues that albeit technical proved to be inherently political as they were 
touching on elements of sovereignty. Third, for the first time since 1999, Kosovo organized 
its elections in the Northern municipalities of Kosovo (North Mitrovica, Zvečan, Leposavić 
and Zubin Potok) and finally, EULEX managed to extend its authority in the northern part 
of Kosovo after nearly five years of its deployment. All of these developments have to be 
mentioned and thought as a contextual setting in reading the data generated from the 
interviews.  
Considering the relatively short time assigned for this PhD thesis, other research methods 
(i.e. focus groups) could have been more time efficient to reach a bigger number of 
constituencies. However, the choice for interviews was unequivocal mainly due to 
sociological reasons. Some of the questions during the interview were rather ‘personal’ – the 
background questions – or other questions might be too related with one’s 
job/career/personal opinion, the interviewees would not prefer to say in front of many 
people. Also, in my view, Kosovo Albanians tend to be rather introverted when it comes to 
discuss issues pertaining to Kosovo’s recent history, which I feared might lead in them being 
‘reserved’ in their narratives in focus groups. Other than that,  the whole concept of engaging 
in interviews goes beyond its methodological importance. The interviews were largely 
intimate in character focused on the personal narratives. This required a more inter-personal 
communication with the interviewee. I wanted to devote special time to each of the 
participants in this undertaking, being careful to grasp more of their intersubjectivity and 
mental framework. Most of all, in the plethora of academic and empirical research on 
Kosovo, the intervention and the missions there has not been a systematic interest to the 
narrative of the locals. My decision to focus on it exclusively is not simply to fill “the gap in 
literature” but to deliberately call for attention towards the narrative of the people where 
missions are deployed and to start looking at countries with missions as the right of the 
people who live in it. 
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Lastly, I want to clarify why have I intentionally chosen not to interview politicians or people 
active in politics. First of all, my interest was to hear narratives of people outside the 
nomenklatura, yet, politically active. Second, with the end of the war and the instalment of the 
government in Kosovo, the ‘international mechanisms’ (i.e. the EU, the UN, the World Bank 
and Quint countries) have been determining in setting the political agenda for Kosovo. 
There has been an internalization of the EU and the international agenda in the political 
processes in Kosovo first because Kosovo is still not a fully-fledged country, and second, the 
EU is Kosovo’s greatest donor by financing the vast majority of its political, economic and 
state building processes. This setup has somehow unified the government’s agenda and EU’s 
programs and international policies in general. Thus, I tend to see the government and the 
donors of Kosovo (particularly the EU due to its political leverage) following the same 
political agenda.  
 
5. Data interpretation 
There is a tension between the goal of social science to reduce the complexity of social reality 
through the construction of parsimonious models and the need to refrain from 
oversimplification that significantly distorts reality.154  Yanow offers a four step model to 
interpretive policy analysis. First, identifying the artefacts (language, objects, acts) that are 
significant carriers of meaning for a given policy issue, as perceived by policy-relevant actors 
and interpretive communities.155  The ‘data’ of interpretive analysis are the words, symbolic 
objects, and acts of policy relevant actors along with policy texts, plus the meanings these 
artefacts have for them. These data remain in the possession of the actors after the 
researcher-analyst has gleaned them. The second step is to identify communities of 
meaning/interpretation/speech/practice that are relevant to the policy issue under analysis. 
Third, identifying the ‘discourses’: the specific meanings being communicated through 
specific artefacts and their entailments (in thought, speech and act). Finally, identifying the 
points of conflict and their conceptual sources (affective, cognitive, and/or moral) that 
reflect different interpretations by different communities.  
                                                          
154 Myron J. Aronoff (2009). "Contested interpretations of the Israeli Palestine Peace Process " Political Science 
Quarterly 124(1): 143-169. 
  
155 Yanow, D. (2000). Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis. London, Sage  
  
51 
 
Shenhav argues that “the fact that any political narrative is looked at in competition with 
other narratives naturally raises the question for their respective adherence to “reality”. Even 
if we assume that reality is a construct made up of various representations, it still remains to 
be determined how compatible a particular narrative is with the analogous”.156  In this 
context, the real challenge for a framer is to construct a frame that will reflect the largest 
possible sharing of stories which share a major understanding on a particular phenomenon.157  
Understanding the ‘population’ you are about to research, knowing the sample to go for data 
collection and knowing the feeling of a saturation point of that society is intrinsically linked 
with knowledge of the local context – its political, social, historical and cultural patterns.158  
For a deconstructionist, the spoken/written language is never a perfect reference to a 
knowable object, because neither the ‘signifier’ nor the ‘signified’ remains fixed.159   Further, 
understanding the consequences of a policy for a broader constituency requires “local 
knowledge” – the very mundane, expert understanding of and practical reasoning about local 
conditions derived from lived experience.160 The discourse of the documents and the 
interviews, will be deconstructed with Derrida. Below I will explain how deconstruction and 
more generally intervention in the text will be applied. Because deconstruction is the grand 
concept informing the philosophy behind the thesis and behind other concepts of Derrida 
used throughout the thesis, deconstruction will be for the most part elaborated here in the 
introduction. For the reader it is important to bear in mind that at times deconstruction is 
used as a theory and/or philosophy, whereas at some points it is used as an ‘intervention’ in 
the text directly. The other three concepts will in turn be elaborated in their respective 
articles. What precedes this discussion is firstly an overview of post-structuralism, its 
epistemological and ontological underpinnings.  
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5.1 Post structuralism  
Post structuralism operates with a notion of deconstruction which is a general mode of 
unsettling concepts and conceptual oppositions which are otherwise taken to be settled. It 
can be understood as a strategy of interpretation and criticism directed at theories and 
concepts which attempt closure and totalization, providing instead a mode of unsettling of 
“decentring that leaves no privilege to any centre”.161  Accordingly, post structuralism is most 
interested in attempted closure, in the ways in which theoretical frameworks are not self-
sufficient or closed, but vulnerable to pressure from an outside. Yet, it is not a war against 
totality, because arguably, that would presume a possibility of yet another totalization, which 
again for post structuralism would be impossible. Questioning whether conventional 
approaches to ethics in international relations embody the ethos of criticism, Campbell 
argues that post structuralism is a semio-critical activity, ever searching for an seeking to 
dismantle the empirico-rational positions where power fixes meaning.162  For Derian, post 
structuralism disturbs the convention in IR that theory and practice are distinct phenomena 
or more fundamentally, that reality is independent of any language used to describe it.163  
In the past twenty years, the discipline of IR has debated the merits of critical thought and 
the question of ethical and political implications of poststructuralist thought. For Campbell, 
otherness, representation, violence, complicity, responsibility are imperatives that call forth 
not an ungrounded faith in the testing of theory via evidence, but an ethically and politically 
committed ethos of criticism.164   In this debate, Derian mentions three main reasons why 
should we bother ourselves with post structuralism in IR, which according to him other 
current IR approaches fail to encapsulate. First, as an intellectual tool to understand the ways 
of postmodernity, or as he prefers to call it, late modernity. Second, because it offers an 
ethical way of being highly contingent, highly relativist. Third, because it provides a reflexive 
methods for constantly challenging and testing the validity of the first two claims.165  
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By and large, most of the post-structuralist strands share some basic tenets in how they see 
the world. Through constructivist lenses, one would look at how norms, values, rules and identity 
inform the foundation of the mission.166  Foucaultians would address the nature and the 
functioning of power.167 The legitimization of power disguises the effects of sovereign 
power: namely, the repression and the subjugation of other discourses. In this sense, 
knowledge is power insofar as the dominant knowledge of sovereign power masks the 
operations of dissident power. Loytard on the other hand argues that the meta-narrative 
represents a particular form of legitimization, in which one referent serves to legitimize all 
other practices, norms, and conventions of society.168  He asks who then has power and what 
he has in mind? What is the aim of someone who  possesses power?169  Critical realism 
moves from discourses to underlying reality to critique while opposing forms of 
deconstruction and discourse theory such as Laclau and Mouffe, for being unable to move 
from discourse, thus failing to ontologies their arguments. Laclau and Mouffe focus first on 
the importance of ideology as opposed to Marxim’s traditional focus on the mode of 
production and in particular Althusser’s notion of the ideological interpellation of subjects. 
Bakhtin circle on the other hand lies with the rejection of ‘psychological’ in ‘objectivist’ 
approaches to discourse theory.  
 
5.2 Derrida. Theories and methods of deconstruction  
Deconstruction, or as Derrida calls it ‘intervention’, “de-totalizes self-enclosed totalities by 
placing them face to face with their internal differentiation enabling us to see partiality of the 
partial, not by itself giving an absolute reading, but by attempting to show that no absolute 
reading is at all possible.170  Deconstruction and the contours of Derrida’s concepts are 
generally framed as a problematic with what we ordinarily call ontology. Derrida opposes this 
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with what he calls hauntology –something that rejects foundations of ontological existence that 
is representative of the bodiless apparition of the ghost rather than the solidity of the 
physical world.171  With hauntology Derrida calls for a systematic dissolvent and de-
totalization of establishments. 
Roach argues that Derrida’s resists absolutising difference, as there is a danger of making 
difference a value in itself and giving it a special status as superior to identity. As such, Roach 
continues, what is at stake for post-structuralism in a politics without sovereignty: a politics 
without centre that aspires to hold everything in its place”.172 
In deconstruction, Derrida explains that Western metaphysics is based on the binary 
opposites of good vs. bad, rationality vs. spirituality, nature vs. cultures etc. These binary 
opposites do not have a peaceful co-existence but in fact, they are violent hierarchies.173  As a 
branch of philosophy, metaphysics deals with the first principles of things, including abstract 
concepts such as being, knowing, identity, time and space. For Derrida, the word 
‘metaphysics’ “is a shorthand for any science of presence”.174  He treats metaphysics as an 
exemplary system of defence against the threat of writing.175  In these hierarchies, things are 
posit intact, pure, self-identical or fully present being or reality and then to show that 
everything that is different from the original purity can be treated in terms of derivation, 
deviation, complication etc.176  In his interview with Jean Birnbaum, Derrida explained that 
deconstruction is “a gesture of suspicion towards Eurocentrism”.177  
Thus, what distinguishes Derrida’s deconstruction from other post-structuralist methods is 
this exhaustively questioning modus without pointing it/or seeking to position answers to a 
certain ideology (i.e. post-colonial research’s focus on control and exploitation; neo-Marxism’ 
social inequality and power etc.). Derrida’s deconstruction is loose on which direction it takes 
its critique and the questioning. It could well lead to all of these and none at the same time; 
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and/or goes beyond them, questioning also the control and exploitation, the social 
inequality, power and status and the like. According to Bulley, one of the obvious differences 
between Derrida and Foucault for example, is that Foucault's genealogies examines historical 
practices and how power is exercised at various levels through their change and 
development.178  He argues that Derrida is more interested in seeking out these binaries and 
then overturning and displacing them by finding the 'undecidables' that destabilise what 
seems to be a coherent narrative/text. These undecidables are terms/concepts/practices 
which appear within the dominant narrative, but at its margins, referring to something 
'beyond' that narrative and thereby challenging its completeness. They challenge and disrupt 
the binary oppositions through which the text/discourse makes a meaningful narrative.  
 
Another dimension in which Derrida’s deconstruction is different from other discourse 
approaches and why in turn is a better fit in this thesis is the very text (discourse) centric 
approach it has. Sometimes it is forgotten or overlooked how much history, politics and 
violence is in the choice of words and how much one could discern from an ordinary talk. 
Derrida also mentions that ordinary language is not neutral or innocent, because all types of 
metaphysical presuppositions are also involved in ordinary language. No other approach is so 
immensely text-centric and persistent in dissolving meanings of discourse. When it comes to 
the missionizer-local relationship – which indubitably suffers from an unequal relationship – 
the discourse exercise and the importance of the text as such becomes even higher. In the 
case of Kosovo, because of its political status and butterfly effect of the sovereignty issue, 
the communication and discourse of the international actors – NATO’s humanitarian 
intervention, UN protectorate-like administration, and the EU mission – is particularly 
welcoming to deconstruct in Derrida’s fashion. Derrida, who has perennially been focused 
with the marginal, the invisible, the less advantaged as opposed to the mainstream and the 
powerful has exploited in this direction unravelling this way how much ‘injustice’, power, 
status, imperialism, superiority and racism is tacked in the text. 
 
Post-colonial, feminist, critical and queer theories among others also associate themselves 
with their own targets of the marginal, with the oppressed, just like deconstruction. Yet, unlike 
each of the above mentioned strands, deconstruction aligns itself with the marginal as a 
principle, not with a particular marginal (women, gay, local, etc.).  What further distinguishes 
deconstruction and Derrida in general not only from the strands mentioned above, but even 
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more so from other post-structuralist methods is his interest in overturning and displacing 
binaries by finding the ‘undecidables’ (terms, concepts, practices) that destabilize what seems 
to be a coherent narrative texts.  While other, primarily Western, philosophers are 
preoccupied with the determination to capture reality, truth, presence, Derrida is after the 
dissolving of establishments, meanings and definitions. 
 
Arguably, deconstruction has its own strands and usages in different disciplines. Phiddian 
argues, that there are those who insist that deconstruction is essentially political, and that it is 
a method for discovering the oppressed others beneath phallogocentric discourse. They use 
deconstruction as a hermeneutic of suspicion, as an instrument for unpicking the structures 
and rhetoric of racism, patriarchy, psychological repression, class.179  Dickens on the other 
hand, argues that deconstruction has come to be seen by some as providing a powerful 
conceptual tool for radical social and political critique. One of his most significant arguments 
is that deconstruction provides the principles necessary for a radical critique of capitalist-
patriarchal institutions that undermines their legitimation from within.180  For Ahn however, 
deconstruction is hospitality, which means the welcoming of the other.... The word 
‘hospitality’ means to invite and welcome the ‘stranger’ (l’étranger), both on the personal level 
– how do I welcome the other into my home? – and on the level of the state – raising socio-
political questions about refugees, immigrants, ‘foreign’ languages, minority ethnic groups, 
etc.181  Particular in Derrida’s fashion of deconstruction is that “….in all conversations 
there’s a hidden patterning of power”.182  For him power is not the name of something we 
possess, rather it emerges out of social situations. What guides deconstruction’s methodical 
shaking of the textual structures is, of course, the text itself. Obviously, not through what it 
shows explicitly. In such case the practice of deconstruction would be a mere variant of what 
is traditionally called interpretation. Rather, the text guides deconstruction through what it 
tries to hide in and through what it says, through the symptoms it manifests.183 
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5.3 Deconstruction at work - how to read the articles  
Deconstruction is a very personal intervention. Most authors who engage with it to read text 
do not follow a standardized methodological technique. Earlier when we talked about the 
transfer of different methods and theories to other fields of studies other than that of their 
origin, we explained that one needs to be aware of what is being transposed into the new 
field, what is not and what is potentially left out to better fit the field. Because this thesis is 
still in the contours of IR and FPA, questions raise as to how will that fit in the field? Talking 
about the ethical turn in thinking about text and literature, Derrida reminds us that 
disciplines/genres cannot be separated as blanks. For him, there is no such thing as legal text, 
literary text, but altogether, there is discourse.184  For him, deconstruction is neither an 
analysis nor a critique, nor a method and cannot be transformed into one.185  When taking 
deconstruction to read text, scholars may be tempted to define it as methodology or method 
or the like. I am not opposed to calling it a methodology or a theory as long as these two do 
not mean a rigid set of principles that are to be forcefully applied to questions. Without 
trying to define deconstruction as a method, technique or the like, deconstruction in this 
thesis has taken the shape of a meta-theory informing in turn all the other concepts used by 
Derrida (employed along the entire thesis) and as a micro-discussion intervening in a text as 
otherwise well-defined methods would do (employed in Article 1). By meta-level, I am 
referring to the philosophy of engaging with text, a philosophy paradigmatically concerned 
and aligned with the marginal, the oppressed, in all its forms, intensities, attribution etc.  
Deconstruction as a meta-discussion has framed the research puzzle in first looking at the 
story of Western missions from the perspective of the marginal in the political and academic 
narrative – the local -  and in understanding the interplay of power relations of the intervener 
with the intervened. Further, aligning with otherwise marginal and/or marginalized 
methodological tools in addressing the puzzle. In Of Grammatology, Derrida talks of a 
‘rationality’ that predominates writing in an enlarged and radicalized sense,186 where he 
inaugurates ‘deconstruction’, not the demolition but the de-sementation of all the 
significations that have the source in that of the logos. The method consists of two related 
steps: the reversal and displacement of binary oppositions and the general displacement of 
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the system. In the first step, Derrida explains this as an artificial separation merely for the 
sake of clarity, and looks to reverse or overturn the violent hierarchies imposed by Western 
thought, making the first term superior to the second.187   The second step displaces this 
system by moving toward the irruptive emergence of a new “concept”, a concept that could 
never be included in the previous regime.188 This double process reveals the interdependence 
of seemingly dichotomous terms and their meaning relative to a particular history. It shows 
them to be not natural but constructed oppositions, constructed for particular purposes in 
particular contexts.189  These new “concepts” are what Derrida calls ‘undecidables’ – “faulty 
lines in an apparently impregnable text, points at which the text disrupts itself. Such 
undecidables cannot be reduced to an opposition (they are neither, for instance, fully present 
nor absent) but reside within it, ‘resisting and disorganising it, without ever constituting a third 
term’, and thus without ever becoming dialectical.190  For him, politics is also an unrelenting 
negotiation between calculation and the incalculable, the possible and the impossible, 
autonomy and heteronomy.  
The two steps of Derrida’s deconstruction can be found in the article as followed. The first 
step is evidenced in the first three articles whereas the last step is found in the last (fourth) 
article. This map is to show deconstruction’s flow in the thesis as a whole. Yet, it cannot be 
taken as if its steps were taken separately and have been applied as such in separate articles. 
In Article 1 Deconstructing ‘Missions’. What’s in a name, the broader concept of ‘mission’ is 
deconstructed, problematizing on the dynamics of having and deploying missions, the power 
dimensions they entail and also who gets to missionize and how. The concept of invitation for 
the mission is problematized in turn, to see who has the authority to issue invitations and 
ways out for the missions. Having deconstructed the broader spectrum within which 
missions and interventions occur, the first step is further extended to reverse and displace 
binary opposites of the concrete materialization of EU’s rule of law mission in Kosovo – 
EULEX. EU Mission in Kosovo: Hospitality and Hostility explains the dynamics of Derrida’s 
concept of hospitality. Here we problematize on the hospitality at home (the deployment of 
EULEX) and hospitality abroad (Kosovo’s membership to the EU).  Deconstruction’s first 
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step is further extended in Article 3 to analyse the materialization of the broader international 
missions in Kosovo. Here the concept of autoimmunity is used to deconstruct the way how 
Kosovo makes sense primarily as a ‘success story’ of democratic peace and intervention but 
not for the subject itself. Deconstruction’s second step – general displacement of the system 
– comes to the fore with regard to Article 4 MetaKosovo: local and international narratives, in the 
pursuit of re-establishing home for Kosovo, to find out that like any other statement, ‘home’ 
and Kosovo are defined by their impossibility. Below I have provided a table displaying the 
usage of concepts throughout the four articles.  
 
 
Thesis Article Derrida Focus 
Step 1 – reversal and 
displacement of  binary 
opposites 
A1: The international 
mission in Kosovo. 
What’s in a name? 
Deconstruction Concept of 
mission in the 
Western 
metaphysics 
Step 1 – reversal and 
displacement of  binary 
opposites 
A2: Hospitality and 
Hostility: The EU and 
Kosovo 
Hospitality The EU mission 
in Kosovo and the 
EU enlargement 
for Kosovo 
Step 1 – reversal and 
displacement of  binary 
opposites 
A3: Autoimmunity of 
democracy project 
Autoimmunity The set of 
missions, NATO, 
UN, EU. 
Step 2 – general 
displacement of the 
system 
A4: MetaKosovo: local 
and international 
narratives 
Home International and 
local narratives on 
Kosovo. 
 
 
60 
 
6. Conceptual map 
What follows in this section, is an overview of the international interventions and missions in 
Kosovo, followed by an elaboration of the main concepts used in the thesis. This thesis 
makes rampant reference to interventions, missions and the missionizers on the one hand, and the 
locals – Kosovo’s population on the other. Oxford Dictionary defines mission as “1) an 
important assignment given to a person or group of people, typically involving travel 
abroad…. 2) the vocation or calling of a religious organization, especially a Christian one, to 
go out into the world and spread its faith….3) a strongly felt aim, ambition, or calling”.191  
The missionizer as such is the structural and discursive presence of the international missions 
in Kosovo which includes NATO, UN and its agencies, World Bank, IMF, EU and its 
structures, EU agencies in Kosovo and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in 
Kosovo, EULEX. The missionizer is defined as the structure who is on the mission to 
democratize Kosovo. Intervention, the first phase of mission also defines the same structures 
above and although there is a rather blurred line between which comes first and which 
follows, in this thesis intervention is seen as temporal involvement/engagement of the mission 
and is a definition used for the NATO bombing campaign against Serbian military sites. The 
mission however, is what followed NATO intervention and how intervention as involvement 
was institutionalized as practice. NATO campaign can easily be looked at as part of the 
mission. 
Deconstructing the discourse on the interventions in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, Bulley 
argues that “responsibility for the rights and well-being of our fellow humans no longer 
stopped at the borders of a state. This duty to promote human rights now appeared 
genuinely universal, even if it involved the violation of a potentially dangerous state’s 
sovereignty”.192   I maintain that as long as wars, ethnic cleansing and conflicts are a natural 
course of events simply as floods, tsunamis and natural disasters, international humanitarian 
interventions are unavoidable. What happens once the ‘humanitarian intervention’ ends and 
how the site of intervention is missionized is what this thesis problematizes with. The locals 
are the receptors of the missionizers’ project, remaining in the fault lines between being part 
of the project design for their country/society and playing a rather procedural role in 
fulfilling the missionizers’ project. The missionizer and the local are defined by different 
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system of values, histories, political and social legacies and they are deconstructed and 
interpreted within their specific identity contours.  
Lastly, the events of the 90s in former Yugoslavia, have been called disintegration, 
dissolution, break-up, fall, deconstruction, dismemberment etc.193  The same ‘discursive 
richness’ appears to be the case on Kosovo as well. Main alternatives still revolve between a 
conflict and a war. While in the vernacular of Kosovo Albanians and the daily communication, 
there is an unambiguous usage of the war,194 for the international community in Kosovo it is a 
conflict.195  For the Serbian population at large what happened in 1999 was NATO aggression.196  
Literature on Kosovo is no exception on this issue. Renown authors on the region such as 
Tim Judah, Noel Malcom feel the need to specify their chosen attribution (war vs. conflict) 
in their works as to avoid any confusion, because usually, authors who embark with war 
instead of conflict are typically seen as favouring the Kosovo Albanians.197  In this thesis the 
events of Kosovo in 1999 are referred to as the war in Kosovo, not to take sides but to denote 
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that 10.000 victims, over 3000 missing people, 1 million displaced198 (statistically speaking 
only) is a step away from conflict.199  
 
Albeit its extensive usage throughout this thesis, I have not engaged with a political or 
geographical debate in defining what West is, West in opposition to what and how. Just like 
Derrida maintains that not everything that has to do with Islam or ‘Arab Muslim world’ or 
‘world’ is t a ‘world’, the same goes for West or the Western world.200  West is not an attempt to 
map the hemispheres of power (even less so to map it from a Euro-centric perspective); nor 
does it denote (strictly) the geography of the Western European countries and the US. 
Looking at the Western-Christian metaphysics, the West comes quite below the Pyrenees 
with Spanish and Portuguese being involved in religious missions. Instead, we look at ‘West’ 
as seen and conceptualized by the natives/locals – the sites of intervention and missions. In 
Guatemala, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, Iraq, Congo, East Timor, ‘West’ is a 
linear/unitary concept denoting the time/space civilizing missions with the initial Spanish 
Christian missionaries, the continental European developmental missions of enlightenment, 
the colonial powers, and todays’ US, UN and EU structures of democratizing missions. For 
local people in Kosovo the consequent interventions and  missions deployed are just part of 
the same set. “Kosovo is a Western project. There is a recycling of the same people and logic 
from UNMIK to the EU mission”.201 
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With metaphysics, Derrida refers to Platonism. “Traditionally (going back to Plato's myths but 
also Christian theology), we think that there was an original pure state of being (direct 
contact with the forms or the Garden of Eden) which accidentally became corrupt. In 
contrast, Derrida tries to show that no term or idea or reality is ever pure in this way; one 
term always and necessarily “infects” the other”.202  He maintains that metaphysics is a white 
mythology which assembles and reflects Western culture where the white man takes his own 
Indo-European mythology, his logos that is the myth of his idiom, for the universal form of 
that which it is still his inescapable desire to call Reason.203 
6.1 Kosovo – NATO, the UN and the EU 
The European Council and the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb, in 2000 launched 
the framework of Stabilization and Association Process. This was later reiterated in EU- 
Western Balkans Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, marking this way an important step in 
‘institutionalizing’ the relations between the EU and the Western Balkan countries (Albania; 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Serbia and 
Montenegro). The framework of Stabilization and Association Process was launched. There 
the prospect of EU integration was given for all the above-mentioned countries provided 
that the performance of the countries in relation to democracy, human rights, good 
governance and rule of law would reach the ‘European standards’.204  Kosovo was not 
mentioned in the summit due to its political status, but the discourse of the Thessaloniki 
Summit re-introduced the concept that ‘the future of the Western Balkans lies within the 
EU’.  
Kosovo, which was given its autonomy in 1945 within Yugoslavia, was part of the later until 
15 June 1999, when the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia signed a treaty which ended the Kosovo war.205  The 
war between Serbia and Kosovo’s Albanian majority incited the NATO intervention as a 
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response to the “violence and repression in Kosovo”.206  The bombing resulted with the 
surrendering of Milosevic and the signing of the Kumanovo agreement that put an end to 
the conflict and paved the way to the deployment of a UN mission in Kosovo which was 
operational until 2008. On February 17, 2008 Kosovo declared its unilateral independence, a 
move swiftly backed by the US and its allies, but strongly opposed by Serbia, Russia and 
China. The EU on the other hand, did not maintain ‘en block’ recognition due to five of its 
member states (Greece, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romani and Spain) opposing Kosovo’s 
independence. Post-independence paved the way to the EU rule of law mission being 
deployed to help/advice Kosovo in strengthening the rule of law and its democratic stability. 
Even though the EU has not issued a recognition ‘en block’ for Kosovo, it is by far the 
single largest donor providing assistance to Kosovo and the South Eastern European region 
as a whole and is at the forefront of the reconstruction effort.207  Since 1999, Kosovo has 
received more than €2 billion in EU assistance. The funds concentrate on “fostering 
Kosovo’s development of stable institutions….and ensuring Kosovo’s European future”.208  
Since 2009, the EU has deployed its greatest CFSP mission in Kosovo to help Kosovars with 
the rule of law and democracy.  
During the two phases of international administration (before and after Kosovo’s 
independence), the international community together with local actors failed to lay the seeds 
of a stable peace in Kosovo.209  While the international community was interested in 
maintaining a fragile peace and stability, Kosovar authorities demanded independence and 
state-building, allowing Belgrade to exploit the opportunity created by this dual agenda to 
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promote its own national interests in the bargaining process in Kosovo.210  Subsequently, the 
contested nature of Kosovo’s independence led to multiple international organisations acting 
with overlapping, and status-neutral mandates, thus challenging the consolidation of 
independent Kosovo’s domestic and external sovereignty.211 
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PART II  
 
Part II is reserved for the four articles, each of them employing a particular concept 
of Derrida, to shed light on the dynamics of Western/EU missions in Kosovo.  
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Article 1 | Deconstructing the ‘mission’. What’s in a name?  
 
Forthcoming in co-authorship with Prof. Dr. Jan Orbie at European Foreign Affairs Review 
(2014) 19: 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
Deconstructing the ‘mission’: What’s in a name?  
Abstract 
This article problematizes on the concept of ‘mission’ in international interventions, who is 
entitled to missionize and how the missionized subject is conceptualized. By looking at the 
international missions in Kosovo (the UN and particularly the EU), we problematize how 
the EU mission in Kosovo is still entrenched in this trajectory of ‘missionizing’ that makes it 
bear the stigma of a non-responsive and non-sensitive structure to the local. Employing 
Derrida’s deconstruction, we explain that the criticism (academic, dogmatic, ideological, 
empirical) on the international missions is not much related on how they operate in the 
deployed countries nor the policy choices they make. Rather, looking at the path dependency 
of the missions in the Western historical and civilizational trajectory, we maintain that the 
problem derives from the idea and the very concept of mission as intervention in itself. 
Key words: Derrida’s deconstruction, Western metaphysics, mission, Kosovo, EU.  
1. Introduction 
To understand the broader metaphysical foundation of intervention as a development and 
the international missions, this article looks at the EU mission in Kosovo (along with other 
international missions deployed in it in the post-war period) to shed light in how 
international missions come and need to exist. Using Derrida’s deconstruction, the article 
problematizes on questions what is the power of the mission as agency? How is the structure 
conceptualized? How does a mission become necessary and what are the ‘critical conditions’ 
that require the establishment of a mission? Who decides that? Where is the idea of having a 
mission inseminated? Whose and for whom are these missions essentially?  
 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, democracy has come to embody the very idea of legitimate 
statehood in international politics, largely through defining a new standard of civilisation, in 
which “democratiness” determines the limits of international society and helps to construct 
relations with non-democracies “beyond the pale”.212  The early 1990s witnesses an increase 
in ‘missions’ deployed abroad by the EU, the UN, the US and other international 
organizations making missions the iconic model of international intervention to end intra-
state wars, regime/system changes, ethnic and religious conflicts etc. Interventions for 
democracy promotion and/or peace building were spread (Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, 
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Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Cambodia, East Timor, and 
former Yugoslavia) under the paradigmatic Western-democratic project, focusing primarily 
on human rights, rule of law and democracy. Orbie and Wetzel argue that EU democracy 
promotion is becoming more and more a focus of EU foreign policy, even though it is still 
unclear what the EU aims to further achieve in third countries. 213  In his critique to ethics of 
foreign policy, Paris argues that peace building and democratizing missions represent an 
updated version of the mission civilisatrice.214  or the colonial-era notion that the ‘advanced’ 
states of Europe had a moral responsibility to ‘civilize’ the indigenous societies they were 
colonizing.  
 
Important to clarify at this stage is that if looking at the recent history, the metaphysics of 
missions and missionizing do not bear the stamp of the European Union per se. As a matter 
of fact, this ideology finds itself very much present in the case of the United States’ 
interventionism. The United Nations and the EU can sometimes be considered as following 
the tradition/trajectory. Thus, rather being the ‘inventor’ of the missionizing ideology, the 
case of the EU in Kosovo shows it to be merely a propagator. When it comes to the Western 
Balkans, for the first time in its history, the EU is involved in the process of building its 
future member states. Along with the development and democratizing agenda, the EU has 
paved the way for bringing the former Yugoslav countries to the EU.  In the case of Kosovo 
however, the stigma of missionizing as civilizing becomes a bit stronger. Unlike other countries 
in former Yugoslavia who became fully-fledged sovereign states after the dissolution of the 
federation, Kosovo still struggles in finalising its statehood. De facto it is no longer part of 
Serbia, although its international code recognition points it to be part of Serbia. Its 
internationally cited name is ‘Kosovo (as defined under the UNSCR/1244)’ – a 
denomination still used while under UNMIK. For the EU, Kosovo is known as ‘Kosovo* 
(without prejudice to the UNSCR/1244)’. Thus for the very first time, the EU was seen to 
get in a ‘serious relationship’ with a non-country.  
 
In this article, we engage with a meta-theoretical critique to understand the epistemological 
and metaphysical foundations of the mission as such. By this we also seek to surpass the 
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criticism of the democratizing mission in terms of its practical application. The problem we 
deconstruct hereon, is how the ‘mission’ as an idea and structure of the current democratizing 
agenda remains rather detached of the local realit(y)(ies) which in turn makes them look as an 
extension of the previous ‘civilizing’ Western missions. The article looks at how the concept 
of Christian missioning, colonizing missions and the late developmental missions mirror the 
idea of today’s democratizing missions. Understanding the materialisation of the mission’s 
idea in the case of Kosovo, in addition to the field work in Kosovo, the article is based on 1) 
literature on Christian missions and missiological texts to understand the early concept of 
‘missions’ and ‘missionizing’; 2) two study visits at the Colonial Museum in Tervuren, Belgium.   
In the plethora of international missions literature there is a recurring theme pointing that 
somewhere in the trajectory the relationship of the mission with the subject concerned starts 
to crack. An argument that comes along frequently is that international missions show the 
tendency to remain intact of the local realit(y)(ies) where they deploy, not only because of 
arguments of their inherent mission civilisatrice nature,215  but also for the arbitrary modes of 
intervention and the insensitivity towards local peculiarities;216  the dominance of neo-liberal 
intervention217 and other reasons related to power extension towards the ‘non-Europe’.218   
Literature on ‘interventions’ and foreign (western) missions falls largely into a normative set 
of binary opposites – that is looking at them as well or not well intentioned; as responsive or 
non-responsive to the cause etc. Positivist informed literature looks at this issue from the 
perspective of “what went wrong”.219  Post-positivist literature (critical theory, post-colonial) 
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explain how the uneven dynamics between the local and the intervener challenge the very 
concept of intervening ‘to do good’.220  The constructivist pursuit would look at how norms, 
values, rules and identity inform the foundation of the mission.221  Foucaultians would address 
the nature and the functioning of power.222  Other post-colonial theories as employed by 
Jean Baudrillard and/or David Chandler would re-emphasize the logic of simulation and the 
neo-colonial aspects of missions respectively. This article discusses what is so inherently 
problematic (to say the least) that galvanizes criticism towards foreign missions in general 
and to EU missions in particular. Epistemologically, how do we deal with tautological 
findings of the locals reporting that the internationals “are not interested in the ‘local’ or 
needs, only in it as a canvas for the projection of Western values and institutions”.223  Or why 
are ‘natives’ (locals) globally so disillusioned and alienated by it?224  In focusing on the EU 
mission, we do not merely look on its ex-post results, rather we look at the metaphysical 
foundations of how the mission comes and needs to exist. 
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Because of the of enlargement agenda as the only sound project for the countries in the 
Western Balkans, when it comes to the EU-Western Balkans relations, there is not enough 
literature taking post-colonial, neo-Marxist, feminist or other post-positivist strands. In this 
regard, by deconstructing the EU mission we shed light on a set of issues altogether – 
cultural, historical, metaphysical, political and imperial. Deconstruction provides a more 
comprehensive way of studying the case of Kosovo. As an intervention in text, 
deconstruction is known for questioning the establishment, the knowledge, the given, the 
‘common sense’. Kosovo in itself, is also a very ‘questionable’ entity and its existence is 
constantly deconstructed in the political, economic, sociological, nation-building, and 
national identity sense. The article contributes to the debate and the rethinking of 
intervention and missionizing in foreign policy. A lot of what Derrida is involved in his work 
is  his relentless questioning and reversing hierarchies providing this way an intervention in 
the colonial thinking. This article also speaks to dimensions of decolonization of thinking by 
dissolving hegemonic establishments and foundations. Defining ‘deconstruction’ as a way to 
intervene in text, the interpretivist school explains that “alike all other approaches, 
deconstruction interprets. And like in all other studying inquiries, we deconstruct, as we look 
beneath and we try to find explanations. The important dimension is which aspect of 
deconstruction is used once taking it from literature studies to bring it to social sciences”.225  
 
2. Derrida’s deconstruction and international missions  
Albeit the uncomfortness he displayed toward the term itself, Derrida had numerous 
occasions to define deconstruction, one of which is particularly important for this article. 
This definition is rather metaphysical and relies on 1) attacking the Platonistic (own italics) 
hierarchies (e.g. order vs. chaos) 226 – or what he refers to as Western metaphysics, meaning 
that order could be reduced down to variation of chaos; 2) redefining chaos and pointing out 
that every order/chaos is temporal; 3) changing the term's orthography, for example, writing 
“différence” (evidenced when we recognize the temporal nature).227   Derrida argues that 
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Western philosophical tradition rests on binary oppositions: unity/diversity, 
identity/difference, presence/ absence, and universality/specificity;228  
democracy/dictatorship; rule of law and order/chaos and anarchy; civilised/uncivilized etc.  
The leading terms are accorded primacy; their partners are represented as weaker or 
derivative. Yet, the first terms depend on and derive their meaning from the second to such 
an extent that the secondary terms can be seen as generative of the definition of the first 
terms.229  Transmitting the ‘leading terms’ of the binary opposites has become the new 
‘modernist cause’ for the West to export.230  The receiving end is downgraded to a degraded 
structure in need for intervention. In this inner dynamic, the giver (of the good values) gains 
the power, its presence becomes a necessity and its intervention is seen as a salvation. And 
through the repetition it turns into a duty and becomes an institution – or what Derrrida calls 
fetishism.231  A duty to intervene, to protect, to end conflicts, to help after natural disasters, 
also to enlighten, to civilize, and to democratize.232 
Linguistically, ‘mission’ is “any important task or duty that is assigned, allotted or self-
imposed…”. Another explanation of it is “a group or committee of persons sent to a foreign 
country to conduct negotiations, establish relations…or the like”.233  At the Berlin Conference on 
Africa in 1885 – which paved the way to the colonization of African peoples –  the European 
colonial powers agreed to ‘bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native 
tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-
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being’, with the aim of ‘instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessing of 
civilization’.234  This legacy is interesting to shed light on how the trajectory of missions and 
missionising travels in time and how it remains entrenched in the broader metaphysical 
premises of the missionary as superior and the ‘other’ who needs to be 
intervened/missionized/enlightened/saved/democratized. The Berlin Conference or as it is 
usually referred to as Scramble Africa represents the epitome of Western superiority (or more 
generally any sort of imperialism) in which land as a mere geographical denomination was 
divided between the European powers of that time.  
 
Grosfoguel reminds us that we cannot think of decolonization in terms of conquering power 
over the juridical-political boundaries of a state, that is, by achieving control over a single 
nation-state; global coloniality is not reducible to the presence or absence of a colonial 
administration or to the political/economic structures of power.235  At the EU-Western 
Balkans summit in Thessaloniki 2003, the EU set forward the project of ‘EU integration’ for 
the Western Balkans as a salvation. “We all share the values of democracy, the rule of law, 
respect for human and minority rights, solidarity and a market economy, fully aware that they 
constitute the very foundations of the European Union….and the EU reiterates its 
unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries…and the 
on-going enlargement encourages the countries (of the Western Balkans) to follow the same 
successful path”.236  The Summit also determines that the Western Balkans countries belong 
to the EU club, not to Russia or any other system. The European Union Office in Kosovo 
points out in its mission statement that “the Office plays a pivotal role in realizing the 
European agenda in Kosovo….and helps to consolidate the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms…”. Similarly, the mission statement of the European Union Rule of 
Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) states “EULEX is concentrated to fight corruption…and 
to achieve the EU’s best practices in Kosovo”.  
 
In a similar vein, “civilizing mission” is not fixed nor does it conform to a single 
interpretation. Weist suggests that in relation to the Christian missionaries of the nineteenth 
                                                          
234 Stig Forster & Wolfgang J. Mommsen (1988). Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: the Berlin Africa conference 
1884-1885 and the onset of partition. New York, Oxford University Press. 
  
235 Grosfoguel, R. (2002). "Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge and Global Coloniality in the 
Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System." Review 25(3): 203-224. 
  
236 The European Council Presidency (2003). "EU-Western Balkans Summit Thessaloniki." Retrieved 
01/09/2013, 2013, from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm. 
  
75 
 
century imperialism, the notion of a “civilizing mission” often had a positive connotation, 
implicit image of Christian missionaries as “a special breed of heroic persons bringing Christ 
to foreign lands”.237  By contrast, the suggestion that they might be undertaking a “civilizing 
mission” is considered to be offensive and overly deterministic. This is because the 
“civilizing mission” has been linked to the discredited concept of imperialism. However, 
even though the nineteenth-century style of imperialism no longer prevails, the theme of the 
“civilizing mission” is still commonly referred to in the field of contemporary international 
relations.238 
 
When we explain how the legitimacy of the missions to intervene comes to exist, we look at 
the Christian, developmental, colonization missions and therefore map what we perceive to 
be the tautology of a) pathologising ‘the other’ by making its moral/political/cultural problems 
as something biological and clinical; b) objectifying ‘the other’ as something invaluable/inferior. 
We have conceptualized these two themes to then compare how the new democratizing 
missions mirror the ideological/conceptual/political/discursive of the previous Western 
missions, which in turn sheds light on the problems with the missions at its core. What 
follows is an explanation of how/by whom the missions in Kosovo were invited, to further 
deconstruct this as a logic of pathologizing and objectifying the other.  
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2.1 (Self) invitations to intervene 
 
When every discourse guarantees that ‘democracy’ is the only acceptable type of political 
regime for emancipated humanity that has come of age and that has no other purpose 
itself, then the very idea of democracy loses its colour, becomes blurred, and perplexes 
us.  
Jean Luc-Nancy239 
 
In none of the cases (Berlin Conference and Thessaloniki Summit) there has been a 
decision/an agreement between two equal partners, which have an ownership in the decision 
of the mission or in the mission itself. 240  The decision to missionize is taken by the 
intervener – the developed, prosperous, Western-democratic agent. Being endowed with 
these values, the intervener gives itself conceptual legitimacy to transmit this ‘miracle’ to the 
local. The local241  - ‘the other’ – is the ‘tribal’ ‘orientalist’/the ‘Balkans’, plagued by chaos, 
disorder and inefficiency242. “The aim of the international community…was to build this 
poor, mountainous and tribal land based on “Western” values”,243  two former UNMIK 
officials report in their book – which has become an ostensibly quoted in the field. In 
opposition to the ‘local’, Bilgin argues, the international sees itself un-reflexively as Western, 
muscular, masculine (though gender equal), capitalist, efficient, normatively and 
governmentally superior, and able to supplant non-liberal, customary, everyday forms of 
politics, society, government and economy.244  
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In the post-war Western Balkans the introduction of a democracy agenda has been a rather 
hegemonic choice in replacing the old/inglorious system. The “yes” to democracy was to 
imbue not only the “yes” to European values but a “no” to everything ‘bad’ the previous 
system brought. The ‘yes’ in quotation marks here is the ‘implied approval’ of the locals. It is 
a fabricated consensus after the missions got installed. Because an intervention usually comes 
as a salvation after a crisis, war or dictatorial regime, or else, the “yes” is implied. Yet, the 
inability to choose, not having the freedom to say “yes” or potentially “no” should be 
thought more thoroughly when we look at ‘missions’ and the steadily unsatisfactorily relation 
they build with the context where they deploy.  In Rouges Derrida argues that “wherever 
freedom is no longer determined as power, mastery, or force, or even as a faculty, as a 
possibility of the “I can”, the evocation and evaluation of democracy as the power and the 
demos begins to tremble”.245  
 
In the trajectory of international presence in Kosovo, two different invitations were made 
both for the UN and the EU. After the conflict with Serbia, Kosovo came under UN 
administration, whose paradigmatic aim was to create “a peaceful environment for all 
inhabitants of Kosovo… and ensuring human rights protection”.246  The  invisibility/absence 
of the agency (as a subject) who makes the decision for the deployment provides that the 
UN mission is indeed invited by the cause of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the duty to 
bring peace. This establishment was also aided by the fact that in practice the ‘winner’ 
(NATO had bombed Serbia for 78 days) and the ‘defeater’ (Milosevic surrendered after 
NATO’s campaign) were signing an agreement on a newly created entity that would come 
under UN administration.   
 
The invitation for EULEX’s deployment is rather different in comparison to that of the UN. 
EULEX was a planned, operationalized and coordinated action. Peculiar in its case was the 
attempt to simulate and create an agency of inviting it. Article 1 of Ahtisaari’s Plan247  
provides that “The international community shall supervise, monitor and have all necessary 
power to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of this Settlement… Kosovo 
                                                          
245 Derrida, J. (2003). Rouges. Stanford, Stanford University Press. 
He questions that if one values freedom in general, before any interpretation, then one should no longer be 
afraid to speak without or against democracy. Is the right to speak without taking sides for democracy, that is, 
without committing oneself to it, more or less democratic? 
246 www.unmikonline.org  
 
247 After failing to reach an agreement in the negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, former UN envoy 
Martti Ahtisaari compiled his plan for Kosovo, setting the blueprint for its independence. 
 
78 
 
shall also issue an invitation to the international community to assist in successfully fulfilling 
its obligations to this end.”.248  In this case the invitation for the mission is made by a foreign 
subject but stated in a format as if indeed the locals have asked the UN to further require for 
the deployment of a EU mission. Why is this interesting? The decision is not only made by a 
‘peace sponsor’ but he goes further in proposing and stating that the locals shall issue the 
invitation (i.e. recite the invitation he wrote). The intervener is unequivocally clear what the 
locals want and powerful to decide what they need to be inviting and what sort of mission 
they need to be subjected to. On the one hand, the aim is to create the idea of some sort of 
ownership (procedural ownership at least) that the local has in calling for a mission. On the 
other hand, the local becomes merely a reciter of the wishes/needs as defined by the 
intervener, but the local has no agency to think/conceptualize/articulate and ‘issue’ an 
invitation. The tradition of deciding for Kosovo continues to date, as Prishtina based 
researcher Engjëllushe Morina says “we still don’t decide for ourselves. Even those decisions 
we pretend to have made are pre-set from the state donors”.249  
 
Talking about hospitality, Derrida argues that “absolute hospitality must break hospitality by 
right, or duty of the juridico-political laws of hospitality which are always conditional…like 
the asylum and immigration laws in any country, they put a variety of conditions upon 
hospitality, ask a variety of questions etc”.250  Unconditional (absolute) hospitality according 
to him is impossible to organize; it will be utopic as no state could write it into laws. On the 
one hand, we could cynically suggest that the invitation is in a way surpassing the post-
structuralist debate on absolute hospitality. When talking about ‘absolute hospitality’ - not 
only welcoming the ‘other’ as another human, but the welcoming of the animal, of the tree, 
the plant etc.,  Derrida says that “humans offer hospitality only to humans”.251  A ‘rational’ 
mind would think what a strange thing would be for a human to offer hospitality to an 
animal let alone a plant, given the ontologizing discourse that hospitality is a human virtue. 
Derrida likes to take certain concepts to their limit to see their ontological metamorphosis. 
The discourse seems to offer this wishful thinking of post-modernist hospitality when setting 
forward that Kosovo as such belongs to all of its inhabitants. As such, it is a step ahead the 
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post-structural concept of identity, of hospitality, of home and as such, supersedes Derrida’s 
conceptualization of ‘hospitality to the other’. 
 
Beyond ironies, the problem here stretches towards the concept of home as the precondition 
of hospitality is lost. The guest has become the host as it has the power to invite itself.  Bulley 
argues that hospitality requires some notion of an ‘at-home’ for its possible performance. 
“Despite the contradictory nature of hospitality and the ontopological ‘at-home’, both must 
be negotiated to keep them as open, responsible and ethical as possible. This giving place 
means not simply allowing them to occupy part of our home, giving them shelter and asking 
no questions, but that they literally take our place. If they take our place then we are no longer 
in the simple position of host. Effectively, the positions have been reversed – we are now a 
guest”.252  In the case of Kosovo, the very concept of home and consequently hospitality is 
taken upside down. If we would think of home as a state, half of the interventions in Kosovo 
(except NATO) have occurred in nobody’s home, as Kosovo was under the UN administration 
and de facto was not part of Serbia any longer. In such scenario, could we talk about 
hospitality as home in Derrida’s fashion, or even could we talk about it as a deterritorialization of 
responsibility in the way Campbell does?253  In a rapidly changing world and the changing 
concept of sovereignty, can we re-think/humanize home in foreign policy as an issue not 
necessarily legally defined as a political entity with an internationally recognized border, a seat in 
the UN etc.?  
 
3. New Holy Trinity -  Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights. The EU 
Mission in Kosovo 
What follows is a positioning of the EU mission in Kosovo in the broader perspective of the 
Western missions. The concept of spreading  ‘goodness’ – belief system, development aid, 
ideological system – to the ‘other’ who is not part of ‘our moral system’ is not new. What 
happened throughout the evolution of the ‘mission’ is its secularization – bringing the 
modern democratizing missions to ‘the other’. The ‘otherness’ of the local as morally and 
politically inferior to the West has been largely elaborated in Said’s Orientalism, Todorova’s 
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Imagining the Balkans, and in the works of Grosfoguel. We maintain that this relationship is 
constructed first by pathologizing the other and its cultural/political traits as something almost 
biologically sick; second by objectifying the other as a site/laboratorium for exportation of the 
good/superior deeds. In pathologizing we look more at the discourse of labelling the other, 
while in objectifying we draw attention to the mission’s action. However, far from being two 
separated categories, as will be shown below, they are far more overlapping.  Mona Ozouf 
explained that with the development of reason in the enlightenment era, the Biblical Holy 
Trinity (God, the father, the son) – the exemplification of the Christian missions – is 
secularized. She adds that the new holy trinity becomes liberty, equality and fraternity.254  We 
maintain that the new holy trinity has become democracy, rule of law and human rights. Today the 
EU’s civilising identity is a self-conception of its relationship to and treatment of the non-
European other, but historically, civilizing missions have been colonialist projects, rooted in 
military power.255 
3.1 Pathologizing ‘the other’   
Derrida says that the logic of development is the logic of Western dominance, and is located in 
the ‘metaphysics of white mythology’.256  Yet, its problem as ‘intervention’ is not merely 
embedded in its intentions but stretches out into further implications. In his work on 
development and colonization, Dossa argues that the idea of development is the core myth 
of Western Christianity, while ‘representing a secularisation of Biblical eschatology’, and 
underlining the Occident’s secular upward march. Development is constitutive of Western 
Christian identity and it becomes its ‘evangelical’ mission, self-acclaimed role to save 
others.257  
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The men of the 16th and 17th century were universalists owing the universality of their 
Christian faith; throughout the 18th and 19th century universalism became the development 
aid. Today they are activists of political theology of human rights, democracy promotion and 
rule of law. Speaking on the British missionaries of the 18th century for instance, Cox argues 
that “when arrived oversees, the missionaries built elementary and secondary schools, 
universities, theological training schools, vocational training centres, clinics and hospitals 
among others”.258  Local education expert in Pristina, Pupovci, evidences the same pattern in 
the consequent missions in Kosovo. “During 2000-2004, there was a massive flow of 
reconstruction funds. There are numerous cases when 2-3 different schools were built by 
different donors in a village with no more than 200 people”.259  
 
Upon arriving in the Americas, the Christians encountered that the ‘indigenous’ had no God 
– had no religion (as conceptualized in Christian metaphysics). The absence of God was 
equal to the absence of soul – until the Pope institution declared that “these people might 
have a soul but it is an animal soul” – which makes it not human. Or as Pope George has 
claimed “half devil, half child”.260  Like in the missiological texts, the locals are stripped off 
their subjectivity when addressed as “these people” as something which has no identification, 
no representation and certainly no agency. In UNMIK’s discourse, locals in Kosovo are 
addressed to as “inhabitants”.261  The English dictionary defines ‘inhabitant’ as “a person or 
an animal that is a permanent resident of a particular place or a region”.262  As such, calling 
the local people ‘inhabitant’ takes out of them the sociological identity and in turn objectifies 
them. The local thus becomes a laboratorial subject for scientific/positivist/controlled 
experiments. Being detached from this ‘object’ of study, the missionizer experiments, 
notices, and draws results as ‘lessons learned’ to be repeated/checked/validated in other 
‘laboratories’. Interestingly enough, both local and international EULEX workers use the 
term “EULEXperiment”,263  to exemplify how the greatest ESDP mission to date is testing 
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its capabilities in Kosovo. “EULEXperiment – is the best term to indicate of what we’re 
doing here”.264  An example of taking off local’s subjectivity is evidenced in the EU’s 
discourse towards ‘ethnic minorities’, where instead it refers to “communities”, which in turn 
is a mutilation of the ethnic identity attribution. “The rule of law is commitment and merit of 
each individual from all communities”.265  ‘Community’ is defined as “a particular area or 
place considered together with its inhabitants”.266  Prishtina based artist, Heta, explains that 
“this is the only case and the first experiment of a non-nation state. In its Constitution 
“Kosovo has ‘communities’ and not citizens, or ethnic groups/ethnic minorities because it is 
pictured to become the place of communities not the place of its actual ethnic 
configuration”.267  
 
Another unwavering evidence of this argument is exhibited at the Colonial Museum in 
Tervuren, Belgium (See Annex I). “Belgium wants to make Congo a model colony. The 
colonial authorities want to forget the past. Citing ‘civilizing mission’ they look towards the 
future”. Both the UN and the EU missions in Kosovo have been notorious for their 
approach of “leaving the past in the past”, that is besides the judicial institutions, no debate 
has been promoted in dealing with the past by talking about it be it in the form of 
transitional justice, healing process or the like. In the aftermath of the conflict, the term ‘war’ 
became unusable and instead the word ‘conflict’ was infused; establishing this way an 
attempt for collective amnesia.268  Prishtina based civil society actor, Ylli Hoxha, explains that 
“In the perception of the EU, the only difference between Kosovo and Congo is that we 
(Kosovo) are part of the enlargement package”.269  
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3.2 Objectifying ‘the other’ - in the name of development 
Throughout the thousand-year span during which Europe was converted to Christianity, one 
prominent mission theme was that of competition between “civilised” religion of the sacred 
book of Roman laws, and the “uncivilised” religion of orality and nature-based spirits.270  
These interactions between “civilised” and “barbarian” communities were critical in 
structuring the explicit standard that accompanied and followed Europe’s more robust 
engagement with the rest of the globe, in the form of imperialism and empire building. This 
way, in line with the supremist and expansionist European attitude, the mission society in 
Europe agreed, in principle, that the colonisation of India had a divine purpose; it was the 
duty of the colonisers and missionaries to civilise and Christianise the natives271 and this way, 
India ”had to be dusted, disinfected, and injected with a Western style of education, 
jurisprudence, and religion”.272 
 
On this self-proclaimed legitimacy, the religious missionaries embarked on to spread the 
‘good’ monotheistic-Christian belief to tribal and primordial areas. This idea was already 
established with Pope Gregory the Great who wrote in 601 what has become a classic 
missiological text on cultural accommodation:  
 
The heathen temples of these people need not be destroyed, only the idols which are 
to be found in them…If the temples are well built, it is a good idea to detach them 
from the service of the devil and to adapt them for the worship of the true God…If 
we allow them these outward joys, they are more likely to find their way to the true 
inner joy.273 
 
The deterministic discourse implying the ultimate solution to the worship of the true God 
not only signals a hegemonic choice, but also undermines the existence of anything locally 
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worshiped as having any value. The statement establishes that the locals believe in the devil – 
as defined and mythologized by the West – and as such shall be saved from this savage 
tradition. The ability/freedom to choose is confined to the “worship of the true God” as 
opposed to the “service of the devil”.  
 
Paris argues that “like European colonialism a hundred years ago, today’s peace-building 
operations convey norms of acceptable or civilised behaviour into the domestic affairs of 
less-developed states”.274  This resembles how the UN and the EU have dealt with the 
legacies of previous systems in Kosovo. For them, institutions/systems practiced by the 
locals and existing prior to the intervention are either stigmatized as something intrinsically 
inefficient, corrupt and unprofessional as opposed to the ‘European values’ of democracy, 
human rights and rule of law. “They have discredited the socialist legacy as something utterly 
inefficient”,275 argues Nita Luci, lecturer of social anthropology at University of Prishtina, 
explaining all the orientalist logic behind the statement. In their book Peace at any price King 
and Mason (former UNMIK employees in Kosovo) explain that “in the aftermath of the 
conflict, the EU was “hoping to clean the inefficient socialist legacy and to enable the 
economic environment to catch up with the remaining part of the continent”.276  
 
On this discourse, the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo was seen as the ultimate salvation 
for ‘Balkan inefficiency’,277   not only to break the ‘inefficiency’ trajectory but also to be the 
ultimate corrector of previous inglorious systems which have established rotten institutions 
and traditions. “We are here to offer advice. But the Balkans are good in signing documents 
but not in implementing them”,278  argues chief of staff at the EULEX headquarters in 
Prishtina, pointing to the problem as something deeply entrenched in the culture and the 
identity of the region. In 1996, after the war had broken in the Balkans, the Carnegie 
Commission sponsored a report on the Balkans, as a sequel to its 1914 Inquiry. The report 
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states that in the Balkans the “veneer of civilization is very thin indeed” and the West should 
“help to transform the proverbially chaotic, bloody, and unpredictable Balkans  of the past 
into a stable, peaceful, and dependeable South-eastern Europe of the future”. 279 
Another EULEX official argues that “there is an utter lack of professionalism in every single 
sector in Kosovo… and here (in Kosovo), everyone, from the bus driver all the way to the 
members of the parliament are trying to find a grey area to do things”.280  This discourse 
points out that notwithstanding the good will of the mission to endow Kosovo with a set of 
‘best practices from the EU’, the environment is the exact opposite pole of the values 
making it practically impossible to take it to the right track. The term Balkans and/or 
Balkanization in contexts like these incites firm reaction particularly in Prishtina based artists 
and cultural workers. Albert Heta, head of Stacion Cultural Centre explains that “the Balkans 
exists only in the mind of Europe (the political Europe). There was rule of law and a system 
of regulation in here throughout the 60s, 70s and 80s. Law and order did not start with the 
EU”.281  
The argument that states in the region suffer from historical ‘path dependencies’ which have 
undermined the relations between states and their societies is quite the norm in the dialectics 
of the EU mission in the region. Valentin Inzko, the Austrian official serving as the EU High 
representative in Bosnia argued the lack of political progress was a result of what he felt that 
Bosnia suffered ‘from a ‘‘dependency syndrome’’ that dates back centuries, to when it was 
part of the Ottoman Empire’ 282 – and setting forward that the mere existence of an EU 
mission is to actually break that evil, orientalist tradition. In a similar vein, when confronted 
with the question when would EULEX potentially leave Kosovo? senior EULEX official alarms 
that “EULEX judges are a must. Imagine how this country would be if we would leave”.283 
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4. Conclusion 
 
Kagan argues that after having found its own perpetual peace, the transmission of the 
European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe’s new mission civilisatrice, 
The metaphysics of good versus evil supports Europe’s ideal of a civilizing mission at home 
and abroad. The battle between the two binary opposites –European democracy, liberal 
values, human rights vs. authoritarian, and non-democratic regimes – ‘creates’ the need for 
the figure of Europe to intervene. Edward Said writes that the rhetoric of the civilizing 
mission is “what has been called ‘a duty’ to natives, the requirement in Africa and elsewhere 
to establish colonies for the ‘benefit’ of the natives, or for the ‘prestige’ of the mother 
country”.284  This identifies not only the asymmetrical relationship between the so called 
‘civilized’ and the ‘uncivilized’ but also sets forward the self-proclaimed duty to ‘civilize’ the 
uncivilized’.   
 
In conclusion, when dwelling into these type of studies, it is important to be aware of the 
dimensions, ideologies and politics of how we engage with both the local and the mission. 
Arguably, there is a fertile ground for academic criticism towards international missions. 
First, is the tendency of pointing to missions’ unresponsiveness leading to the fetishizing the 
‘local’ as such on the one hand, while simultaneously keeping the focus on the problems of 
deployed missions? Do we also in turn orientalize principles of autonomous recovery and self-
determination of the local? Second, accepting that system/regime change, war, and other 
forms of system reformation are natural circles of mankind, how does this inform and 
influence the way intervention, mission comes to existence? How does it legitimize it? How do 
we think of autonomous recovery at the same time? Where is the thin line of epistemological 
entrapment into yet another set of binary opposites of missionizing and autonomous recovery? The 
range of ‘solutions’ does not need to be downgraded to alternatives that while trying to be 
more responsive to the ‘local’, end up in producing ‘models/frameworks’ which denote the 
‘locals’ (subjects of intervention) as a homogenous category. That would merely be a 
recycling of the top down/patronizing approach. An important step to surpass this is for 
missions to consciously and healthy drop from the trajectory of holy trinities where they 
constantly save/purify/emancipate less glorious systems. Interventions/missions (if they 
unequivocally need to happen) should engage more genuinely and respectfully with 
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individual cases of ‘locals’, acknowledge its agency and respect the ‘difference’ as a learning 
diversity that would also shape the ‘intervener’.    
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Hospitality and Hostility. The EU and Kosovo   
Abstract 
This article explains that when it comes to EU-Kosovo relations, both the EU and Kosovo 
are hosts and guests at the same time. While the EU is first a host in the enlargement process 
and the visa regime, with Kosovo as the guest, the EU is also a guest in Kosovo with its 
deployed mission. Kosovo on the other hand, is a host towards the present EU mission on 
its territory. At the same time, as an aspiring member state, it is a guest in the shared ‘EU 
home’ (EU as the home of 28 countries). Derrida’s concept spectrum of hospitality is 
composed of conditioned and unconditioned hospitality and ultimately hostility. With 
conditioned hospitality, an analysis of the politics of EU enlargement for Kosovo is 
undertaken, demonstrating that the EU oscillates between the thin lines of, on the one hand, 
(conditioned) hospitality in terms of offering Kosovo the enlargement package, and hostility 
on the other with its visa regime towards Kosovo. The article finds that even though 
absolute (unconditioned) hospitality is said not to exist and to be impossible to implement, 
the existence of the EU mission in Kosovo is the first case of unconditioned hospitality.   
Keywords: hospitality, hostility, Kosovo, EU, enlargement.  
1. Introduction 
Derrida explains hospitality as welcoming the other. It means to invite and welcome the 
‘stranger’ (l’étranger), both on a personal level – how do I welcome the other into my home? 
– and on the level of the state, which raises socio-political questions about refugees, 
immigrants, ‘foreign’ languages, minority ethnic groups etc.285  For Derrida hospitality appears 
to be as close as one can get to being synonymous with the ethical.  
 
“Insofar as it has to do with the ethos, that is, the residence, one’s home, the familiar 
place of dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we 
relate to ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners, ethics is 
hospitality; ethics is so thoroughly coextensive with the experience of hospitality”.286  
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Central to the whole concept of hospitality and the politics of hospitality is the concept of 
home, which not only makes the act of hospitality possible, but at the same time distinguishes 
the host of a home from the guest as a subject of hospitality. 
 
For both ‘Kosovo’ and ‘the EU’, the concept of home is inherently problematic because it is 
linked to demarcating borders, as to what is foreign or domestic, and what constitutes inside 
and outside. As such, bringing into this discussion both the EU as a supranational structure 
and Kosovo as unfinished state (in the Westphalian principle) is particularly delicate, as the 
notion of physical/state borders is crucially important in both cases. At the beginning of the 
1990s, Derrida argued that the task of realizing an ethics of hospitality is difficult everywhere, 
but especially in Europe. As a “union”, he continues Europe is hyperbolically anxious about 
borders, with the tendency to close up on the outside to the extent that it claims to be open 
on the inside.287  To oversimplify, internally, the EU’s energy is devoted in making borders 
(legal, cultural, institutional) obsolete. The trajectory of pooled/shared sovereignty continues 
with the prospect of fully attaining a ‘European home’ beyond nation states. Externally, the 
EU is anxious about protecting its borders both with its careful waves of enlargement and 
also regarding ‘unwanted’ guests through immigration. Kosovo on the other hand, struggles 
to attain internationally recognized borders and as such be a legitimate in a host of its own 
home in the Westephalian system.  
 
EU-Kosovo relations identify both forms of hospitality to be applicable. On the one hand, 
the EU as ‘host’ of the ‘EU home’ offers ‘conditioned hospitality’ to Kosovo with the 
enlargement package. On the other hand, even though it has been claimed to be merely a 
poetic act and something that no state can write into law, ‘unconditioned hospitality’ is 
evidenced with regard to EU’s ‘guest’ status with the deployment, mandate and longevity of 
the (primarily) European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Ultimately, the 
EU slides into ‘hostility’ in its visa regime policy. Lastly, the article shows the EU’s altered 
personality in being both conditionally hospitable and hostile towards Kosovo, and at the 
same time being subject to an unconditional hospitality within Kosovo. This in turn provides 
original insight, first with regard to the study of EU enlargement and second with regard to 
Derrida’s take on unconditional hospitality, marking one of the few encounters with his 
concept in practice. 
 
                                                          
287 Derrida, J. (1992). The other heading. Reflections on today's Europe Indiana Unievrsity Press. 
  
91 
 
Nevertheless, when we think about hospitality we should in no time think about the 
distinction between host and guest in terms of clearly defined boundaries. Derrida 
distinguishes between conditioned hospitality, that is, welcoming the other under certain 
conditions – the showing of documents, asking for a visa and similar procedures. Hospitality 
is due to the foreigner, certainly, but remains, like the law, conditioned, and thus conditioned 
in its dependence on the unconditionality that is the basis of the law”.288  Unconditioned 
hospitality, for Derrida, obliges one to accept the visitor, regardless of whether he or she is a 
foreigner, an immigrant, an invited guest, or an unexpected visitor, whether the new arrival is 
the citizen of another country, a human, animal, or divine creature, a living or dead thing, 
male or female. The absolute, unconditioned law of hospitality, as Derrida himself acknowledges, 
is impossible to practically implement or organise. Such a pure hospitality ‘can have no legal 
or political status. No state can write it into laws and as such it can only be poetic.289  
 
For him, the distinction between visitation and invitation is the other mode to explain 
unconditioned and conditioned hospitality. “Hospitality of visitation (pure hospitality) consists in 
letting the visitor come, the unexpected arrival, without asking for any account, without 
demanding his passport”.290  He adds that in contrast to invitation, visitation does not select 
the guests nor does it expect or prepare for the other’s visit. “If I am unconditionally 
hospitable I should welcome the visitation, not the invited guest, but the visitor. I must be 
prepared, or prepared to be unprepared, for the unexpected arrival of any other”.291  For 
Derrida, invitation “remains a scrutinized hospitality, always under surveillance, 
parsimonious and protective of its sovereignty.292  For Homer, invitation is the most 
common form of conditioned hospitality practised by individuals, family units and social 
groups where the host selects the guest to whom  his/her hospitality is to be offered, and 
expects a possible payback. 293  
                                                          
288 Derrida, J. (2000). Of Hospitality. California, Stanford University Press. 
  
289 Ibid. 
  
290 Ibid. 
  
291 Derrida, J. (2005). The Principle of Hospitality. Paper Machine. J. Derrida. Stanford, Stanford University 
Press. 
  
292 Borradori, G. (2003). Philosophy in a time of terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, 
The University of Chicago Press. 
  
293 Homer quoted in Hu, C.-y. (2013). "The Im/Possible Host/Guest: Hospitality in a Passage to India." 
Intergrams 14(1). 
  
92 
 
2. Tracing ‘Hospitality’ in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)  
Derrida is not the first to have been preoccupied with ‘hospitality’. His concern comes from 
Kant’s universal hospitality, which Derrida characterizes as ‘conditioned’ for it is ‘dependent 
on and controlled by the law and the state police”.294  Bulley argues that hospitality is not a 
notion of obvious importance in FPA, “partly because it is a liminal concept”, that is existing 
on the border between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ but disturbing the differences 
between the two”. 295 Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and 
between positions.296  On the one hand, it invites to first and foremost demarcate ‘borders’; it 
requires a definition of what is ‘domestic’ and what is ‘foreign’, what is ‘home’ and ‘abroad’; 
who is a host (the subject offering hospitality) and who is a guest (the subject being welcomed). 
On the other hand, it disturbs this clear distinction between two ‘alternatives’, precisely 
because to talk about hospitality we do not necessarily need to have clear-cut delimitations of 
guest and host.  
In the past 20 years, the concept of hospitality has gained popularity in international relations 
and ethical foreign policy literature.297  The fact that ‘hospitality’ is still not a very popular 
concept in IR and foreign policy studies at large is not at all comforting, especially given the 
trend of xenophobia, the rise of right-wing movements, anti-immigration laws and not at 
least racism. Bulley argues that as a “liminal  concept that works on the border of the way 
that traditional international relations (IR) has been thought, hospitality still allows the 
enactment of ethics as it welcomes the outside into the inside”.298  He adds that as such, 
hospitality is of immediate and obvious importance to international political theory as a sub-
discipline that is defined by contesting and cross-examining the separation between inside 
and outside.299 
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However, when hospitality is examined in IR, such as in a confrontation with Kant, the 
emphasis is placed on granting hospitality to individuals, especially, the refugee”.300  In EU 
studies in general, (especially concerning enlargement and the EU’s external relations) the 
notion of hospitality offers new paths for an emancipatory debate on the inclusiveness and 
exclusiveness of the EU and its politics of enlargement; on the EU’s welcomed guests and 
those less welcome, or simply not welcome; how hospitality takes place in the era of 
‘pooled/shared’ sovereignty; on enlargement’s politics of space between self and the other. 
In his account ‘Ethics as Foreign Policy’, Bulley brings forward the concept of ‘conditioned 
hospitality’ to explain the shifting meanings of ‘Europe’ and its borders with regard to the 
enlargement package to the Western Balkans and what he calls, the far more ‘circumscribed 
hospitality’ for European Neighbourhood Policy.301  Looking at the shifting meanings of 
‘European identity’, ‘Europeanness’ and ‘non-European’, Petersen compares the EU’s 
‘hospitality’ during accession of Central and Eastern European countries in 2004 with the of 
enlargement strategy for Moldova and Ukraine.302  The shifting identities of Europe and who 
is entitled to be called European are also evidenced in Neumann’s work where he discusses 
the meaning for the boundaries and identity of Europe of Morocco’s rejected membership 
application in 1986, which received the response that only Europeans can apply for the 
project, hence establishing that Morocco is unequivocally non-European on the one hand, 
and the inclusion of East Germany which became a member without application, 
referendum or even ratification. 303 
What follows is the application of the two laws of hospitality and their manifestation in the 
EU’s relations towards Kosovo by looking at the discourse produced by the EU and the 
evidence from field work in Kosovo.  
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2.1 The scrutinized ‘conditioned hospitality’ of enlargement   
The Western Balkans has been present in the EU’s foreign policy agenda since the 1990s. 
After the ‘Kosovo crisis’ in 1999, the EU opened the possibility for ‘virtual membership’ 
(virtual hospitality) for the Balkans on grounds of 1) the proclaimed solidarity of the EU with 
crisis areas and 2) the duty to help those plagued by catastrophes.304  Bulley used ‘virtual 
membership’ quoting Romano Prodi in 1999. The later used the term to give stimulus and 
advantages of close cooperation, provided that certain conditions are met. For Bulley, this 
‘virtual membership’ was a result of the ambiguity of the EU’s spatial imaginary of home and 
family and how would the Western Balkans fit in. In this article we observe a scrutinized 
conditioned hospitality for Kosovo in particular and the Western Balkans countries in general, in 
that a set of criteria had to be met before even beginning to consider the granting of 
‘conditioned hospitality’. The virtual hospitality was further strengthened at the Thessaloniki 
Summit in 2003, where the EU confirmed “its unequivocal support to the European 
perspective of the Western Balkan countries. The future of the Balkans is within the 
European Union”,305 making the group of these countries, which Schimmelfennig has termed 
‘eligible’ for membership.306  
 
For the EU, “the Balkans have for over a decade been a top priority for our foreign policy 
efforts. Nowhere is the EU expected to deliver more… They lie on our doorstep”.307  
Notions of the Balkans as the EU’s backyard, front-yard, doorstep etc. appear constantly in 
EU texts on the Balkans. From this perspective, the Balkans can potentially be considered to 
be a subject of the EU’s hospitality because it is physically (geographically) somewhere 
around (in the back, in the front, next door etc.). For Bulley “the familial imaginary of the 
EU is both geographical (bounded by the 15, and by 2004, the 25 member states’ borders) 
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and moral (based on a range of ethical and political values seen as ‘European’).308  A similar 
narrative or ‘rhetorical entrapment’309 was evidenced firstly in offering EU enlargement to 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) after the end of communism. The heads of 
state and government of the EC maintained in 1989 that "[t]he current changes and the 
prospects for development… require overcoming the divisions of Europe”.310  Secondly, the 
enlargement prospect for CEE is also framed as ‘re-uniting’ Europe with its ‘other’ half. The 
metaphor of a ‘re-uniting’ or ‘return to Europe’ points to the way that CEE countries belong 
not only to geographical Europe, but have traditionally shared the values and norms of 
European culture and civilization and, that they always aspired to belong to the West during 
the years of the "artificial" division of the continent.311  This ‘manipulation of European 
identity’, was used by both leaders of CEE and the EU.312  
 
The countries who joined the EU in the previous rounds have all been ‘conditioned’ on the 
fulfilment of certain criteria;313  hospitality was granted, provided that the guest had ‘adjusted’ 
a number of issues about itself. While the rules of enlargement were rather more of a 
procedural agreement for the initial six members, consequent members of the ‘European 
family’ were conditioned with lists of criteria, obligations and standards to fulfil prior to 
membership. In fact the further the ‘family’ has expanded, the firmer the rules and 
obligations incumbent upon would-be member-state have become. Like in the case of CEE, 
in the Western Balkans the conditions deriving from the acquis communautaire are 
supplemented with the ‘Stabilization and Association Agreement’, which is primarily 
concerned with commitments for reform in the domains of politics, economics, trade and 
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human rights.314  Yet, the democratic criteria for the CEE countries were more limited in 
comparison to the conditions for the Western Balkan countries.315  The new requirements are 
to address the post-conflict regional challenges of reconstruction, stabilization and reform. 
The extra conditions for EU enlargement for the Western Balkans and for Kosovo, have 
already been seen as evidencing the “multi-dimensional nature of EU conditionality in South 
East Europe” gearing towards reconciliation, reconstruction and reform;316 or as the 
“creeping of membership of South East European countries”.317  For most scholars, the 
extra conditions for the Western Balkans are a result of the inner political peculiarities of the 
respective countries (cooperation with ICTY, regional cooperation, the issue of Kosovo), 
rather than extra requirements from the EU strictly speaking.318  
While these findings are technically true, there is an epistemological pitfall in this research 
edifice. These studies operate within external action of the EU, but they do not profoundly 
question its external action.319  ‘Hospitality’ on the other hand, invites a debate of borders, 
exclusions and inclusions, stretching out the discussion to the very idea of enlargement as a 
willingness to be hospitable and/or hostile, without necessarily being entrenched in the 
technical and political peculiarities of the process itself. When it comes to the case of 
Kosovo, we argue that the conditioned hospitality has had a spill-over effect in the extra 
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conditions deriving from the already conditioned hospitality: 1) structural changes; and 2) 
Stabilization and Association Agreement. The later was further conditioned with yet another 
criterion - dialogue with Serbia, making this entire process a scrutinized conditioned hospitality.  
2.1.1 Structural Changes  
The enlargement prospects of the Western Balkans have been envisioned as resulting in 
fundamental societal, political, system changes that would ultimately bring the region closer 
to ‘European values’. The 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper of the European Commission 
states that “enlargement policy needs to demonstrate its power of transformation in a region 
where states are weak and societies divided”.320  For Romano Prodi, the European 
Commission’s tenth president, it was “the moral duty of the EU to take care of the Balkan 
countries”.321   In several cases, taking the region in the ‘European home’ seems to take on 
‘religious’ tones whereby getting on to the ‘European path’ and/or ‘adhering to European 
values’ is a form of ‘salvation’. The salvation of breaking free from weak and divided 
societies, and embracing European values.  
 
The prospect of offering EU membership to Kosovo, inter alia, has been presented as a 
restorative project after the dissolution of Yugoslavia after which Kosovo would undergo 
structural changes in coming closer to embrace ‘European values’. In his speech Towards a 
new international morality: the humanitarian interventions, Solana described the ‘horror’ in the 
Balkans where “entire societies could fall prey to warlords, rallying the tribe against the 
enemy, the stranger, or simply the ‘other’, right in the heart of Europe, one hour flight from 
Rome, Vienna or Athens”.322  The structural or transformative power the EU would exert 
was to bring the region to centres which are not sites of such horrors. For the head of the 
European Union Office in Kosovo, Samuel Žbogar,  "we [the EU and Kosovo] have to 
build together a culture of non-tolerance on corruption. This is the European way".323  The 
rhetoric of embracing European values (sometimes European standards, best practices, 
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highest international standards and European values are used interchangeably), is very much 
present in the EU’s discourse towards Kosovo. Although nowhere reference is made to what 
explicitly the ‘European standards’ to be fulfilled are (are they the same as or different from 
international standards; which international standards?), reference is porously made to issues 
pertaining to multi-ethnicity, the internal market, rule of law etc.   
 
2.1.2 SAA  and the ‘Prishtina-Belgrade’ dialogue. ‘Normalization of relations’ through 
enlargement prospects 
The signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) marks the opening of 
contractual relations between the EU and the countries of the region and paves the way for 
membership. The SAA is based on EU’s acquis communautaire in that the respective countries’ 
legal structures should be harmonized with EU legislation.324  Yet, unlike in previous rounds 
of enlargement, in the case of Western Balkans the EU decided to start the SAA negotiations 
with chapters 23 and 24.325  As they deal with issues pertaining to the rule of law and 
democratic order, they are considered the most important chapters, and provide in this way 
an enhanced difficulty for the membership trajectory”. Even then, the very opening of SAA 
talks is conditional upon several criteria. “Before opening SAA negotiations, the EU 
examines whether a sufficient degree of stabilisation is in place”.326  The set of conditions is 
further determined by a dialogue for the ‘normalization of relations’ between Kosovo and 
Serbia. Although labelled ‘technical dialogue’, the rounds of negotiations showed it to be 
inherently political. In April 2013, the two negotiating governments completed the so-called 
“Brussels Agreement”,327  which was hailed as a historic agreement for Kosovo and Serbia 
and a major achievement of EU foreign policy. Agreement was reached on areas that 
regulate the relations between Kosovo and Serbia with regard to regional representation and 
trade and international customs among other things. This was the first time two leaders from 
Kosovo and Serbia would sit to discuss matters pertaining both countries since the late 
1990s. For Catherine Ashton this indicated “a step away from the past and, for both of them 
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(Kosovo and Serbia), a step closer to Europe”. For EU Commissioner Füle, the agreement 
represented “the most striking recent example of the transformative power of the EU 
accession process and a clear signal that even the most difficult decisions can be made if 
there is strong motivation and political will”.328  If the ‘normalization of relations’ is a 
historical day for both parties, does this indicate that relations have so far been abnormal? 
What would that in turn mean? For local Kosovo scholar, the ‘historicity’ of the 
‘normalization of relations’ comes because, in the EU’s gaze, the Serbian-Albanian question 
is ethnic not political. By their definition, he continues, these are two nations that have 
conceptual problems with the existence of the other. Consequently, “everything that is not 
an outburst of our primitive ethnical [sic] passions is indeed a historical achievement”.329  
This scrutinized, and at the same time, heavily conditioned hospitality is first and foremost 
confusing. On the one hand, the EU pledges its support and commitment to bring Kosovo 
to the ‘European family’. On the other hand, every step that it takes seems to become more 
hesitant in terms of realizing its commitment, by continuously asking for more requirements 
to be met, putting into a bigger question mark whether this still remains hospitality?  
 
2.2 The ‘unconditioned hospitality’ of the EU mission in Kosovo  
While enlargement for Kosovo is the exemplification of scrutinized conditioned hospitality, 
looking at the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), we suggest that 
the ‘EU in Kosovo’ is an example of what can be the closest link to unconditioned hospitality. In 
Of Hospitality Derrida explains that hospitality is not simply a matter of allowing them (the 
other) to occupy part of our home, giving them shelter and asking no questions, but it 
literally means that the other takes our place. If they take our place, then we are no longer in 
the simple position of host. The question of hospitality is no longer just about us giving 
hospitality to the other, it is about hospitality being granted to ourselves in our own ‘at-
home’, which is always the home of the other. “Our home is no longer where we can relax, 
feel free to be ourselves, but where we are persecuted”.330   The other can arrive at any time, 
without invitation, and take what he likes in our place. The ‘at-home’ becomes where we are 
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held hostage. To exemplify, EULEX will be taken as the guest, Kosovo will be taken as the 
host and, as such, as being able to offer hospitality.  
The invitation for EULEX issued in Ahtisaari’s Plan – which was later enshrined in Kosovo’s 
Constitution 331 – provides that “Kosovo shall issue an invitation to the international 
community to assist in successfully fulfilling its obligations to this end.” 332   The Council 
Joint Action, which set forward the invitation for EULEX, states that member states of the 
EU answered Kosovo's request for assistance and agreed to provide the European Union 
Rule of Law Mission “to help build up and strengthen the rule of law, support a functioning 
democracy, as well as aid Kosovo along its European processes.”333  What was clearly a self-
invitation for EULEX’s deployment, (self-invitation in the sense that the Western 
democratic structures were transferring mandates to one another), came to be known in the 
official and public discourse as an invitation from Kosovo’s authorities calling EULEX to 
offer assistance and mentoring of Kosovo’s democratic and rule of law consolidation. 
“EULEX shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement 
agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing 
and strengthening in independent multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that 
these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally 
recognised standards and best European practices.”334  
 
Let us momentarily ‘neglect’ the issue of ‘invitation’ as a (ceremonial) precondition for 
hospitality. After all, in a number of non-Western environments (Albanian included) the 
issue of ‘invitation’ is not a precondition for hospitality and/or for the manifestation of the 
guest and host roles. Homer’s Odyssey provides that in Greek culture the host receives 
guests, provides them with food and shelter, helps them regain their energy and keeps them 
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away from danger and harm.335  Hu observes this as its ‘unconditioned’ character. This 
tradition is also evidenced in Saudi Arabia and a number of other Gulf countries.336  A similar 
account of hospitality, the treatment of the guest and the responsibilities of the host are 
excruciatingly elaborated in the Albanian The Code of Lekë Dukagjini.337  The account provides 
that the guest is welcomed anytime it shows up and the host is to be hospitable, irrespective 
of the ‘invitation’. Any guest (known and unknown) is to be welcomed, fed and offered 
shelter… asking about when the guest is to leave or how long is he/she about to stay is 
dishonourable for the host.338  
 
How does this speak to EULEX’s situation in Kosovo? As part of its ‘monitoring’ role, 
EULEX has sovereign powers in its own mission. It decides its own ‘job description’ and 
priorities; it renews its mandate every other two years and its staff has immunity over 
Kosovo’s jurisdiction. It enjoys certain executive authority (responsibility) in performing its 
tasks, especially in prosecuting war crimes cases and corruption affairs.339  So far, EULEX’s 
performance has been subjected to one audit process conducted by the European Court of 
Auditors.340  This constellation of EULEX as a guest accepted unconditionally and beyond 
dispute comes very close to what Derrida describes as ‘absolute hospitality’. Going back to 
the conceptualization of ‘home’ in IR and FPA as in ‘sovereign states’, Kosovo is not a 
state/home for EULEX as such, as it is not recognized by the EU ‘en block’.341  Although as 
a structure EULEX operates within the framework of Kosovo’s legislation, its mandate is 
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given by the United Nations, to which Kosovo is not an independent state and as such not 
‘home’. However, since its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, the discourse has 
shifted from the binary opposite of ‘state’ and ‘not-state’/province, into to what extent can it 
be called a state, based on how many countries have recognized it, and how many 
international structures recognize it as independent etc. This discussion spills over to a more 
societal level of conceptualizing ‘home’ too. If not a fully-fledged ‘home’, how are its hosts 
and guests defined? How is the blurred line between these two? As a host, Kosovo (its 
institutions and people) do not question (cannot and are not entitled to) how long the 
mission is going to stay, whether the mission will abide their house rules etc.  
Quoting Benjamin Franklin’s famous saying, “fish and visitors stink after three days”, on his 
interplay of host and guest dialectics in Christian missions, Brandner argues that after a 
period of time the guest is either to become a resident or move on.342  Remaining in the 
status of guest is impossible both for the host – who cannot sustain all the work in 
maintaining a guest for a long time – and for the guest who yearns for independence.343  In 
2011, three years after EULEX’s deployment, it was initially civil society in Kosovo which 
recommended a ‘time frame’ for EULEX’s exit strategy.344  The same year, Kosovo’s 
government intensified its calls to end EULEX’s mandate through a joint coordination.345  
The discourse of EU officials in Kosovo is that “EULEX will leave when Kosovo’s rule of 
law and democratic principles are sound and sustainable”.346  For EULEX Chief of Staff 
Thomas Meuhelman, if EULEX were to leave, “Kosovo wouldn’t be able to stand on its 
feet. The international support is very much needed”.347 In her work on EU’s involvement in 
Africa, Rutazibwa notices what she calls the ‘inequality mechanism’ of the intervener as the 
“benevolent that comes in order to alleviate  the receivers’ suffering”.348  Talking about 
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hospitality, Derrida maintains that there does not need to be a clear cut division of guest and 
host, because that one precondition for the host, to be called such, is that he/she needs to 
maintain his/her own mastery; “he controls the threshold, he controls the borders”.349  With 
EULEX setting the rules in the house in which it is staying as a guest, it changes the 
dynamics of behaviour, it governs the local (albeit through supervision and monitoring), and 
ultimately it becomes a host. Kosovo’s people become guests in their own home.  
 
The inversion of the position of guest and host is a recurring theme in literature dealing with 
relationships between colonizers and colonized and their shifting roles of guests and hosts. 
In his account on Indian hospitality to English visitors, Hu argues that colonialism 
“commences the inversion of the host/guest because those who originally occupy the 
position of the host and offer hospitality to the outsiders are now turned into the colonized 
by their colonizers”.350   On a similar note, in his travel narrative A Passage to India, Foster 
argued in 1924 that in colonial hospitality, the locals were subject to their foreign ‘masters’, 
who usurp their homeland and as the “master”, the colonizers discover that they need to 
replicate their original home in order to “be at home”.351  Foster reminds us that though 
theoretically speaking the English who come to India are visitors/guests, the political reality 
in which the English colonize India makes the English self-acclaimed hosts. Meanwhile, the 
Indians, now the reluctant guests of their English colonizers, attempt to reverse their role 
and reclaim their position as hosts. A similar situation, albeit with differences in content and 
aims, appears to characterise EULEX’s status as guest/host precisely because of Kosovo not 
being a fully established ‘home’.  
 
2.2.1 Hostility 
“Hospitality” is a series of combinations: of “hospitality, hostility, hostipitality”.352  It is 
precisely the action to defend ‘home’ as such that can lead to hostility; and this is true for 
both its conditioned and unconditioned forms. Hostipitality for him reveals the way hostility 
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and hospitality are joined within the same undecidable un-ethical concept.353 Speaking on EU 
enlargement, Bulley argues that whatever the conditions or lack thereof that it sets, 
enlargement will inevitably fall into the category of ethical undecidability of hostipitality as 
the necessary filtering and choosing (of who and what is included) also necessitates a violent 
exclusion.354  For him, this exclusion occurs on a spectrum from those geographically distant 
(such as Latin America and Asia, who are absolutely excluded), to neighbourhood countries 
(who are largely excluded), to the Balkans (who are excluded until they stop being other and 
become the same).355   
 
Looking at the EU’s visa regime for Kosovo, this part demonstrates how the EU slides into 
hostility. The EU invented “negotiations on visa liberalisation” for the Western Balkan 
countries, provided that a whole range of conditionality requirements on enlargement would 
be fulfilled by the respective countries.356  After acknowledging the progress made, the EU 
granted visa waivers to the citizens of Serbia (without Kosovo), Montenegro and Macedonia 
in December 2009.  The non-inclusion of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina was met with 
fierce criticism. Since ethnic Serbs and ethnic Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina can hold 
passports of their ‘mother’ states – which were granted visa liberalization – that led to a 
bizarre situation in which only the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were not able to 
travel visa free. Criticism in Bosnia and Herzegovina went viral claiming that this is another 
“discrimination of Srebrenica’s victims”.357  The EU was presented as “anti-Muslim” given 
the high percentage of Muslim population in both Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina.358  
By December 2010, the EU granted a visa waiver to citizens of Albania and Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina, leaving this way only Kosovo with the visa regime in place.359  On the one 
hand, the exclusion of Kosovo was seen as to indicate a further step from the EU side to 
deal with it as a state on its own, not as part of Serbia. On the other hand, the EU closed its 
doors to Kosovars, thereby reverting into hostility. This closeness of the EU ‘borders’ from 
‘others’, has been coined ‘fortress Europe’ by Kramsch et.al.360  For Houtum and Pijpers, the 
EU is beginning to look like a ‘gated community’ also referred to as ‘defended 
neighbourhood’, a form of housing found mainly in developing countries with large internal 
income differences such as Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela, as well as in the US,361  whereas 
for Seyla Benhabib this indicates who are the new ‘barbarians’ that are denied access.362 
In addition to exclusion from the visa free regime, there has been an enhancement of the 
procedures for applying and acquiring a Schengen visa for Kosovo citizens.363  Though 70% 
of its population are younger than 35, Kosovo remains one of the most isolated countries in 
the world.364 Even compared to countries like Afghanistan – currently on the list of countries 
characterised by warfare and high risk – citizens of Kosovo can travel visa free to only five 
countries (Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and the Maldives) while Afghanis can 
travel to 22 states without a visa.365  This isolation incites fierce criticism, both among 
Kosovars who experienced visa free travel in the Yugoslav heyday and equally among those 
born in the mid-1980s where the barriers to travel were quite the norm.  For Astrit Salihu, 
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Prishtina, the isolation of Kosovo is not only 
against the very idea of what the EU stands for, but is also in opposition to the whole 
concept of the EU presence in Kosovo. “I teach European philosophy in an auditorium of a 
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hundred students, only two of them had been able to travel to these European centres”.366  
One can argue that not many Belgian or Portuguese students in their 20s have been able to 
travel to Rome, Berlin or Prague. The fundamental difference is that unlike their Kosovar 
counterparts, they are first of all not denied the possibility to do so, they are not required to 
present a long list of medical, employment, education, and legal documents to be considered 
for a visa, nor to pay 30% of their parents’ monthly salary for a visa application.367  
Maintaining a very security-centric approach, the European Commission has repeated that 
the restriction will stay in place until it is guaranteed that Kosovo “can ensure that relevant 
reforms are implemented and rules and procedures are respected so as to minimize the 
associated security risks for EU Member States”.368  For Hajrulla Çeku, head of the NGO Ec 
ma ndryshe, the EU’s visa regime towards Kosovo has less to do with fulfilling the 
requirements foreseen by EU’s roadmap for visa liberalisation; rather, it is much more a 
result of its constructed discourse on Kosovars as asylum seekers threatening EU security.369  
 
The EU’s hostility towards Kosovo is not merely a result of the EU closing its doors to 
Kosovars as ‘non-EU’ and/or ‘others’. The same policy (albeit with nuances) is maintained 
to the vast majority of so-called developing countries and countries with lowly records on the 
rule of law, democratic principles etc. Consequently, Kosovo is not the foremost case to 
evidence hostility in place. What makes it peculiar in this case is that this is happening 
towards a country in which the EU is investing quite a lot to make it part of its own family. 
On the one hand, the EU has envisioned a ‘European future’ for Kosovo by giving it a 
membership prospect. Further, the EU takes concrete actions to ensure Kosovo’s 
adjustment to ‘European values’. Since 1999, the EU is Kosovo’s biggest donor per capita in 
the world and it has deployed its biggest CFSP mission to date there.370  On the other hand, 
the EU is not offering the possibility for Kosovo to have and develop contact with its 
‘European future’ and, by closing its doors, it sends the message that Kosovars remain 
‘others’, not European enough.  
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3. Conclusion 
When in the position of host towards Kosovo as guest, we have seen the EU with its Janus-
face; offering a scrutinized conditioned hospitality with its enlargement package, while at the 
same time being hostile with regard to its visa regime policy. As a host, the EU is largely seen 
as trying to minimize the ways and opportunities to welcoming Kosovo into its family, while 
at the same time, it makes a strong promise for its ‘European future’. When in the position 
of guest in Kosovo, we have seen the EU becoming metamorphosed from guest into a host.  
 
With regard to the EU as host and its hospitality towards Kosovo, we should ask whether 
this scrutinized conditioned hospitality is still hospitality? This article has demonstrated that 
in the case of Kosovo, there is a slippery slope in the procedures of conditioning the 
conditions for conditioned EU membership. How much hospitality is there left to speak of? 
Or is this a very difficult, almost unwanted ‘conditioned hospitality’? Is it an indirect form of 
hostility instead? These questions become even more relevant when, in parallel to this 
scrutinized conditioned hospitality, the EU’s slides into hostility in regard to the visa regime 
towards Kosovo.   
 
Looking at the EU as guest, we have come to witness what can be the closest link to 
‘unconditioned hospitality’ with the changing nature of EU from guest into a host. Though 
reference was made to a number of traditions on hospitality which treat the guest as king 
(Albanian included), it would be presumptuous and naïve to think of EU’s reversed identity 
to be a result of the local tradition of hospitality.  More than anything, the role reversal of 
guest and host brings to light a number of power and political dimensions. Because it is not 
recognized as a state by the EU as such, is Kosovo actually a ‘home’ such as we have spoken 
so far? Is this reversal possible in non-finalized states/homes, only? Or is this more a trait of 
a power imbalance like the one evidenced in the literature on the colonial heritage? In the era 
of ‘liberal interventionism’ and the evolving trajectory of post-national, post-modern states, 
shall we give up home in the sense that there is neither need for well-defined home as such, 
nor for guests and/or hosts? Finally, the very condition of the hospitality of the EU is closely 
linked with its hostility, similar to how its position of guest is inherently subordinate to the 
condition of host. This in turn makes hospitality a hostility to otherness. As such the 
conditioned hospitality of enlargement, with its selection of the same and exclusion of the 
other, cannot help but be both hospitable and hostile. 
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Autoimmunity of Democracy Promotion. The case of Western missions in Kosovo  
Abstract 
This article discusses how the international project for democracy building/democracy 
promotion in Kosovo, while aiming to establish democracy and the rule of law, suffers from 
fatal contradictions and self-inflicted damage commits suicide as its modus operandi opposes 
the very concept of democracy. Looking at the text of three major international 
structures/stakeholders in Kosovo – KFOR, UNMIK and the EU – the article 
problematizes how, while aiming to promote democracy and reconciliation in the post-war 
setting, all three institutions slide into non-democratic actions. Derrida has explained these 
phenomena with the concept of ‘autoimmunity’, which exemplifies the failed attempt of an 
organism to recognize its own constituent parts as self, leading to an immune response 
against its own cells and tissues.  The article shows cases in which, while aiming to install 
“international standards” and the “European values” of democracy, rule of law and human 
rights in Kosovo, the international missions has essentially been behaving in a manner in 
contradiction to its stated aims for the country.  
 
Keywords: autoimmunity, Kosovo, mission, democracy  
1. Introduction  
In the aftermath of the war in 1999, Kosovo experienced the deployment of the full package 
of Western humanitarian aid, democracy and peace building structures: a 50,000 NATO-led 
international peacekeeping force under the name of KFOR;371  around six thousand 
peacekeeping officers under the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo 
(UNMIK);372  and about five thousand other experts from the World Bank, IMF, USAID, 
OSCE and EU, who were stationed mainly in Pristina373 – the capital of around two million 
people. Each and every structure was in its way contributing to the introduction and 
implementation of the overarching democratizing project for Kosovo.  
Like the international presence itself, the case of Kosovo and the whole project of 
democratic peace for Kosovo has received a lot of attention in academia and the media. A 
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large body of  literature deals with the deployed missions itself,374 their performance,375 
strengths and weaknesses,376  lessons to be learned377 and so on. In this setup, why is it still 
relevant to write on Kosovo and the international missions which operated and continue to 
operate there? Why would their existence, performance and legacy still matter?  The two 
main reasons the article addresses are formative. First, Kosovo is still subjected to a large 
international presence. Since 2009, the European Union has launched its largest CFSP 
mission to date (EULEX) to promote the rule of law. 378  Second, albeit with differences in 
scope and mandate, we have observed that there is continuity in terms of how the 
international missions and their structures in Kosovo try to promote democracy and the rule 
of law, while precisely by not adhering to these principles themselves. 
 
By applying Derrida’s concept of autoimmunity, the article elicits an original debate inviting 
literature both from democracy studies and the studies of interventions alike. The potential 
of the concept of autoimmunity is not limited to problematizing the international missions in 
Kosovo, nor to merely casting light on the problems of the missions in a (still) contested 
country. Rather it proposes that the very idea of democracy promotion in general can also be 
problematized by being brought in to the loop of the discussion. With regard to the plethora 
of contributions to the literature mentioned previously, we come to yet another argument as 
to why applying autoimmunity and Derrida to the case of international missions in Kosovo is 
important. The vast majority of this literature is preoccupied with fixing how the missions 
perform; drawing ‘best lessons’ from comparing missions over time and space; questioning 
the technical and performance characteristics. Yet, a very marginal section of this work 
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shows a tendency to problematize the concept of intervening and/or missionizing as such;379  
in reflecting on the foundations of democratic peace380 and in questioning cartographies of 
power in who gets to ‘export’ democratic peace and who is (usually) the receiving recipient.381  
This article adopts the concept of autoimmunity to first challenge the narrative of the 
democratic project and international state building as such and second to display its 
autoimmune character.  
 
Keeping faith with the exemplified notions of autoimmunity in the three cases, this article 
explains the autoimmunity of the ‘mission machinery’ in Kosovo as an embodiment of 
Western / European intervention within the project of democracy building. The article 
testifies that in the case of Kosovo, democracy is autoimmune because the international 
missions are not elected and therefore not accountable to the citizens of Kosovo. 
Consequently, their presence is not subject to the principle of checks and balances, which is 
formative for democracies. Instead of searching for responses to / examples of 
autoimmunity in every case elaborated, the article invites the reader to look for autoimmunity 
in the project of each structure and their ‘togetherness’ in the overall democratizing project 
for Kosovo. Focusing on the text – speech acts, billboards, leaflets – of KFOR, UN, the EU 
and EULEX – as structural exemplifications of the democratic project for the past 15 years, 
the article concludes how the acts of these structures have been autoimmune for their very 
democracy project. 
2. Autoimmunity contextualized  
Autoimmunity is not a concept of obvious relevance to studies in political science and/or 
international relations at large. Derived from biology, autoimmunity refers to the failure of an 
organism to recognize its own constituent parts as self, thus leading to an immune response 
against its own cells and tissues.382  In Rouges, Derrida explains autoimmunity as a process: 
while attempting to protect itself, it destroys itself, playing in this way both the role of 
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medicine and poison.383  In this regard, autoimmunity is a type of suicide, as an organism, 
while attempting to protect itself, attacks the vital elements that keep it alive. This is not the 
first time Derrida brings concepts from other fields (biology, psychoanalysis etc.) to explain 
processes that are inherently political.384  Within studies in political science and international 
relations, autoimmunity is mostly used in the literature on terrorism385 and sovereignty 
studies.386  In the sphere of IR at large, Derrida has employed autoimmunity to explain a 
number of questions and concepts in philosophy, three of which deserve particular attention 
in this article – ‘democracy’, ‘Europe’ and ‘colonialism’.387  All three concepts come together 
in the case of the EU and other international missions in Kosovo. Democracy as the 
overarching project sponsored in Kosovo from the Western liberal democratic structures; 
Europe, both with its deployed mission in Kosovo, but also Europe as the European future 
envisioned for Kosovo through the prospect of enlargement;388  colonialism, more precisely 
features of colonial like behaviour and/or fragments of neo-colonialism evidenced in the 
narrative of local Kosovars.389  
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2.1 Democracy 
Discussing democracy’s autoimmunity, is very much preconditioned in first defining 
democracy as such. A definition (however loose) is a challenge in more than one way because 
of its evolution in time, space, and not less its outcomes. For Przewroski et. al, democracy is 
representation and accountability.390  For Plotke it is representation.391  For Polletta392 and 
other advocates of deliberative democracy,393 freedom is essentially the core of democracy. In 
spite of this, in 1991 Schmitter and Karl, argued that a remarkable consensus has emerged 
concerning the minimal conditions that polities must meet in order to merit the appellation 
of “democratic”394.  The classic approach of Schumpeter suggests that democracy is “that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”.395  Schmitter and 
Karl accept certain aspects of the classical procedural approach to modern democracy but 
differ primarily in their emphasis on the accountability of rulers to citizens. “Modern political 
democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in 
the public realm of their elected representatives.396  For Robert Dahl, who has offered a 
generally accepted list of what constitute the “procedural minimal” criteria of democracy, the 
characteristics include among others 1) consensus – the agreement of citizens on the 
substantive goals; 2) the participation of citizens in politics; 3) responsiveness – rulers must 
be held accountable; and 4) checks and balances – an overall ‘supervision’ of state 
institutions.397  In reading Derrida, Bulley argues that Derrida associates democracy with 
freedom / liberty (eleutheria) and license (exousia), which is also whim, free will, ease, freedom 
of choice, and the right to do as one pleases. Thus, from Ancient Greece onwards, 
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‘democracy’ is conceived on the basis of this freedom.398  This freedom and license, Derrida 
argues, associates itself with the concept of human rights, the rights which protect one’s 
democratic freedoms.  
 
Democracy for Derrida is a suicidal concept – in that it has the ability to kill itself by working 
against itself. “Democracy is autoimmune first of all because its concept or quasi-concept is 
“undecidable”;399  it is essentially void of any content or meaning in and of itself, that it is 
outside the linguistic matrix in which it is located.400  The concept is thus always open to 
iteration and re-inscription, its meaning in some sense is always still to come. For Jacques 
Ranciere, democracies on the one hand, send armies to bring to other people by force that 
democracy which is supposed to mean the self-government of the people; on the other hand, 
they unrelentingly complain that democracy is ungovernable, that the democratic 
government is threatened by a moral danger which is the excess of democratic life.401  
 
Derrida talks about two cases of democracy’s autoimmunity which I will classify as 1) intrinsic, 
meaning that democracy’s autoimmunization is traced at the very concept of it; 2)  political / 
procedural and has to do with the ‘election’ as a cornerstone of democracy.  
Autoimmunity is intrinsic to democracy which in Derrida’s argument comes from democracy 
being rooted in the freedom of speech.402  Democracy is the only system, the only 
constitutional paradigm, in which, in principle, one has the right to criticize everything 
publicly, including the idea of democracy, its concept, in history and its name.403  It contains 
within it the possibility of welcoming an undemocratic regime, and of inviting (and to some 
extent encouraging) terrorist attacks, as well as the possibility of producing another attack 
against itself in an attempt to divert these threats.404  The debate on ‘democracy’ and its 
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enemies has traditionally been focused in tracing democracy’s enemies in the ‘outside’, be 
that with communism as its ‘other’ / enemy throughout the Cold War or with ‘religious 
fundamentalism’ / terrorism in the post 9/11 world.405  With autoimmunity, Derrida sets 
forward the proposition that the ‘enemy’ of democracy is within the concept as such and 
within it as a system. To clarify what he means by that, it is relevant to refer to two examples 
he elaborates in Rouges and Real and Symbolic Suicides, respectively. Derrida mentions that 9/11 
is an autoimmune action of democracy, in which the system is compromised from inside. 
Most people in the al-Qaeda network were US citizens.406  That is, they were brought up in 
the US, educated in American universities with American values of democracy, 
multiculturalism and so on. It was in turn these people who waged the attack with the 
hijacked planes against the US itself. The perceived threat to the democracy of the United 
States following 9/11 led to US democracy attacking itself by suspending certain democratic 
rights and liberties of its citizens in the name of security.407  
 
Political / procedural autoimmunity is traced in the elections of democracies, where a sovereign 
vote may end democracy while using the democratic right to do so. Derrida points to the 
example of the elections of 1992 in his native Algeria, where democratic elections were 
suspended when it became likely that a majority would elect a party that has as its objective 
the end of democratic rule and the installation of a theocratic regime408.  In the name of 
democracy, then, the democratic leaders in Algeria suspended the democratic process 
temporarily so that the opposing party would not, once elected, put an end to it 
permanently.409  A similar example has been noticed in the elections of 2006 in Gaza. While 
the US and the EU were calling for fair and democratic elections, Hamas’ victory by 44.55% 
to Fatah’s 41.43% showed that the results from the very important democratic vote were 
nonetheless null, as both the EU and the US pledged not to work with Hamas which both of 
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them regarded as a terrorist organization.410  Algeria and Gaza are rather accidental examples 
and they do not ‘map’ democracy’s autoimmune practices in new / emerging / weak 
democracies. Other cases are evidenced throughout the past 20 years in countries like 
France, Austria and the UK. For instance, the victory of Marine Le Pen of France, and of 
Nigel Farage in the UK in the European Parliamentary elections of 2014 with their anti-EU 
platforms reconfirms the autoimmunity from within. Both parties trace their development in 
their guaranteed right to compete and be elected for European Parliament elections, which 
both ultimately challenge its very core existence and instead argue for a retreat to a traditional 
country based sovereignty. The pervertibility of democracy in this case is double sided, with 
the autoimmune condition of Le Pen and Farage’s victories as a result of a possibility created 
by a democratic system of elections, on the one hand, and the inability of the EU to question 
the result because of the principle of acceptance embedded in the democratic values on the 
other. In another example, the heads of government of fourteen EU members decided to 
cease cooperation with the Austrian government and impose political sanctions after Jörg 
Haider of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) came to power in 2000 on grounds of the 
party’s right-wing extremism manifested in its anti-Semitic, anti-immigration, Euro-sceptic 
program.411  For the first time in its history, the EU was imposing a diplomatic sanction on a 
member state with supporters of sanctions arguing that Europe is a “community of shared 
values”412 that must clearly distance itself from the “insulting, anti-foreigner and racist 
utterances of Jorg Haider.”413  Defending democratic principles, Die Zeit newspaper argued 
that by imposing sanctions the EU was breaking “the fundamental right of each democracy 
to decide freely which parties its citizens can vote for and which of these parties should form 
government.”414     
 
Cases like that of Haider and his party are rather common throughout Western Europe, and 
not only there. This is not a tendency to collect what may appear sporadic cases to ultimately 
argue democracy’s suicide. More than a sound argument, that would be a fetishization of 
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‘elections’ as an institution in democracies. At this point it is imperative to enquire about the 
meaning of actions like these mean for democracy as such? Is Austria less democratic since 
Haider’s victory and do similar cases ‘kill’ democracies? Rather than claiming the death of 
democracy in Austria, what these cases have shown is democracy’s vulnerability to auto-
immunize against itself. 
 
2.1 Europe 
“Europe is the most beautiful, and also the allegory of autoimmunity.” 
Jacques Derrida415 
 
With regard to Europe, Derrida's thinking is itself “internally differentiated, complicated, and 
often paradoxical, being traversed by an array of ethico-political motifs such as democracy, 
justice, responsibility, and hospitality.416  Two of his works in which he talks about Europe 
deserve attention and will be looked as responses to one-another. The first is The Other 
Heading. Reflections on Today’s Europe written in 1992, and the other is his co-signed letter with 
Habermas in 2003 after the intervention in Iraq, February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: 
A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe.  
 
In The Other Heading, Derrida sees two ‘contradictory imperatives’: on the one hand, or under 
one heading, Europe “cannot and must not accept the capital of a centralizing authority” that 
“would control and standardize, subjecting artistic discourses and practices to a grid of 
intelligibility”; on the other hand, or the other heading, “it must resist and renounce the 
proliferation of a multiplicity of self-enclosed idioms or petty little nationalisms” – must 
resist and renounce, in short, difference for its own sake. Experiencing the aporetic417 desire 
both for unification and for maintaining the difference that makes cultural identity possible, 
Europe must undergo what Derrida calls “the experience and experiment of the impossible” 
– the drive conditioned by two contradictory laws.418 He picked up on this contradiction in 
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his discussion with Elisabeth Roudinesco in 2004, describing as autoimmune the paradox 
that we are liberating ourselves from ethnocentrism, and eventually from Eurocentrism, in 
the name of its European filiation. The contradiction lies in that “Europe itself, yesterday 
and today: not only does it give itself weapons to use against itself and against its own 
limitations, but it gives weapons to all the peoples and all the cultures that European 
colonialism itself has subjugated.”419  
 
Written in the wake of mass demonstrations around the world against the waged war in Iraq 
in 2003, the Habermas-Derrida text calls the nations of Europe to forge their European 
identity and to formulate a common foreign policy in order to serve as a counterweight to 
US global power. The document urges the European political community to take 
responsibility for global peace, international law and justice, principles that seem to have 
been abandoned by the US government.420 Central to this letter is the underlying message of 
the ‘responsibility’ of the ‘European identity’ that has to be the “locomotive” of change. 
How would that memory be? More importantly, how would one ask ‘responsibility’ from the 
memory itself, by addressing to a group of nations? It was in the Other Heading that Derrida 
spoke of Europe as memory and heritage, arguing that the discourse on what constitutes 
Europe, or what points and promises in the name of Europe, is the heritage before which, 
and in response to which, responsibility arises.421  Hence the duty to respond to the call of 
European memory, to recall what has been promised in the name of Europe, to re-identify 
Europe; opening Europe, from the heading that is divided because it is also a shoreline: 
opening it onto that which is not, never was, and never will be Europe. The same duty also 
dictates welcoming foreigners in order not only to integrate them but to recognize and 
accept their alterity: two concepts of hospitality that today divide our European and national 
consciousness.422  
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Up to this point, though Europe’s autoimmunity can be traced, this does not exactly link it 
with the case in point – the Western and European missions in Kosovo. Here I will argue for 
a new form of autoimmunity. This form of autoimmunity is political and appears with the 
exporting of democracy overseas. The exporting of democracy and the imposition of 
democratic values is firstly autoimmune as a process – the arbitrarily imposition of liberal 
democratic values, and secondly as an outcome – that by imposing liberal democratic values to 
establish a democratic order, the act of democracy project itself becomes non-democratic. 
This contextualization brings us to Derrida’s point on colonialism’s autoimmunity. He does 
not dwell on an analysis of this, but mentions it as a tangent while talking about Europe.423  
Derrida makes reference once again to Algeria’s fight for independence from France and 
argues that autoimmunity was “the violent imposition of a culture and political language that 
were supposed to be in line with a Greco-European political ideal that helped fuel a so-called 
civil war, one that was really a war for independence waged in the very name of the political 
ideals extolled by the colonial power.”424 This final dimension is particularly relevant in the 
case of missions in Kosovo for primarily two reasons. First, the arbitrary imposition of the 
European / international model of democracy in Kosovo has traces of neo-colonial heritage. 
Second, the criticism towards the international structures and the local resistance towards the 
practices of the international missions is much more a criticism towards the ‘Europe’, the 
‘democracy’ as an arbitrary imposition, with neo-colonial nuances, rather than against the 
first two per se.  
Aspects of the discourse of the international structures in Kosovo will be hereon 
deconstructed on a chronological basis. Thematically, we will explain how the ‘international 
standards’ for democracy building played out for KFOR and the UN further shift with 
‘European standards / values’ of the deployed EU mission. The article does not stop to, nor 
is it interested in, discussing the structure, mandate and technicalities of the above-
mentioned structures. It rather posits them in the broader Western model of the ‘democracy 
promotion’ trajectory.  
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3. In the name of ‘international standards’   
 
“They [the international community] talk about diversity, melding in and 
multiculturalism, while both UNMIK and EU structures entrench themselves in 
buildings with high walls, with barbed wires on top, and have no contact with the local 
population”. 
Albert Heta, head of Centre for Contemporary Art, Stacion, Pristina 
 
In addressing the democratic path Kosovo ought to be undertaking, the discourse of KFOR, 
the UN and to a lesser extent, of the EU structures in Kosovo, makes rampant reference to 
concepts like ‘international standards’, ‘highest international standards’, and ‘best 
international standards;’425  the same applies to the European Union Office in Kosovo and 
EULEX who make extensive usage of ‘European standards’, ‘European values’, and ‘the 
European way.’426  It is not clear though what these standards and/or values are.427 
A ‘popular’ example in political communication of international structures in Kosovo is a 
KFOR billboard of 2005 in which a cat and a dog are sitting next to each other in a relaxing 
fashion, with the caption “If they can be tolerant, so can you….Become tolerant!” (see 
Annex II). Let us for a moment put aside the military identity of KFOR as a structure and 
see it embedded in the intervention and missionizing structure whose aim is to end hostility 
and eventually bring democracy to Kosovo. In most of the cultures there is a clear symbolic 
of cat and dog as antagonized animals perennially in conflict. Their fight is not a survival 
one. A lion fights with a zebra to feed itself. But this is not the case between a dog and a cat 
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which makes their fighting all the more mystifying. These are two animals fighting for 
something which is outside of the rules of nature – the survival circle. And so are the Serbs 
and the Albanians. They are somehow perennially in a struggle, in a fight that defies common 
sense. Studies in veterinary psychology devote special focus to ‘habituating’ the cat and dog 
as pet animals living under the same roof. For Gina Spadafori, pet columnist, under no 
circumstances should cat-dog introductions be handled by throwing the animals together and 
letting them work out things on their own. “The process must be supervised, and they must 
be handled with planning, care and patience.”428 Going back to the billboard, the message 
pathologizes the conflict, inferring it to be utterly irrational, yet not impossible to be 
contained. Two local Serbian interviewees deconstruct the billboard best. “They [the 
international community] need us to stay here, so that Ahtisaari and Ashton can say ‘look we 
made it. They are living together.”429  We see here how the whole idea of multi-ethnicity is 
autoimmune to itself. While intending to send the message of multi-ethnicity in the virtues of 
tolerance, coexistence etc., KFOR sends the message that tolerating the other essentially 
means keeping it in the abundantly clear boundaries of ‘othering’.  
The whole concept of multi-ethnicity (embedded in the democratizing project) being 
autoimmune to itself is particularly present in the document of the UN envoy to Kosovo, 
Martti Ahtisaari.430 Advocating the so-called ‘best practices from the most prosperous 
Western democracies,’431 the document is seen as the most advantageous example of human 
rights, minority protection and inter-ethnic policies.432  Its Constitutional Provisions provide 
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that Kosovo “shall be democratic, multi-ethnic, have an open economy and have no official 
religion.”433 Each of these ‘decrees’ represent a deliberate intervention into dimensions of 
identity, ideology and history of the local reality. First, deciding arbitrarily to become 
democratic, multi-ethnic, to have an open economy and no official religion, and furthermore 
internalize it in the Constitution434 is undemocratic in practice, as it erodes the very basic 
principle of ‘democratic standards’ of debating and reaching that consensual agreement. This 
comes closer not only to the more emancipatory concept of deliberative democracy,435 but is 
also a cornerstone of the so-called more classical definitions of democracy.436  The discussion 
of whether in a different scenario – that of the ability to choose – Kosovo would still plump 
for the option of being “democratic, multi-ethnic, and having an open economy and no 
official religion”, is not all important at this part. The very message that deciding on 
democracy is to be done non-democratically – not taking into account people’s choice or will 
–  is a representation of its autoimmunity. We are going to ‘make’ you democratic by not 
adhering to democratic procedures / principles, or in other words by killing the principles 
that lead to it. In a similar fashion, Rutazibwa notices that with regard to the Cotonou 
Agreement in EU-Africa relations, “privatisation, liberalisation and market economy are 
suddenly the only way forward to which both parties subscribed.”437 
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The concept of ‘multi-ethnicity’ and how it is to be realised in policy practice is not only 
omnipresent in the document but is basically its modus operandi. Multi-ethnicity was 
established, notwithstanding the fact that Kosovo’s population (especially after the war) was 
rather homogenous with above 90% Albanians.438  Decentralization along ethnic lines was 
put forward as the model for local governance and most of all as a way to guarantee the 
rights and the protection of ethnic minorities. Extensive language rights are guaranteed for 
all minorities provided that they comprise 5% of the population in a community, while in 
most European countries with far more mixed ethnic and linguistic groups, the threshold is 
20%.439  In trying to ascertain the “best” or “highest” international standards intended in this 
case, we see this to be the practice in Finland – Ahtisaari’s birthplace – one of the countries 
with the best record of minority protection in the world. Here Swedish is an official language 
due to the 5% of Swedish speaking Fins440. The ‘5% model, which was reached by way of 
more than a hundred years of controversies and debate in Finland, is therefore suggested to 
Kosovo a mere eight years after the war with Serbia, in a country transitioning from war to 
‘peace’ and from socialism to democracy and open market. In trying to implement multi-
ethnicity in this way, the project as such works against itself, first by being an arbitrary choice 
for the local constituents in the absence of debate on the decision and premises of multi-
ethnicity; and second, by suffocating a number of multi-layered processes of transitional 
justice, conflict resolution, that could potentially lead to a more embedded debate on multi-
ethnicity and extended minority rights. For Hajrulla Çeku, head of the NGO Ec Ma Ndryshe 
in Kosovo, Ahtisaari’s Plan did not give people the opportunity to decide what they wanted.  
“It set forward that Kosovo will have a text-less national anthem – a post-modernist 
experiment; our flag will have Kosovo’s map on it, to fulfil the optical illusion of a state, 
which is ironically similar to the flags of two very dysfunctional states – Cyprus and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.”441  
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Practices like these have been largely elaborated in critiques of the liberal peace.442  For 
Chandler, these are cases of post-liberal states that are “not designed to be independent 
political subjects in anything but name,” but their relationship of external dependency means 
that the domestic political sphere cannot serve to legitimise the political authorities or 
reconstruct their societies.443   
Below we will talk about two different ways in which Ahtisaari’s Plan enforces the principles 
of multi-ethnicity, both leading to multi-ethnicity’s autoimmunity. In the first case, Kosovars 
are stripped of their national, ethnic and sociological identity for the sake of the multi-ethnic 
project aiming to promote “…the peaceful and prosperous existence of all its inhabitants,”444  
which sets forward the idea that Kosovo has inhabitants not citizens (Inhabitant has been 
regularly used in UN’s communication towards Kosovo, while in EU documents reference 
to ‘population’ is noticed).445 Why would this semantic difference deserve attention? Oxford 
Dictionary defines inhabitant as “a person, or animal that lives in or occupies a place.”446 As 
such, Kosovo has inhabitants – who are merely dwellers in this particular location – but it has 
no citizens, as in “persons with legal and political status by which they are entitled to a set of 
rights and privileges.”447  By this token, the term citizen has a sociological and legal attribute, 
while inhabitant does exactly the opposite – stripping the subject off of its sociological 
identification. The idea of infusing the ‘multi-ethnicity’ project in an otherwise clearly ethnic 
based identified environment is autoimmune to itself as it calls for multi-ethnicity while 
stripping the subject off its sociological agency. Arguably, this practice is not limited to 
Kosovo. During the Ohrid Agreement448 in Macedonia, in negotiations mediated by the EU, 
NATO and the US, Solana proposed that the Framework Agreement should not mention 
any ethnic attribution. It was only after major pressure from the ethnic groups in Macedonia 
that the document mentions that “Macedonia is defined as the state of Macedonians, 
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Albanians, Turkish, Serbian and Vlach people who live there.”449  The same ‘technique’, 
albeit different in content, is also evidenced with the wording of ‘communities’ in place of 
ethnic groups and/or ethnic minorities450. While with inhabitants Kosovars are mutilated of 
their sociological agency, in the second case they are mutilated of their ethnic attribution, for 
the sake of the multi-ethnic project. For Hoxha and Çeku, “this neo-colonial approach has 
disfigured and alienated the locals’ history and identity for the sake of the multi-ethnic 
standards.”451 On a similar take, Chandler argues that the EU’s promotion of good 
governance has done little to promote democratic political processes in either Kosovo or 
Bosnia and, as such, the population is seen as “bearers of human rights – rather than as 
‘citizens’ with rights of political equality.”452 
 
In the second case, ethnic and religious differences are made abundantly clear, firstly to 
propagate the rights of minorities in the multi-ethnic project and secondly to codify practices 
of double standards for ethnic minority accommodation. With Ahtisaari’s provisions, 
Kosovo’s parliament has had 20 seats for minorities, of which 10 were reserved for Kosovo 
Serbs, while the others were reserved for the Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Bosniak, Turkish and 
Gorani communities.453 Any seats won through elections were granted in addition to the 
reserved ones. Up until 2014, this praxis indicated mixed results on issues pertaining to 
multi-ethnic representation. With guaranteed seats, the Serbian minority was less willing to 
get organized in party politics, and as a result less enthusiastic about participating in the 
institutional life and being part of the projected multi-ethnic picture. The plan foresaw the 
abandonment of the practice after two electorate mandates following the adoption of the 
Constitution.454  Yet, in the parliamentary vote for the establishment of the so called 
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“Kosovo Armed Forces”455 in 2014, Kosovo Serbs conditioned their pro-vote for the army 
with the request of extending the practice of the reserved seats for yet another mandate. 
According to civil society members in Kosovo, continuing the reserved seats for the Serbian 
minority because of their conditioning undermines inter-ethnic relations and may lead to 
public opinion coming to see the guaranteed Serbian presence in the parliament as a risk.456   
4. In the name of ‘European values’ 
Moving on to the European Union and its structures’ discourse in Kosovo, a shift is 
evidenced from ‘international standards’ of democracy to democratic standards as ‘European 
values’. In fact, the shift is not so much a shift from one single well-defined set of 
‘international standards’ to ‘European values’; rather, at times the discourse seems to meld 
international standards with ‘European values’ and the other way around. For instance, the 
resolution of Kosovo’s status is not just foreseen to be completed through the ‘best 
international standards’ but it “should be based on European values”;457 strengthening the 
decentralization process envisioned through ethno-politics is now given as a “European 
value of cohabitation and multiculturalism”.458  
Since 1999, the EU has been “investing major political and financial efforts to building 
lasting peace and democracy, and to facilitate Kosovo’s progress towards a democratic, 
multi-ethnic society.”459 For Koeth, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the Western 
Balkans in general are a litmus test for EU foreign policy and the EU’s constructed 
subjectivity as an international actor.460  Therefore the way the Balkans are handled in this 
period is formative for how the EU constructs itself as a subject. For Xavier de Marnhac, 
former head of EULEX, “Kosovo’s success is directly linked to EULEX’s and EU’s 
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success.”461  Solana talked about the Balkans as a ‘journey’ that “we must help them to 
complete”. We must also, he says, “help the straggler (Serbia) along.”462  The metaphor of 
the ‘road to Europe’ is often used by Patten, and it develops further. For example, in a 
speech to Bosnians, Patten suggests that the EU can “help build that road….we can flag the 
staging posts, and applaud you as you pass them”, all of which means they will ensure that 
“BiH never has to walk the road to Europe alone.”463  This metaphor has been similarly put 
in place by the then European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) in Kosovo.464  On a 2005 
billboard, EAR placed Kosovo in the centre of a picture, with a beautiful mountain scenery 
in the background where the EU flag waved. The road toward that mountain, and eventually 
to the EU flag was depicted as long and curvy shaped, conveying in this way the idea of the 
EU being always further away, behind Alp like mountains. In the background was a clear 
blue sky with a radiant yellow sun. For local anthropologist Luci and contemporary artist 
Heta, the scenery in the billboard represents the EU’s stance and vision of what Kosovo can 
and has to become. “For each step taken towards this long road, we will get applauded like 
skiers surpassing the flags in the skiing stages.”465  They add that each step Kosovars take 
forward would imply a further step in becoming more European. “The only other options 
are either to move slowly,” like Serbia, the straggler in Solana’s words, “or to move 
backwards. But sideways movements appear to be impossible.”466 In addition to this, we 
suggest that this idyllic representation of a European future, of what Kosovo should want to 
become, marks the road that Kosovo has to take. If we go back to Derrida’s exemplification 
of democracy as freedom to choose as one pleases, the billboard seems to offer neither a 
‘choice’ of the path to be taken, nor, as such, the ‘freedom’ in choosing.  
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While the ‘European future’ is autoimmune with regard to choice as the very precondition of 
democratic decision, examples will be provided below to show the autoimmunization of the 
criteria for the ‘European future’ on a more micro level. The first example of ‘true European 
values’ is imprinted on Kosovo’s flag in which six white stars are posited in an arc above a 
golden map of Kosovo, on a blue field. Each of the six stars represent a “community” - as in 
ethnic minority – in Kosovo.467  The flag was commissioned by the UN and the EU and was 
designed by a local Kosovar. As in other examples of inversed ownership,468  the production 
of such an image is an example not only of how “Europe sees Kosovo,” but also how it is 
envisioned for Kosovo to see Kosovo. The same flag was adopted for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where 10 white stars (resembling the 10 cantons) were posited on top of a 
yellow triangle (the tripartite federation) on a blue field. Both flags have a significant 
resemblance to the EU flag, this way making Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina the first 
real EU countries, even though none of them are part of the EU. Both flags were 
conceptualized and designed to tone down any groups’ national identification with the flag, 
setting forward the EU’s idea of united in diversity with a post- and/or non-national flag. 
Kosovo’s flag was introduced for the first time at Kosovo’s Assembly following the 
declaration of independence in February 17, 2008469.  In this way, the foundation of the new 
state (in its political sense) was associated with the new flag, signalling that the history and 
remembrance of ‘Kosovo’ was born that exact day. The process of adjusting to the usage, 
identification and the embrace of the new flag is still underway. Two million Kosovars, who 
up until that moment had been using their national flags, were introduced to the newly 
founded state, new national anthem and a new flag. The is the construction of ‘year zero’470  
for Kosovo by the EU; not only was a new ‘state’ as structure formed that day, but also a 
new nation (the Kosovar nation) identified with the EU-flavoured national symbols was born. 
The ‘year zero’ also marks the amnesia of an existence of a Kosovo as a one dimensional 
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struggle for independence from its Albanian population, but instead sets it forward as victory 
of the struggle for democracy of all Kosovo’s ‘communities’.  
The second example of ‘European values’ is enshrined in Kosovo’s national anthem. The 
international community had established a ‘competition’ in which “Europe” – a melody 
composed by a local Kosovar was chosen. The selection of an anthem without lyrics, would 
not have any reference to a particular ethnic group.471  “The anthem of Kosovo is text-less. 
You can’t sing it; chant it, or feel it for that matter. You are muted in a way,”472  argues Luci. 
Again, the same practice of a text-less national anthem has been used for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s case. Does this make Kosovo truly or more European than any other EU 
member states who happen to have flags in Billig’s format – as elements of banal nationalism 
to remind us of history, myths, forefathers, struggle, collective identity etc.? All of these 
elements/processes; the flag, the national anthem, are quintessentially linked with Derrida’s 
definition of democracy as embedded in the demos’ freedom to choose and debate. And this 
is not because all of the above are the symbols upon which the identity of a state, group, nation 
is built, rather because of a democratic right to be part of the decision making process that 
led to these processes instead of a mere spectator of the final outcome. 
 
Is the EU simply transplanting its (self-ascribed) post-modern, post-national identity? 
Drawing on Paul Valery’s work on the raise and decline of Europe, Derrida makes rampant 
reference to this autoimmune feature, albeit not focusing strictly on either a particular 
geographical area, or on missions as such. For him, the ‘Decline of Europe’ – as the 
autoimmunity of Europe – belongs to this “age of the finite world that Europe itself has 
precipitated by exporting itself, and by Europeanizing the non-Europeans, awakening, 
instructing, and arming those who aspired only to remain as they were.”473  For him, this 
Eurocentric mondialisation474 – Europe exporting itself – suffers from an autoimmune crisis 
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insofar as its attempts to establish itself worldwide results in a breakdown of its own 
immunity to change and transformation. “What is exported, in a European language, 
immediately sees itself called into question again in the name of what was potentially at work 
in this European legacy itself, in the name of a possible auto-hetero-deconstruction. Or, 
autoimmunity.”475  For Derrida, this autoimmunity is traced back deeply in the European 
thought and identity, which according to him not only gives itself weapons to use against 
itself and against its own limitations, but it gives political weapons to all the peoples and all 
the cultures that European colonialism itself has subjugated”476.      
 
The EU’s efforts to promote multi-ethnicity have expanded to agencies and structures 
which, albeit not part of the EU, share the philosophy of multi-ethnicity as a part of 
‘European values’. The Council of Europe in Kosovo has been extensively involved in co-
publications with the European Union Office in Kosovo primarily on projects related to 
cultural heritage and multi-ethnicity at large. For instance, in a co-publication of the 
European Union and the Council of Europe in “support and promotion of cultural diversity 
in Kosovo”, published in 2012, 14 strip stories on otherness, urban identity, non-material 
cultural identity, tourism, European heritage  etc. are explained in the following manner. The 
stories are built around a group of aliens (UFOs) who have just landed on Earth and are 
trying to figure out the ‘cosmos’ and the way humans live in it (See Annex III). The Council 
of Europe in Kosovo has a long tradition of raising awareness, making public debates and 
also providing programs and lectures for Kosovo’s academic personnel (teachers, lecturers, 
professors) in how they should revise their curricula’s to better incorporate the concept of 
‘cultural heritage’ and also on how they shall teach their pupils and students on cultural 
heritage in the broader paradigm of multi-ethnicity.477  In critical and post-colonial studies 
there is a recurring theme of the missionizer’s – endowed with the democratic values – 
‘lecturing’ attitude towards the ‘primordial’ local who has not yet reached the level to 
appreciate these values.478 Derrida reminds us that one sign or symptom of democracy’s 
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autoimmunity is the way canonical discourses of democracy from Plato to Aristotle onwards 
have had difficulty distinguishing between the goods and evils of democracy, freedom from 
license or democracy from pedagogy. As such, he continues, “the perfectibility of democracy 
is related to the “hyperbolic essence,” the “autoimmune” essence”.479  In the Council of 
Europe’s publication, which is nevertheless not a marginal approach of how the local is 
spoken to, and thus should be seen embedded in the overall discourse, the newly arrived 
UFO represents the local Kosovar, unaware of the (Western-democratic) concept of cultural 
heritage and thus unable to know its importance. In addition to the patronizing discourse, 
the alien-earthly human dichotomy, is again the recurring ‘year zero’ with the EU for 
Kosovo, in that talking and notions of protecting cultural heritage and even multi-ethnicity 
had not existed there before the EU and its fellow international missionizing organizations 
had stepped into Kosovo. Former Yugoslavia, of which Kosovo was part of, was a 
federation of four religious groups and a handful number of sects. Kosovo itself is home to a 
number of Islamic, Christian and Orthodox sites dating back to the 11th and 14th centuries. 
Albanians of Kosovo themselves share both Islamic and Christian religion with intermingling 
traditions and cultures from both, and with situations where churches and mosques are built 
within the same yard.480  Although a number of religious and cultural sites was destroyed 
during the war, their century long preservation had been in place long before the 
introduction of the Council of Europe’s and/or the EU’s lectureship on cultural heritage and 
the wonders of its preservation.  
It is interesting to point out that both the Council of Europe in Kosovo and the EU 
structures display the picture of Prizren city when they want to make the point of what 
cultural heritage is and how important it is. Dating back to the 2nd century AD, the city has a 
rich Ottoman architecture, is home to a diverse ethnic population and hosts important 
religious sites of Christianity, Islam, Judiasim, Orthodoxy and Dervish sects.481  The picture 
of Prizren with all that it represents is shown to Kosovars as a symbol of what the EU wants 
to promote in Kosovo, as if Kosovars have not been stakeholders in making and preserving 
Prizren as it is today.  
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Throughout these strips, the problem of cultural heritage and the solutions for its protection 
are traced and found in a rather irrational conflict between the two humans (corresponding 
to the Serbs and the Albanians) and the UFOs (the internationals) trying to make sense out 
of the situation. While the whole booklet is addressed as ‘teaching cultural heritage to aliens’ 
– in which scenario the locals are the aliens and the ‘lecturers’ are the internationals – in 
some of the strip stories, the internationals become ‘the UFOs’ trying to understand the 
problems and the conflicts of the ‘humans’ – locals. In the strip named “The other,”482 for 
instance, a group of UFOs decide to “study the behaviour of humans” while watching them 
having a disagreement. The UFOs reach the conclusion that while this problem is easily 
solvable, “it is completely different with humans.”483 Positing the problem of heritage as a 
result of a conflict between two groups (the Serbs and the Albanians), the narrative 
pathologizes the conflict as such, setting forward that the problem has something that is 
uniquely distinctive to “these humans”. The international missions deal with Kosovo as a 
struggle of two homogenous, culturally conflicting groups where everyone is simply put in 
one of the two categories. As with the cases with decentralization and human rights, the 
missionizing structures in Kosovo have ethnicized cultural heritage in the Albanian-Serbian 
dichotomy. The ‘solutions’ for cultural heritage are also looked at through the lenses of 
ethnic conflict. “The EU is not interested in protecting the civic cultural heritage (like the 
communist heritage, the anti-fascist legacy etc.). Protection is given to Christian Orthodox 
heritage claimed as cultural heritage but works instead as conflict management.”484 Prishtina-
based scholar of philosophy, Agon Hamza, argues that the trend of “culturalization” of 
ethnic studies (in the Balkans and elsewhere) is a serious problem in academia.485  
5. Conclusion 
This article has contributed to the debate the idea that it is not only with regard to the so-
called ‘top-down’ democracy promotion projects in third countries that practices turn out to 
be essentially undemocratic, but rather that the problem is traceable back to its very core – to 
democracy as a system itself. At a conceptual debate, the passage to democracy, 
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democratization, will have always been associated with license, with taking too many liberties, 
with the dissoluteness of the libertine, with liberalism, indeed perversion and delinquency, 
with failing to live according to the law, with the notion that ‘everything is allowed’, that 
‘anything goes’486. The practices of the international structures in Kosovo discussed in this 
article display the autoimmunity of democracy in the concept, practice and result, showing 
this way the suicidal characteristic of the entire democratic project. Keeping faith with 
Derrida’s elaboration on the autoimmunity of democracy as such, in this article we have 
revealed the suicide of the democratic project in the missions deployed in Kosovo. We have 
to go back for a moment to Churchill’s statement that “democracy is the worst form of 
government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”487  
However, the democratic vote has had its products like Berlusconi in Italy, Erdogan in 
Turkey, Kjaersgard in Denmark and the like. This is not to discuss whether there is a need to 
ask for a ‘more democratic’ system of democracy. This is to remind ourselves that like any 
other concept ‘democracy’ is not an empty term, and, what is more, it is what we decide to 
do, signify, label or export with it.  
In the case of the missions for democracy in Kosovo, autoimmunity is not only evidenced 
because democracy, as Derrida reminds us, has the ability to commit suicide while trying to 
implement itself. In addition to that, due to Kosovo’s peculiar political status, we witness that 
not only does democracy as such commits suicide, but the very mirage or the idea of 
democracy never quite takes form – because it is imposed rather arbitrarily. There has not 
been a ‘socialization’ of the subject with the process, there has not been the necessary and 
somewhat healthy journey of reaching to the promise of democracy. For instance, the ‘5% 
rule’ on language use attained through hundred years debate and still discussed to this very 
day in Finland, when implemented in post-war Kosovo, does not actually reflect nor does it 
contain the same democratic value, not only because technically there has not been a process 
leading to it, but because the very imposition of it, kills its own intent.  
 
If we are to turn the gaze towards the long-term effects of these choices, like the democracy 
sponsors would probably do, consolation is to be found in the idea that in the long term, 
Kosovo would have socialized with these practices and had internalized them. Until it has 
internalized them properly, democracy will remain to come, will remain behind the Alps. The 
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further away from the Alps – from democracy and the EU – the longer the process for 
European values and democracy to come. They are thus never here, never present, and 
ultimately never enough. So is the aspiring subject willing to get closer to the metaphor of 
the ‘Alps’. It is never democratic enough, never egalitarian enough, never multi-cultural 
enough and thus never good enough. Its status is also ‘à-venir’ in that it has to pass through 
stages to prove itself, by appearing (symbolically and/or theoretically) a ‘real’ member of the 
club and by embracing the ‘EU sponsored’ elements of national identification and politico-
economic choices. 
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MetaKosovo: local and international narratives 
Abstract  
This article examines local narratives on Kosovo and their role in crafting and articulating 
interpretations of Kosovo and international missions. Using the concept of ‘home’, as used and 
conceptualised by Jacques Derrida, the article reverses the order of who is ‘guest’ and ‘host’ in 
Kosovo and how that defines the local narratives on the subject. In the first part, attention is 
paid solely to letting local narratives deconstruct themselves, while in the second part we let 
them deconstruct the international narrative on Kosovo. The aim of the article is to present 
Kosovo as a battleground of division and commonality among the narratives and at the same 
time as an ‘impossible’ ‘home’ of all its narratives. In conclusion, some thoughts pave the 
way for the idea of ‘renegotiating’ the concept of ‘home’ with particular focus on ‘home’ in 
interventions and missions and its ultimate influence on the ethics of intervention.  
Key words: hospitality, Derrida, Kosovo, EU.  
1. Introduction 
This article looks at the competing narratives on Kosovo – narratives of its local population 
– in relation to the international narratives on Kosovo. Establishing Kosovo as ‘home’, we 
set forward Derrida’s deconstruction of the dialectics of host and guest in offering and being 
subject to hospitality, respectively.   
The war between Kosovo Albanian majority and Serbian military ended in 1999. NATO 
bombing against Serbia in 1999, was followed by KFOR deployment (NATO-led 
international peacekeeping force), responsible for establishing a secure environment488.  In 
June 1999, after the withdrawal of Serbian military troops, Kosovo was officially under the 
United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNIMIK), whose mission was “…to ensure 
conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo and advance regional 
stability in the western Balkans”489. De jure, Kosovo was still part of Serbia, while de facto 
the state of Serbia was not present in Kosovo any longer. After rounds of UN mediated 
negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, the inability to solve Kosovo’s political status 
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was due to parties’ diametrically opposite views490. Serbia was asking, Kosovo’s reinstatement 
in Serbia; Kosovo on the other side was asking for independence.  In 2007, the UN mediated 
negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, UN envoy Marti Ahtisaari compiled his plan to 
resolve Kosovo’s status, setting the blueprint for its independence491.  In 2008, Kosovo 
declared its unilateral independence, a move swiftly backed by the US, the UK, and other 
Western European countries, yet to this very day, opposed by Serbia, Russia and China 
among others. Kosovo has been recognised by more than 100 states. The European Union 
has not recognised Kosovo’s independence ‘en bloc’ either, and has come up with the 
definition of ‘status neutral’, leaving it up to its member states to decide on their own 
relations with Kosovo492. While UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo is de-facto inexistent since 
the declaration of independence and the adaptation of the Constitution in 2008, in 2009 the 
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was deployed to help and 
monitor Kosovo’s institutions with rule of law programs, particularly in the area of police, 
judiciary and customs493.  
While Serbia maintains its staunch opposition to its independence, Kosovo’s status remains 
contested at the international level as it is not yet a member of the United Nations. Firstly, 
due to its political status, at the international level, Kosovo remains a fault-line between an 
independent state and as part of Serbia at the same time. In this setup, the international 
project is ‘testing’ the creation of the very first post-Westphalian/post-modern political entity 
bypassing the issue of status settlement. Moreover, because of the high degree of 
international intervention and missions, Kosovo has many more of the characteristics of a 
protectorate/semi-protectorate than those of a state. This way, the roles of the ‘host’ (the  
local) and the ‘guest’ (the missioniser) have been reversed. The missioniser has become the 
‘host’ in that it decides, makes decisions and acts on behalf of Kosovo as ‘home’ and on the 
other hand, the local has become the ‘guest’ playing along with the rules set by what was 
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initially the ‘guest’.494  The implication of this reversal at the local level has further entrenched 
the discourse of ethnic groups along the lines of ‘finishing’ and/or contesting  the state - in 
Westphalian terms. Such claims not only speak to the very idea of having and opposing an 
independent state; they are quintessentially linked to the very concept of belonging to a state 
– as in subject of identification.  
Since 1999, Kosovo has been a pivotal case in analysing Western democratic interventions 
and missions. Most studies embark from a positivist and Euro-centric viewpoint analysing 
the legal and political peculiarities and their implications for the missions;495 others take a 
more constructivist turn in analysing how norms and values have played out in this 
context.496  To a large extent, these literature strands are not preoccupied in questioning the 
asymmetrical power relations of the mission and the missionized. Fewer accounts take a 
more critical approach in shedding light on the controversies of international state building 
towards the locals as subject of interventions497 or leftist approach providing the politics of 
capitalism in the day-to-day democratic missions.498 Little or no debate at all has taken on 
post-structuralism or Derrida’s concepts to dwell into international intervention and state-
building in Kosovo, politics of EU enlargement etc.499  With Derrida, the article initially 
invites for an inverse of the guest and host roles, in their initial position to further contribute 
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to the debate of the politics of ‘home’ in international relations and its politics in the case of 
‘unfinished’ countries subjected to international interventions and missions. 
Derrida mentions ‘home’ when deconstructing the concept of hospitality, that is inviting and 
welcoming the ‘stranger’, both on a personal level – how do I welcome the other into my 
home? – and in the level of the state raising socio-political questions about refugees, 
immigrants, foreign languages, minority ethnic groups etc.500  For Derrida, ‘home’ is the 
precondition for hospitality. “The unconditional desire for the home, which is impossible to 
renounce also ‘should not be renounced’, for without the home, ‘there is no door nor any 
hospitality’”,501  thus ‘home’ has also no meaning without ‘host’ and ‘guest. Operationalizing 
Kosovo, we refer to it as ‘home’ of its citizens, groups, communities etc. The agency of 
‘host’ will be given to its local people and the ‘international’ presence in Kosovo will be 
treated as ‘guest’. 
This ‘reversal’ is important, firstly, to shift the gaze to local narratives in understanding how 
Kosovo is conceptualised. Secondly, the developments of the 1990s in Kosovo, along with 
other processes that led to Yugoslavia’s breakup, are largely (and not always rightly) 
explained as a result of inter-ethnic hatred. This led to what Edkins called ‘grand narratives’ 
which conceal the fragility of possible ‘solutions’.502  Being all encompassing, the grand 
narratives are linear and as such they offer an oversimplified ‘cause’ of the problem in 
question and ultimately another oversimplified ‘solution’ in how to deal with it. She argues 
that in grand narratives, searches for solutions assume they know what the ‘problem’ is and 
focus on the need to solve it, not to engage with the results or implications of what is 
happening or has happened. Aligning with Edkins, in this article we ‘trouble’ the linear 
narrative on Kosovo, to further reverse the pre-established concept of the conflict and argue 
that, like in any other conflict/war, the events of 1999 in Kosovo were a struggle for 
domination and power. Amending Clinton’s famous motto:, “No, it’s not the old myths and 
ethnic hatred. It’s the political power struggle, stupid”.503  We go beyond the dichotomous 
view renegotiating the way narratives on Kosovo are presented – as an ‘either/or’ equation 
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between the Serbs and the Albanians and the international actors as the non-aligned, 
objective actor who seeks to do something in Kosovo beyond petty ethnic politics504.   
Narrative research is widely used in interpretivist social science and is generally to give voice 
to otherwise marginalized discourses and/or groups.505  David Campbell suggests that a 
concern with narratives can be important when it comes to making judgments about 
competing accounts of contentious issues, issues of both interpretation and representation 
should be taken into account, because far from being one mode of historical representation 
among many, they are a “meta-code” for the creation of shared meaning.506  Narratives are 
not restricted to a post factum shaping of events;507  it is not merely the “facts” that define the 
actions but also the “structural and figurative apprehensions of these facts”.508  MetaKosovo 
is an inspired term from Campbell’s MetaBosnia, where he sets forward his concern with the 
array of practices through which competing narratives of ‘Bosnias’ come to be, rather than 
assuming a pre-given, externally existing Bosnia. He brings the concept from White’s usage 
of Metahistory in which he wrote that in knowledge production in history, “when it is a 
matter of choosing among these alternative visions of history, the only grounds for 
preferring one over another are moral or aesthetic ones.509 MetaKosovo deconstructs 
narratives on Kosovo, what each means, and how each narrative claims ownership in its own 
story and ultimately claims ownership on Kosovo. Local and international narratives are looked 
in a competing battleground, to conclude that though the concept of home is never quite 
finished and always prone to interruptions, in ‘unfinished’ states, it is permanently vulnerable 
of the impossibility to be home as such.  
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2. Kosovo’s narratives 
Being a project of several ‘stakeholders’, Kosovo has a number of narratives, none of which 
are compact; rather, they are constantly deconstructed in their inner struggles. From the 
conducted interviews, two groups of narratives become visible: narratives of locals and narratives 
of internationals. The first, Kosovo as historical justice, denotes the stories of its peoples, 
ethnic/cultural groups and explains Kosovo as the memory, identity and future of its own 
population. The second, Kosovo project explains Kosovo as home where democratic values of 
international intervention are at stake. Here, Kosovo is a success story of the interveners, 
primarily: 1) the merits of NATO’s first attack on a sovereign land as ‘humanitarian 
intervention’; 2) as a success story of conflict management and peace building under the 
most ambitious UN mission in history;510 3) as a triumph of Western democratic values in a 
post-conflict/post-socialist setting; and 4) as a site of ‘European values’ and ‘best European 
practices’, unfolded via the EU presence in Kosovo and the largest Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) mission deployed to date, (EULEX).  
2.1 Kosovo  as historical justice 
In the ‘local narratives’, we re-return ‘home’ to Kosovo’s people, acknowledge it as their 
historical justice and let their ‘home’ deconstruct itself. ‘Home’ in this narratives is also read as a 
sense of belonging, dignity and respect – not only of having a ‘home’ as such, but more 
importantly being the host of it.  
2.1.1 Albanians: Kosovo fetish 
In the Albanian narrative, we deconstruct the representation of Kosovo as myth in the 
interviews, anecdotal evidence,511  literature on Kosovo’s national struggle,512  and media 
discourse (television and news portals). Three news sources available online were consulted: 
‘Koha’, the web-portal of one of Kosovo’s oldest daily newspapers; ‘GazetaExpress’, the 
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electronic newspaper mostly read in urban areas; and ‘Telegrafi’, the first web-based news 
portal in Kosovo and has the highest clicks per day. Considering that ‘myth’ and 
‘mythologies’ are rather common references in writings on the history and politics of the 
Balkans, it is important to clarify that myth in this case does not imply anything to do with 
the ‘truthfulness’ of stories. Rather, it is more a term to indicate sacredness of Kosovo in the 
Albanian narrative. This is neither an attempt to claim a linear narrative of Kosovo 
Albanians,  nor to look at ‘nation’ and ‘ethnic group’ as homogenous and static categories; 
these concepts are always contested and dynamic. However, literature on nationalism and 
field work evidence reveal that when it comes to the paradigmatic issue – which for societies 
in the making is the foundation of a state – there is an overarching consensus on statehood – 
Kosovo’s statehood in this case. Looking at the ‘reproduction’ of its historical past, we 
develop that [for Kosovo Albanians] ‘independence’ has framed Kosovo’s history for the 
past hundred years and to a large extent continues to frame its present as well. In this 
narrative, Kosovo is the historical justice of people who have lived in inhumane conditions in 
the Yugoslav federation. It is the Kosovo entrenched in the national (imagined) memory and a 
dreamlike project for making it an independent state.  
The post factum narratives of the Kosovo Albanians provide as if the fight for ‘independent 
Kosovo’ has always been linear, uninterrupted, cohesive and unambiguous. The imagined 
linear and non-contested project for ‘independent Kosovo’ is far more shaped in what 
Campbell calls the post factum phase of events rather than as an undisputed and uninterrupted 
project for the past hundred years. Craig Calhoun notices that “schoolbooks of histories of 
nations commonly present them as always already there, they’re actually product of a 
struggle”.513 Particular ‘interruptions’ of this project are noticeable from the time when 
extended autonomy was required during the Ottoman period; extension of cultural and 
national rights throughout different interceptions of the Yugoslav federation in the 70s a 
period which the Kosovo Albanians remember as the golden age of their existence in 
Yugoslavia;514  from the 80s onwards, especially with the codification of a ‘Dardanian’ 
Kosovo conceptualized by what was known as Kosovo’s President in the 90s, Ibrahim 
Rugova, the ‘independence’ project takes more of a shape that is reflected in the post factum 
phase. Lastly, KLA’s motto of uprising against Serbian military in Kosovo was initially calling 
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for Kosovo’s unification with Albania and was later ‘metamorphosed’ into an independence 
project. Albert Heta notices, the idea of making Kosovo a new independent state 
[independent from Albania as well] is a clear example of how far the ‘negotiation’ of the so 
called national project has gone. “Therefore, this state [Kosovo as it is now] is a ‘betrayal’ to 
the original idea of what was conceptualized to be done with it as a national project”.515  
For the Albanians, Kosovo’s (remembered) organised struggle for self-determination is 
traced back to 1878 along with other nation-state movements in the region at the threshold 
of the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The word ‘remembered’ is used because, rather than 
being an event as such, it describes more a social imaginary, which for Anderson is “not as a 
set of ideas; rather it is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of 
society”…and it presents the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they 
fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations 
that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations. As such, Kosovo has never been a ‘state’ in its own right, rather, part of 
something bigger (the Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia etc.). It has never been a ‘home’, rather a 
part (room, corridor, back yard) of bigger homes, or mansions. For a long time, the issue of 
‘independence’ and ‘statehood’ in Kosovo has been a project of different segments of society 
which do not necessarily share ideological, political and cultural identity. The project of 
building a ‘home’, and more importantly being the ‘host’ of it, has had as its promoter the 
pacifists of Kosovo’s Democratic League (KDL), who refused to resort to violence against 
Serbian troops, maintaining that a Gandhi-like ideology of resistance and pacifism was the 
only way through. Yet Kosovo as ‘home’ has also been a project of the guerrilla movement, 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) – the insurgent against the Serbian army in 1999. The 
collective memory and the current struggle of the nation, considers independence as 
something sacred: sacred to religious levels characterised by devotion, adoration and, most 
importantly, sacrifice.516 Hobsbawm argues that nationalism is a civic religion that replaces 
religion, “because of the near pathological character of nationalism, nations, inspire love, and 
often profoundly self-sacrifice”.517  In a similar vein, Anderson reminds us that while 
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historians, diplomats, politicians and social scientists are quite at ease with the idea of 
‘national interest’, for most ordinary people of whatever class the whole point of the nation 
is that it is interestless. Just for that reason, it can ask for sacrifices. 
While never materialised, Kosovo is this ‘home’ that has been dreamt of and fought for. It 
has always been idealised, produced and reproduced in the collective narrative. In Spectres of 
Marx, Derrida writes that as soon as there is production, there is fetishism, idealisation, 
autonomisation and automatisation, dematerialisation and spectral incorporation – 
fetishization on which capitalist abstraction is based - which eventually turns concepts into 
religion.518  For him, only reference to the religious world would enable this sort of autonomy 
of the ideological and its automaticity.519 ‘Home’ for Derrida renders the “misty realm of 
religion” and the secret introduced into fetishism and ideological and ultimately allows the 
production and fetishising autonomisation of this form. The collective memory views an 
‘independent Kosovo’ as a perennial cause; it repeats it throughout the imagined historical 
events and struggles and idealises it as sublime, turning it ultimately into a fetish. It becomes 
a mirage, and at the same time loses its intrinsic meaning. It is not thought of simply as a 
‘home’ to live in and be able to own materially. Rather, it is an ideal, a reparation and above 
all, justice. 
In time, Kosovo had been downgraded into this ideology inseminating resistance, pride, 
sacrifice and sense of collectivity. Most Kosovo Albanians who saw Kosovo ‘liberated’ in 
1999, had a vague or no memory of a normally functioning state apparatus.520  The ‘state’ 
(Serbia/Yugoslavia) was the enemy and the structure to be feared, resisted and escaped 
from.521  The ‘state’ (Kosovo) they were asking for was a restoration of their lost possibility 
of having a ‘home’ and being acknowledged as ‘hosts’. The fetishism of what ‘state’ is also 
lingers after all these years in daily political life.522  In the account of their experience in 
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Kosovo, two UNMIK officials wrote that “after so many years of life and death, struggling, 
survival and sacrifice, the Kosovar voter was not educated to request from the elected 
politicians to deal with day-to-day issues like irrigation or waste management”.523  On a 
similar note, Kosovar journalist Baton Haxhiu argues that “it is difficult to make that shift 
now…to think of a state as a state that is there to simplify and regulate your life. It is in our 
subconscious that we don’t deserve liberty as people but we have it because something 
supernatural has happened”.524  
Fetishised, Kosovo becomes the political and social identity of the Albanians. Campbell argues 
that identity is always defined by difference, saying that there are no pre-existing foundations 
that determine an identity; instead they are constructed through the differences between 
inside and outside. First as the need to identify with an independent state as ‘home’, second, 
in opposition to the other  (Serbia and the Serbs), not only as perpetrators but also in the 
obstruction that Serbia makes to the very idea of having an independent Kosovo. In Minding 
the Gap: The Subject of Politics, Laclau and Zac argue that people underscore a generally felt 
need to belong to society, because it is this sense of belonging that establishes our identity 
and allows for agency.525  In ‘unfinished’ societies, the sense of belonging and identifying 
with one’s country is even higher. For instance, toponyms like “Kurdistan”, “Catalonia” or 
“Quebec” become a common vernacular in the identity of the respective groups. 
Throughout the Yugoslav period, refusing to say “I come from Yugoslavia” from Kosovo 
Albanians was common, notwithstanding that it would not arbitrarily imply any sort of 
ethnic attribution. The vast majority would have preferred to respond “I am from Kosovo”, 
as to denote that they did not see themselves as part of the political state they lived in.526  
Rather, they saw themselves and hence wanted to be acknowledged as people, ‘hosts’, of this 
imagined ‘home’. The term ‘unfinished’ does not stand in front of its obvious binary 
opposite ‘finished’. If Kosovo, Kurdistan etc., were to be referred to as ‘unfinished’ 
countries, that does not automatically imply that Switzerland, Belgium etc. are ‘finished’ 
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cases. When operationalizing the narratives and their engagement with the necessity of 
having a ‘home’, we should bear in mind to treat Kosovo as ‘unfinished’ – not home yet – in 
the sense of not having achieved to set the Westphalian contours of a state (i.e. 
internationally recognized borders, legitimacy etc.). Currently, it is rather common to see 
Kosovars at conferences or international meetings stating that “I come from the Republic of 
Kosovo”. This, however, should not be seen as a mere identification with a ‘republic’ in a 
material way. “Kosova Republikë” (Kosovo is Republic) was a common illegal graffiti slogan 
in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, when Kosovo’s autonomy had been revoked and 
it implies on-going struggle. 
 
2.1.2 The Serbs: Kosovo the injustice of international aggression 
In the Serbian discourse, the events of 1999 are not known as a war between Serbia’s 
government and the Albanian majority. In the interviews with Serbian respondents,527  in the 
Serbian media,528 and Serbian school books,529  the events of 1999 are referred to as “NATO 
aggression”, which was then followed by the internationalisation of Kosovo’s case. The 
removal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the installation of international structures is also 
seen as a Western project for creating an Albanian Kosovo while belittling the Serbs. This in 
turn defines the historical injustice.  
In this narrative, Kosovo is also unfinished as ‘home’ and identity. Whose ‘home’ is it now 
that it is not part of Serbia anymore? What is its identity and more importantly how does it 
affect the identity of local Serbs? These questions are not merely rhetorical, considering how 
porous the concept of ‘home’ is in the case of Kosovo. For instance, since the end of the 
war, Kosovo Serbs have been living in three different political contexts/‘homes’ at the same 
time, depending on which area they were located. Their narratives should also be viewed in 
this shifting context. The Serbs in south-east Kosovo were living under the ‘Albanian system’ 
and later in ‘independent’ Kosovo; the Serbs in the south and Gračanica have been living in 
“Kosovo under UNSC1244” (Kosovo’s official denomination while under UNMIK), while 
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those in the north have been living in ‘Serbia’. Northern Kosovo is almost exclusively 
inhabited by Serbs and it includes cities of North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Leposavić and 
Zvečan. Because there has not been a uniform legal system of governing and the ‘borders’ 
(political and administrative) were porous, one could basically ‘choose’ under which authority 
to live.  
The city of Mitrovica – divided at the bridge over the Ibar/Ibër river between an Albanian 
part in the south and a Serbian part in the north – marks the ‘border’ between the four 
ethnically Serbian municipalities and the rest of Kosovo. Derrida argues that boundary (as in 
border) defines the line where one thing ends and another begins, and as much as it is about 
identification, it is about exclusion.530  Derrida exemplifies the border distinction pointing 
that whereas in the case of the Swiss-Italian border in Mont Blanc is not only recognized as 
convention and nobody really cares which rocks of the mountain are to be excluded or 
included from each country, in the case of the Berlin Wall the exclusion did not apply to 
rocks but rather to people. Until 2013, the ‘border’ marked the end of the local and European 
structures jurisdiction (police, courts etc.), making the ‘north’ a fault line between Serbia and 
Kosovo. Except from UNMIK, since 1999, Serbian municipalities in the north have been 
outside of the local jurisdiction and control, while it took more than three years for EULEX 
to deploy its control in the northern part due to local Serbs uprising against it. Showing their 
opposition to what they call Kosovo’s secession from Serbia, they have protested and 
resisted new establishments while maintaining ties with Serbia instead. The ‘border’ has 
become more solid, which for Kosovo Albanians has been the greatest and most dangerous 
failure of the international community. For UNMIK, any intervention to include the north in 
‘Kosovo’s’ jurisdiction was off the table because it would have incited violence from the 
Serbs and would have jeopardised the ‘stability’ achieved in Kosovo;531  EULEX, on the 
other hand, cannot take action because they “lack the capabilities to do so and most 
importantly because any move to do so would imply that EULEX is supporting Kosovo’s 
independence and that would outrage the Serbs”.532 
The ‘border’ at the bridge does not only mark the division of Albanians and Serbs and even 
Serbs and the ‘others’ of Kosovo. When passing Mitrovica’s bridge, one also transcends 
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‘Kosovo’ and finds oneself in Serbia. The cars carry Serbian number plates (if they carry any), 
mobile phones receive the message ‘Welcome to Serbia’ and one is automatically connected 
to Serbian phone companies. Schools, institutions and the like have the labels of Serbian 
ministries and institutions. In supermarkets one can only purchase goods ‘Made in Serbia’ 
and everything is paid in ‘dinar’ – Serbia’s currency.533 
‘North’ is least of all a geographical notion. When passing the ‘border’/bridge, one also travels 
in time. The city’s scenery goes back to the socialist/Yugoslav setting of the 1990s. A state of 
emergency and ‘securitisation’ is immediately felt as there are no signs of police or any 
security structure, and EU officials patrol in bullet-proof cars and vests. Banal nationalism as 
exemplified by Billig534 is omnipresent, with ‘patriotic’ slogans and Serbian flags. Elements of 
banal nationalism are equally present in the Albanian inhabited cities. It is not mentioned in 
the ‘Albanian narrative’ because the existence of two ‘national flags’ in the their case, (the 
Albanian double headed eagle flag and the newly introduced Kosovo flag) deserves a more 
thorough elaboration than the space allow it in here. While in a silent war with the Albanian 
majority, the Serbs in the north are fierce opponents of the international presence too. They 
see the US and the EU/EULEX –  not so much the UN – as structures which are there to 
make Kosovo an independent state in which the Serbs are side-lined by the Albanian 
majority. The feeling of being abandoned/betrayed by Serbia itself has increased, since 
negotiations started between Belgrade and Prishtina.535  Posters of Serbia’s and Kosovo’s 
prime ministers shaking hands in EU High Representative Catherine Ashton’s office are 
omnipresent in the city, captioning “We will never forget”. “For 15 years, I protest against 
the Prishtina’s secessionism. And now what? Dacic goes to Brussels and kisses with Thaçi 
and Ashton”, argues a local in North Mitrovica.536  
For Serbs in Gračanica and other parts of Kosovo, the situation is slightly different. 
Although retaining the dissatisfaction with Kosovo (eventually) becoming a fully-fledged 
independent state – an Albanian-hosted ‘home’ – most of them are already part of Kosovo’s 
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institutions and/or work with the international structures in Kosovo. For them, the post-
1999 period is all about the Albanians, but because Kosovo has to appear ‘multi-ethnic’ and 
‘tolerant’ abroad, the international structures want to keep the Serbs to make that point.  
 
“We [the Serbs] are merely a decoration here. Brussels and Washington need us here so that they can 
say that Kosovo is the country of everyone. Least of all it is of the Serbs; it’s not of the Albanians either. 
The West lures the Albanians with power just to make its agenda happen”, argues Nenad Maximović, 
local Serb in Gračanica working with NGOs .537  
 
For him, Kosovo Serbs are not on the agenda of any of the ‘stakeholders’ who have power 
over Kosovo. He adds that The EU is negotiating with Dačić and Thaçi on Kosovo’s future, 
but interests of Kosovo Serbs are not represented. “Serbia is trying to buy its own way to the 
EU; Kosovo is buying its independence and the EU is showing they deserved the Nobel 
Prize”538. Overall, the Serbs in Kosovo struggle with another fault line, on the one hand, 
opposing what appears to be a Kosovo Albanian hosted ‘home’ and arguing for Kosovo’s 
restoration as part of Serbia, and on the other hand, trying to redefine their place in the 
upcoming ‘home’ and redefining the meaning of ‘home’.  
2.1.3 Multi-ethnic Kosovo: The insignificant ‘others’ 
Literature on developments of the 1990s in Kosovo is entrenched in narrative of two 
characters (the Albanians and the Serbs) and one single topic – the Balkan, tribal-like 
eruption of violence, rooted in myths and historical past.539  Other minorities (ethnic, 
religious, cultural, etc.) hardly trigger even a marginal debate.540  This has not only further 
mystified the whole debate of what exactly happened during the war but it has also 
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influenced policy choices on how to deal with it. If other groups are marginalised in the 
narrative and are treated as a liminal anomaly, we must at least ask why. Being smaller in 
number and structurally detached from high politics, Roma, Bosniaks, Turks, Croats, Ashkali 
have remained outside of the dichotomous debate. In the international community’s 
discourse, minority politics, human rights, or even the whole concept of cultural heritage 
have been downgraded as ‘rights’ to accommodate the Serbian minority in the new 
settlement.541  The Plan is heavily  based on the logic of granting asymmetrical power to the 
Serbs. Based on the concept of multi-ethnicity, the document offers extended rights for the 
ethnic minorities with particular emphasis to the rights of Serbs. Extended religious and 
linguistic rights are foreseen for the Serbian minority alongside with 10 reserved 
parliamentary seats for Kosovo Serbs and 10 others for other ethnic minorities. The values 
of ‘communities’ and minorities appear to be not that important when it comes to other, non-
Serb minorities.  
The Roma, for instance, who in the eyes of the Albanians are seen as collaborators of the 
Serbs during the war, are ‘shifted’ into the domain of the Serbs.542  The politics of ‘home’ in 
the case of Roma is not as simple as and as easily generalizable as with other ethnic 
minorities in the case of Kosovo, precisely because of Roma’s diasporic identification. 
Because a thorough ethnographic and sociological analysis of it is beyond this paper’s scope, 
the article analyses them as one of the ‘group’ in a volatile ethnic environment. Throughout 
1999-2010, around 200 Roma families were internally displaced by UNMIK to what was to 
be a temporary camp near Plemetin. Medical evidence provided that most Roma children 
born in the camp carry toxic substances in their blood.543  For ten years, human rights 
organisations, such as International Committee of the Red Cross, Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International, European Roma Rights Centre, Society for Threatened People, 
Refugees International, have highlighted how this camp is located near industrial zones, and 
contaminated with lead and other forms of toxic waste. In this case, the inhumane conditions 
of Roma were not hampering the ‘multi-ethnic’ image of Kosovo as much as was, for instance, 
the inability of Serbs and Albanians to sell their home-grown vegetables at a joint market. 
After all, the Roma scandal was a violation of human rights principles (strictly speaking); it 
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did not constitute a violation of ‘community rights’, ‘opportunities for the communities’ or the ‘multi-
ethnic’ image of Kosovo. This does not only display the utter discriminatory logic of 
attribution but most of all it detaches the concept of minority rights from the basic human rights 
concept and ultimately displaying the pervertibility of ‘multi-ethnicity’.  
Rrahmon Stollaku, a local Roma from Fushë-Kosova, initially employed at the Ministry for 
Communities and the Return, explains how Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians are simply not 
seen as part of the problem/solution. Despite the 10% quota for employing non-Albanian 
communities in public institutions, Serbs were mostly favoured, for political reasons. 
“Nobody will be shocked if there is an open discrimination towards a Roma, but if that 
happens against a Serb, all international media will be alarmed”.544  Shpejtim Limani, a local 
from Gadime (after Albanians, Ashkali community is the second largest in this town) argues 
that despite the ‘population percentage’ of Ashkali minority, the Serbs are given priority in 
employment and education.545  
Kosovo’s Turks did not openly ‘favour’ any particular side during the war, but were 
nonetheless seen as allies of the Albanians both by the later and the Serbs, mainly due to 
religious proximity.546  Concentrated in Prizren and eastern Kosovo, they were more 
organised to benefit in the post-war period with the Albanians in power, by developing 
further ties with Turkey and benefiting from decentralisation to extend their cultural and 
linguistic rights.547  As with other ethnic minorities, a quota is set for their representation in 
public institutions, although this in no way represents their accommodation in society at 
large.548  
Bosniaks and Croats have a rather hybrid post-war identification. Whereas during the war 
they were seen as opponents of the Serbs due to the previous wars in their mother states, 
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they were not as well accommodated in the aftermath, due to linguistic and cultural 
proximity to the Serbs.549  Along with the Roma, they remain on the margins of both the 
Serbo-Albanian struggle and the international project.    
In the case of Roma, Turks, Bosniaks and Ashkali, Kosovo tries to become multi-ethnic by 
sidelining them. ‘Mutli-ethnicity’ mentions Serbs as a marked category, whereas the rest are 
simply ‘others’. They are insignificant not only being marginalised in the narrative but above 
all being a group of ‘others’, with no name or agency. It becomes imperative to ask then how a 
minority group or, in EU’s language “a community” is defined? Who and for whom the picture 
of Kosovo as a home of “all communities” is important? The concept of ‘multi-ethnicity’ and 
‘home of all communities’ implies importance, relevance and equality. Yet certain groups appear 
to be more important and more relevant for the multi-ethnic picture.  
 
2.2 Kosovo Project: From UNMIKISTAN to EULEKSPERIMENT 
The missionizer will be reinstated in the position of ‘guest’, to further understand the 
construction of international narrative of Kosovo as ‘home’.  
UNMIK’s period (1999-2008) was characterised by the logic of ‘“stability”  above all’.550 
Defined in terms of inter-ethnic relations, lack of physical violence between Serbs and 
Albanians marked ‘stability’ and all other issues were subordinate to it.551  This was even in 
cases where basic democratic principles had to be violated, such as the case with Prishtina-
based newspaper Dita in 2000. After reporting that a suspected Serb, who had been involved 
in the war against the Albanians, was employed by UNMIK, the head of UNMIK at that 
time, Bernard Kouchner, passed a controversial regulation in “prohibiting media to incite 
violence” and the newspaper was closed.552 The regulation stated that “owners, operators, 
publishers and editors shall refrain from publishing personal details of any person, including 
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name, address or place of work, if the publication of such details would pose a serious threat 
to the life, safety or security of any such person through vigilante violence or otherwise”.553  
Failure to comply with the rules would result in the “seizure of equipment and/or printed 
material; and suspension or close down of operations”.554  The regulation had further 
implications in prohibiting other media from engaging with investigative journalism and/or 
openly criticising the international administration.555  The aim to maintain ‘stability’ was utterly 
undemocratic, not only in practice but also in content.  Practices like these – where the locals 
were lectured about democracy while the mission was not adhering to basic democratic 
principles itself – led to frustration and the coining of the term ‘UNMIKISTAN’ (See Annex 
IV). The ending ‘stan’ is Farsi for land, widely used in other Middle-Eastern languages. For 
instance, ‘Afghanistan’ means ‘the land of the Afghans’. That in turn means that Afghanistan 
is not the land of anybody else. It is not the land of Algerians, for instance. By the same 
token, UNMIKISTAN not only denotes Kosovo as ‘the land of UNMIK’ but at the same 
time it tells that this is not ‘the land’ of somebody else. It appropriates it. UNMIK had an 
unprecedented and all-encompassing mandate, being in charge of the executive, legislative 
and judicial functions with which it practically ‘appropriated’ Kosovo. During interviews, 
locals were using UNMIKISTAN to indicate that the mission had turned Kosovo into a 
corrupt/oligarchic/poor/former Soviet-like republic, where debate, power and decision-
making rested in a higher nomenclature, detached from its population.556  
During the EU mission ‘“multi-ethnicity”, “rule of law” and “European values” above all’ became 
omnipresent. Like its predecessor, EULEX is trying its best ‘models’ in promoting 
democracy in Kosovo. This has created a sense of living in a laboratory where locals are used 
as units of analysis in the subsequent experimentation process.557  When it comes to EULEX, 
the criticism is fiercer, firstly because expectations were much higher than what the mission 
seems to be able to deliver, and secondly, because it was seen as an opportunity to break the 
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‘inefficient’ trajectory of UNMIK. For instance, EULEX took on UNMIK’s practice of 
impunity of high-level officials as a commitment for its rule-of-law program. However, 
despite the action taken in dramatic scenes, where ministers, deputies, bank governors were 
publicly arrested, no one in high levels of power was ever judged.558 The high-profile accused 
were released on grounds of lack of evidence, recalled to court again and released. Actions 
like these have lowered mission’s popularity, coining it ‘EULEKSPERIMENT’ – a graffiti 
omnipresent in Prishtina (See Annex V).559  ‘EULEKS’ is the Albanian and Serbian 
pronunciation of EULEX, while the bold ‘KS’ letters are commonly used as a code for 
‘Kosovo’. While experimenting with the mission, they are also experimenting with us locals 
too, argues local security studies scholar Abit Hoxha. “The recent EULEX advertisements 
have on their background “Mission Impossible” movie theme song.560  It is rather unclear 
though, whether fighting corruption is impossible for EULEX itself or whether it is 
impossible to fight corruption in Kosovo. Part of EULEX communication campaign, were 
flyers saying “EULEX has done nothing to fight corruption and serious crime… More than 
200 people and counting…” (See Annex VI), to cynically respond to local criticism. Legal 
expert Betim Musliu, argues that on top of everything, EULEX seems to be failing in its own 
public relations too. “One cannot brag about procedural acts. ‘Success’ in the judiciary is 
claimed on closed cases and verdicts”.561  Interestingly EULEKSPERIMENT is not only 
popular amongst locals. Several EULEX officials use the term too. “EULEKSPERIMENT 
indeed! A lot of what we do in Kosovo is experimental. Some of the experiments are 
successful, others less successful”.562  
3. Conclusion: ‘Unfinished’  
In this article, we have tried to ‘give’ Kosovo back as ‘home’ to its own people and by 
reinstating their ‘host’ status we have acknowledged their narrative as a story of their ‘home’. 
Yet, the very attempt in defining Kosovo as ‘home’ and more so, proclaiming its ‘host(s)’ and 
‘guest(s)’ was faced with the very impossibility to do so. Although the reader was initially 
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required to accept the original roles of locals as ‘host’ and missionizer as ‘guest’, the 
distinction overthrew itself. While we have seen the locals claiming Kosovo as ‘home’ on 
grounds of historical justice, identity and nation-state formation, Kosovo is also a constructed 
‘home’ where the international missions edify Western democratic values of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’, peacebuilding and democracy promotion. Furthermore, in establishing and 
promoting its values in this ‘home’, in deciding for how long to stay in implementing these 
values, in having the authority to edify the ‘best models’,  the missionizer earns the status of  
a ‘host’. Derrida’s concept of ‘undecidability’ – as in the impossibility of attributing something 
with certainty – is nowhere so organically linked as in the case of Kosovo.563  Undecidability 
as the attempt to trouble dualisms, or more accurately, to reveal how they are always already 
troubled; that it doesn’t conform to dichotomy and as such is both present and absent at the 
same time.564 Kosovo as ‘home’ and its narratives deconstruct themselves ceaselessly and 
turn it into the point of division and commonality of all narratives. Both international and local 
narratives are always already both subject and object, yet fully neither at the same time. They 
exist and are destroyed by their own logic. Their autoimmune subjectivity is inherently 
undecidable. They themselves are incapable of accepting ‘ownership’ and this reveals their 
own instability. 
On the one hand, all the narratives claiming Kosovo, see the latter as ‘home’. At the same 
time, it is not fully ‘home’ of any of the narratives. As such, it cannot be ‘home’. The 
impossibility of identifying Kosovo within narratives also makes it an ‘undecidable’. The 
difficulty lies in identifying it as ‘home’, and identifying the ‘host(s)’ and the ‘guest(s)’. Here, 
Kosovo is a battleground of competing/struggling stories – stories of ‘host(s)’ and ‘guest(s)’. 
Each of them struggles for supremacy and legitimacy. At the same time, each of them 
struggles for survival. The Albanian narrative seeks legitimacy as justice after the catharsis, 
seeks supremacy as the right of the ‘victim’ and survival to build and own a ‘home’ (as in a 
sovereign state). The Serbian narrative seeks legitimacy for the ‘home’ they  had and asserts 
that they are equally a victim of a broader project of intervention. Narratives of the Roma, 
Turks, Bosniaks struggle primarily with survival in a dichotomous battleground between the 
Serbs and the Albanians but also as narratives on their own. Lastly, the international 
narrative seeks legitimacy in Kosovo as its successful project, a success story of interventions 
and missions – despite contestation from locals. Every narrative which claims it, ‘deserves’ it 
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and at the same time each of them is contested, implausible and weak. That is, each of them 
both ‘own’ it and at the same time are alien to their ‘owning’.  
On the other hand, Kosovo is also an arena of shared/common narratives. If we were to 
think home as the place where ‘ethics’ are, Kosovo is ‘home’ to all narratives that trace in it 
their stories, histories, memories, values and also ethics. It is a point of commonality primarily 
for the two dichotomous narratives, seen as binary opposites or mutually exclusive stories. 
The Serbs and the Albanians have reached a historical point in their claims on Kosovo, 
where they share Kosovo as a state beyond ‘home’ (beyond sovereignty). For the Serbs, 
Kosovo as their previous ‘home’ is beyond remedy, for the Albanians Kosovo as their 
new/legitimate ‘home’ is beyond reach. Thus it is ‘home’ of both and none at the same time. 
It is not present in either way. Above all, all narratives presented in this article share the 
“Kosovo to come” – Kosovo that is not here, not present. Talking about democracy to come, 
Derrida argues that “for democracy remains to come, not only it will remain indefinitely 
perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but belonging to the time of the 
promise”.565  So it is with Kosovo. In all of the narratives, it exists only as a promise. It is a 
promise to happen in the future. As for now, it is only possible as impossible. Its 
impossibility is the condition of its possibility. As such, it is defined as the very ideal of 
Kosovo, by the lack of its presence. It inscribes support or adherence to believe in it. Finally, 
Kosovo as ‘home’ is hospitable to all narratives, just as much as it is hostile. What does this 
mean then for the concept of ‘home’ and its position towards intervention? What about the 
concept of mission? Even though the concept of ‘home’ offers both the possibility to 
welcome the other and be hospitable, it incites brutal responses towards others in the name 
of protecting the ‘home’; it should be defended for the very notion of a desire to have a 
‘home’. On similar grounds, Derrida has defended the ‘home’ as “the unconditional desire, 
which is impossible to renounce and should not be renounced, for without home, there is no 
door nor any hospitality”.566  Thus the very existence of it makes the welcoming of the other 
and more broadly ‘hospitality’ possible. We do not have to choose or give up options or 
narratives; rather, we can engage deeper with renegotiating ‘home’ as always to come. 
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Part III  
 
Part III provides a summary of main issues covered in the thesis,  concluding remarks 
and a debate for further research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
158 
 
Conclusion 
1. General Conclusions  
In shedding light on the puzzle, this thesis evidences four premises stemming from the four 
articles.  
a) With ‘democracy, rule of law and human rights’ becoming the New Holy Trinity of the 
West, the missionizing of the other is materialized on two premises 1) pathologizing 
the other as something intrinsically corrupt and 2) objectifying the other as a 
something that is to be studied, experimented with, to test models that can be further 
tested for generalizations. Pathologizing leads to fragments or echoes of neo-coloniality 
as the local Kosovar is stripped of its sociological agency, while objectifying leads to 
fragments of racism as the local is stripped of its human agency.  
b) With regard to the EU relations with Kosovo, the EU operates in thin lines between 
hospitality and hostility. With regard to the EU mission deployed in Kosovo, 
EULEX, we find out what can be the closest link with Derrida’s unconditioned 
hospitality given that the mission has taken the position of a host in Kosovo, 
meanwhile the locals have turned into a guest.  
c) With regard to the spectrum of missions in Kosovo, while they try to establish 
democracy in Kosovo, they slip into non-democratic acts, making this way the 
project of democracy in Kosovo ‘to commit suicide’ – in Derrida’s words –  
displaying this way the autoimmune character of democracy and democracy promotion.  
d) Finally, in deconstructing local and international narratives on Kosovo, an attempt 
was made to re-instating Kosovo as home of its citizens, placing this way the 
missionizer in the position of guest, and the local in the position of a host. The very 
attempt to do so systematically deconstructed itself indicating the impossibility to re-
instate Kosovo as home.     
What follows in the first part of this conclusion is a final remark on EU’s relations with 
Kosovo, followed by a summary of the four articles and what binds them together. The first 
part concludes with a discussion on the methodological and theoretical limitations of this 
research. The second part, is devoted to a methodological and theoretical discussion for 
future research in FPA and the field of IR more broadly finalized with ideas for future 
research agenda.  
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1.1 Aporias, Kosovo and the EU  
The EU’s relations with Kosovo can be grouped among three sections. Spectres of missionizing, 
denoting the relations between Kosovo on the one hand, and the EU and its agenda 
embedded within the broader Western democratic project. Spectres of EU enlargement, 
regarding the EU enlargement agenda for Kosovo in particular and the Western Balkans in 
general. Spectres of Kosovo, addressing problems stemming from political and identity premises, 
in particular with regard to its agency as a non/half-independent state and how does that play 
out in its relations with others.  
What is gathered from the four articles is that the intervener first pathologizes Kosovo as 
something intrinsically corrupt. Along with the rest of the Western Balkans, patholigizing 
almost exclusively comes under Balkanization. Encyclopaedia Britannica defines Balkanization, 
as a division of multinational state into smaller ethnically homogenous entities. The term was 
initially coined at the end of World War I to describe the ethnic and political fragmentation 
that followed the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Balkans567. To this day, 
Balkanization has come to be associated with a number of ‘dysfunctions’ and ‘diseases’ in 
several fields including computer science,568  medicine,569 history,570 demography studies571 
etc. Todorova argues that what has been emphasized about the Balkans is that its inhabitants 
do not care to conform to the standards of behaviours devised as normative by and for the 
civilized world. She adds that whether the Balkans is European or not is a matter of political 
and academic debate, “but they certainly have no monopoly over barbarity”.572  Talking 
about West, in his account Freud and the non-European other, Edward Said acknowledges that to 
the European, the non-European world contains only natives, and “the veiled women, the 
palm trees and the camels make up landscape, the natural background to the human presence 
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of the French”. It is the European clinical psychiatrist who establishes the native as a savage 
killer who kills for no reason573.  What is important for Todorova in her account is the 
question to explain the persistence of such a frozen image. Here, the question is how this 
frozen image plays out in the relations between Kosovo and the EU and Kosovo.  
Second, the intervener, the Western democratic agent, who is imbued with values and norms 
and the legitimacy to spread them, acts as omnipotent, all-encompassing power while the 
other is objectified into a structure with no agency that has to follow. On this logic, Kosovo is 
asked to embrace the international standards and European values of democracy. Trying to 
transpose the democratic agenda at any cost, the missionizing machinery slides into non-
democratic acts first by creating an unequal relationship with the intervened and stripping it 
off of its sociological agency – bringing fragments of neo-colonialism, and second, by 
stripping the local off of its human agency – sliding into racism. Concretely this can be 
evidenced on the self-invitation upon which the EU has launched its greatest CFSP mission 
to date in Kosovo, EULEX, in what it calls to help Kosovo authorities with strengthening 
the rule of law. Albeit its ‘monitoring’ role, EULEX, has sovereign powers in Kosovo. It 
decides its own ‘job description’, priorities; it renews its mandate every other two years and 
its staff has immunity over Kosovo’s jurisdiction. It enjoys certain executive authority 
(responsibility) in performing its tasks, especially in prosecuting war crimes cases and 
corruption affairs574. So far, EULEX’s performance has been subjected to one audit process 
conducted by the European Court of Auditors 575.  I have argued that this constellation of 
EULEX as guest accepted unconditionally and beyond dispute, who acts and behaves like a 
sovereign while stripping the local of its agency and sovereignty, comes very close to what 
Derrida describes as unconditioned or absolute hospitality.  
Spectres of EU enlargement. In the case of the Western Balkans, the EU is for the first time in its 
history involved in the process of building its future member states, by supporting their 
state-building and aid programs. EULEX mission is also an edition to this overarching 
program. Although schematically I put EULEX in Spectres of missionizing, EULEX is a linking 
point of the EU’s mission in Kosovo and the EU’s enlargement agenda for Kosovo. Yet, 
unlike in other cases of the Western Balkans, the EU’s support for state-building in Kosovo 
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is not to foster institutions of an already fully-fledged state. There is a two-fold ‘experiment’ 
stemming from this. One, for the first time, the EU enters into contractual relations with a 
non-country aspiring to become a member state. The EU’s contractual relations with regard 
to enlargement have always been conducted with internationally recognized independent 
states. Two, the EU is for the first time trying to build its true/genuine EU member state, a 
structure floating between an independent state, a (semi)protectorate and a post-modern 
entity, among others. To exemplify, Kosovo’s state identity elements (flag, national anthem, 
constitution) have more resemblance with the EU than any other old/new EU member 
state. Despite the significant high percentage of the Albanian majority, Kosovo is declared a 
multi-ethnic state. Its sovereignty is transferred to Brussels, what Chandler has coined as the 
inversed sovereignty. Does this make Kosovo the first genuine candidate for EU membership? 
Is the EU expected to be more hospitable in making Kosovo part of the ‘European family’, 
given the EU’s financial and conceptual support in making Kosovo genuinly ‘European’?  
What is observed with regard to these questions is the EU sliding from hospitality to 
hostility. In its enlargement package for Kosovo, the EU appears fairly cautious in its 
attempt to make the European agenda happen for Kosovo. I have called this a scrutinized 
conditioned hospitality to indicate the enhanced difficulty of the enlargement criteria for 
Kosovo. In addition to being a scrutinized conditioned hospitality, the EU appears uncertain 
of the whole prospect of invitation issued for Kosovo’s membership to the EU. This 
uncertainty is further substantiated observing the EU’s visa regime towards Kosovo, what I 
evidence to be Derrida’s hostility principle. As such, the EU seems to be entangled within 
diametrically opposite stances of its own. In one stance, it projects Kosovo as a reincarnation 
of its self-ascribed identity. In the other, it reverts back to its insecurities and alienates itself 
from its agenda and alienates Kosovo from the ‘path’ promised in Thessaloniki Summit in 
2003. On Derrida’s pursuit I call this entanglement of the EU’s stance towards Kosovo as 
the aporetic EU. From ancient Greek, aporia means difficulty of passing, puzzlement, while in 
philosophy it generally denotes a philosophical puzzle, an expression of doubt. With aporia, 
Derrida refers to the experience of the possibility of the impossible. On the one hand, the 
EU argues on the imperativeness of its structural presence in Kosovo. On the other hand, in 
promising Kosovo a place in the European home, the EU is offering hospitality to the ‘Kosovo to 
come’, to the Kosovo which will eventually internalize and represent the EU’s values of multi-
ethnicity, of post-national identification. The ‘Kosovo to come’, as Derrida would argue is never 
present, never here, but always in the future. The EU is sliding into hostility towards the 
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‘Kosovo’ which still lags behind the European values, with not well consolidated democracy, 
weak record of rule of law and human rights.  
 
Here, it is imperative to ask whether this is EU’s inability and the inability of its structures 
deployed in Kosovo to bring the later closer to the European family, or is it Kosovo’s 
inability to embrace the European values? In The Other Heading, Derrida argued that Europe 
must undergo “the experience and experiment of the impossible” – that is experiencing the 
aporetic desire both for unification and for maintaining the difference that makes cultural 
identity possible576. It appears the EU is confronting itself with yet another ‘experience and 
experiment of the impossible’. After having constructed Kosovo and more generally the 
Balkans as ‘other’ and to some extent as the EU’s ‘other’, the EU is now facing its own 
impossibility of undoing Kosovo’s ‘otherness’ and asking the later to undo its own 
‘otherness’’.  
 
Spectres of Kosovo. Much like the EU, Kosovo appears to be entangled in its own aporias with 
regard to its place in the ‘European family’. It sees itself not as EU’s well defined ‘other’, 
rather as an interception/interruption between the EU/West and another ‘other’, be that 
Turkey, the ‘Arab World’ or something else. Todorova talked about the Balkan’s 
transitionary status and the Balkan’s imputed ambiguity where “the West and the Orient are 
usually presented as incompatible entities/antiworlds, whereas the Balkans has always evoked 
the image of a bridge or crossroad”577.  With the establishment of its ‘European future’, 
Kosovo has been brought up to face a multi-layered ambiguity with its own. What is 
Kosovo? What is the meaning of Kosovo without its ‘European future’ and the prospect for 
EU integration? What is Kosovo to be within the EU?  On what grounds and on what 
political/legal status will its European membership take place?  
With regard to its identity, Kosovo is a liminality between its socialist and collectivist heritage 
on the one hand, and the promise of democratic, liberal system on the other. This ‘liminality’ 
has been caused first by a historical and geopolitical factor and second, by the international 
missions in Kosovo. Following the break-up of Yugoslavia, Kosovo experienced its first 
alienation with its socialist and collectivist heritage. Associated with the previous regime, they 
were disregarded as systems of governing, yet, remaining very much present within the 
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political culture and identity. This heritage continues to this day although it is ‘muted’, in that 
it exists but it does not get to speak nor to manifest itself with its own name. For Mehmet 
Kraja, an academic from Pristina, Kosovo alienates itself from everything that is non-
Western (social democracy, leftism etc.) because it is afraid of identifying itself with what it 
really is578.  The second alienation with its heritage and history Kosovo experienced with the 
confrontation of the ‘missions and structures for democracy’. The socialist legacy and the 
history as memory was systematically disregarded from the international structures, be it in 
the form of cultural heritage, collective culture or system of governance. The memory and 
remembrance of the wartime has been forsaken to ‘open way for the future’ castrating this 
way the post-war healing process and downgrading it into donor financed projects for 
transitional justice. The commemoration of the birth of Kosovo as a state from the 
international structures was conceptualized as its ‘year zero’ disregarding its past and history 
while seeing it only as a project of the ‘European family’. This in turn is a cohabitation 
between a self-‘mutation’ of its own heritage on the one hand, and a ‘mutilation’ of Kosovo’s 
history, memory and identity from the international missions on the other. All of these 
aspects combined lead to a (silent/muted) resistance from the local constituents against the 
intervener. The similarity of local resistance to the international governance of post-conflict 
societies shares many similarities with local resistance in colonial and post-colonial contexts. 
Those who engage in critical approaches to international interventions acknowledge an 
exploitative albeit non-material relationship between the intervener and the intervened, 
evidencing the multi-dimensional nature of power manifested not only by the powerful 
international actors of ruling local elites, but also reflected by the weak and powerless 
population579.  
 
I first call for de-missionizing of the spread of democracy, be that as an aim to civilise, 
modernize or, Europeanize, others. It is the missionizing of causes, as rooted in Western 
metaphysics that is inherently problematic. Second, with regard to Kosovo, the de-
missionizing would go hand in hand with de-pathologizing Kosovo as clinically ill in need for 
intervention. Third, de-objectifying Kosovo by acknowledging its agency, eroding this way the 
possibility for it being a site for controlled experiments to test ‘best European/international 
models’ and ‘draw lessons’ for further replications. Essentially, I am calling for a more 
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democratic philosophy to construct the relations with ‘others’. That would include first and 
foremost acknowledgment of the other as equal and engaging in an open, equal and 
transparent relationship.  
 
1.2 Deconstruction and beyond  
Throughout the thesis, Derrida’s deconstruction has been both used as a meta-discussion 
being central as a mode of thinking and as a micro-discussion, as an intervention in text 
employed in Article 1. The two steps of deconstruction have been spread out in the four 
articles presented in this thesis. The first step – the reversal and displacement of binary 
oppositions – clarifies the differences and looks to reverse/overturn the violent hierarchies 
imposed by Western thought, making the first term superior to the second580.  This step has 
been firstly put in place in Article 1, where the concept of intervention and missionizing was 
deconstructed and analysed embedded in the trajectory of the Western metaphysics. The 
article provides that like in the Christian missionaries, ‘democracy, rule of law and human 
rights’, has become the New Holy Trinity of Western democracy missions. The first step is 
further extended in Article 2, where the nature of EU’s relations with Kosovo is 
deconstructed. Embarking with the concept of hospitality, the article finds out a scrutinized 
conditioned hospitality in regards to the EU enlargement package for Kosovo on the one hand, 
and for the first time an appearance of Derrida’s unconditional hospitality regarding the EU 
mission in Kosovo on the other. Finally, deconstruction’s first step is exemplified in Article 3 
with an account of mission’s autoimmunity, exemplifying the suicidal tendency of the 
democratic agenda in Kosovo. In the name of ‘international standards’ and ‘European 
values’, the democracy agenda shows the vulnerability of committing suicide as it slides into 
non-democratic actions itself.  
Deconstruction’s second step – the general displacement of the system and moving towards the 
irruptive emergence of new ‘concepts’581 – is employed in the last article. In Article 4, a 
general displacement is called on re-establishing Derrida’s conceptualization of ‘home’ to re-
instate the position of ‘guest’ (missionizer) and of ‘host’ (locals). The article embarks on 
displacing grand narratives on Kosovo as home of both its local citizens and of the 
international structures (non)present in Kosovo. Deconstructing both local and international 
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narratives, the article posits all narratives in a battleground and calls for de-Balkanizing of 
narratives on Kosovo. 
 
In addition to deconstruction, other concepts of Derrida such as hospitality, autoimmunity and 
home are used as main concepts in each consecutive article. The debate of ‘guest’ and ‘host’ is 
a recurring theme along the four articles. Deconstructing the concept of mission in the case 
of Kosovo (both of the EU and UN missions) in Article 1, the first reversal of ‘guest’ and 
‘host’ positions is evidenced, a reversal similarly found in the relationship between the colonizer 
and the colonized. Employing the concept of hospitality and the interplay of ‘guest’ and 
‘host’ relations, Article 2 exemplifies the reversed role of guest and host with regard to the 
EU’s relation with Kosovo and the EU mission in Kosovo. Article 3, goes further in 
exemplifying the reversed roles of guest and host in the broader missionizing structures and 
agendas in Kosovo, extending the view to NATO forces in Kosovo, the UN administration, 
and the Council of Europe. Article 4 embarks on re-instating the positions of ‘guest’ and ‘host’ in 
their initial positions, that is acknowledging Kosovo as ‘home’ of its citizens, and 
acknowledging its citizens as ‘host’ while positioning the missionizer as ‘guest’. This last 
article carries the most important weight in the thesis, in that it deliberately calls for returning 
the gaze to the local, a pitfall I have identified embedded not just in the relations between the 
intervener and the intervened but also with regard to an epistemic violence in knowledge 
production where the local is generally absent. Yet, this re-instatement of home to the locals 
was interrupted from its inception, given Kosovo’s peculiar political status on the hand, and 
the nature of its relations with EU on the other. This impossibility to establish ‘home’ 
reconfirms once again Derrida’s assertion of the impossibility of home as such.  
In the following page is a table overview of the articles presented in this research.  
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 Meta-Discussion 
Deconstruction582  
 
Micro-
Discussion 
Conceptual 
findings  
The mission 
deconstructed  
Art.1 Step 1 – Concept of 
mission in Western 
metaphysics  
Deconstruction Reversal of guest 
& host 
evidenced  
‘Democracy, rule 
of law and human 
rights’ as the New 
Holy Trinity. 
Pathologizing and 
objectifying the 
other  
Art.2 Step 1 – the EU 
mission in Kosovo 
Hospitality Reversal of guest 
& host 
exemplified with 
the EU mission 
in Kosovo 
EU mission in 
Kosovo: 
Unconditional 
hospitality  
EU enlargement: 
Aporetic Europe 
Art.3 Step 1 – the mission 
machinery in Kosovo 
(EU, UN, NATO) 
Autoimmunity Reversal of guest 
& host 
exemplified with 
the mission 
machinery in 
Kosovo  
The suicide of 
democracy 
promotion 
Art.4 Step 2 – Kosovo as 
‘home’, re-
instatement of guest 
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Home Re- instatement 
of guest & host 
in their initial 
position and the 
impossibility of 
home 
Multiple 
narratives.  
Aporetic Kosovo 
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1.3. Research limitations  
The first three limitations I want to address are methodological. The first two are linked with 1) 
limitations beyond the 34 interviews conducted and 2) limitations within the 34 interviews. 
The first is primarily related to the insufficient time assigned for this PhD project (36 
months).  Findings would have been more robust with a wider pool of research participants 
in the field work. First, with regard to the relationship between the missionizer and the local, 
including former EU, UN employees and other employees of international structures in 
Kosovo would bring more inter-personal experiences on how the mission functioned. The 
same applies to former politicians and/or peace negotiators from Kosovo and other Western 
Balkans. Second, more interviews with non-Albanian ethnic groups, primarily Roma, Serbs, 
Turks; LGBT community, war veterans, religious leaders would have further deconstructed 
local narratives on Kosovo providing this way a deeper understandings of aspects underlined 
in  MetaKosovo: local and international narratives in Article 4.  
The second limitation speaks to the concept of interviewing the set of people ‘active’ with 
civil society (broadly speaking) such as journalists, analysts, researchers, professors, art 
workers. This selection comprised of a pool of people who have a regular job, have at least 
college education, have worked at some point with international organisations in Kosovo or 
projects paid by the later and this way they form part of the so called ‘elite’ clique in 
Prishtina. I am talking about a known trend of ‘elite creation’ from donor-oriented civil 
society, evidenced in transitional societies after the collapse of communism. This is not a 
problem of how representative ‘this sample’ is. From the outset, I have not read these stories 
as a generalization of the overall population in regards to the international missions. My 
concern is turning the gaze to the local, by interviewing this category of people, how local are 
their narratives, their critique? How different is their narrative from other locals? In ceaselessly 
trying to align with the marginal in the discourse, how marginal are the local narratives 
presented in this thesis? Are they also in turn marginalizing towards other more marginalized 
voices? What stories are silenced/subjugated when turning the gaze to these particular 
voices?  
A third methodological limitation is about the interpretivist school and its concerns with the 
issue of narratives as stories and text. The compilation of narratives presented here does not 
occupy an authentic position to claim an ultimate/unrevealed truth from the subaltern. 
Rather they are presented as yet another fragment in the bigger story of Kosovo. Neither am 
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I as an author trying to occupy the authenticity in presenting a story. This comes as imperative 
to point out, especially considering the normative statement this project has taken in turning 
the gaze to the locals and in calling for attention to the locals. With this I have not missionized 
myself as a narrator to provide the marginalized story as the ultimate truth. However, we 
should be aware of the ‘privilege’ of both the storytellers (interviewees) and the ‘narrator’ 
(the author/the interviewer) in crafting and articulating this story. This of course carries a 
certain dimension of agency and power in itself and also comes at the expense of ‘silencing’ 
other stories.  
In terms of theoretical limitations I would like to set forward a couple of questions and 
concerns with regard to Derrida and his philosophical underpinnings. I embarked with 
deconstruction and Derrida to primarily challenge the premises of Western metaphysics and 
its materialization in its current democratic missions. An Algerian Jew who developed his 
intellectual thinking in Paris, Derrida called himself a European philosopher, was genuinely 
interested in the European logos, and wanted to leave a mark in the European philosophy. In 
a number of occasions Derrida has been crucified as ‘Eurocentrist’, ‘the last Eurocentric’ etc.  
In The Other Heading. Reflections on Today’s Europe and even more so on his co-signed letter 
with Habermas, February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign 
Policy, Derrida displays what I call his Europhilia. What do I mean by Europhilia? In some of 
his statements, especially in his co-signed letter with Habermas, Derrida seems to suggest the 
preservation of ‘Europe’ not merely for the sake of ‘Europe’ but for the world at large. He 
talks about Europe being endowed with a sort of responsibility of heritance. “Europe has the 
privilege of being the good example, for it incarnates in its purity the Telos of all historicity: 
universality, omnitemporality, infinite traditionality and so forth” says Derrida adding that 
the empirical types of non-European societies, then, are only more or less historical; at the 
lower limit, they tend toward non-historicity.583 Being a Europhile and having Eurocentric 
views is not a criticism in itself, but the fact that applying deconstruction from a Eurocentric 
view has its own limitations, in how far and what can one go deconstructing. Deconstruction 
is limited to the metaphysics of the researcher (the knowledge, background etc.) who is using 
it. Therefore, this debate focuses on limitations of who gets to use deconstruction, rather than 
how deconstruction is used.  
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Gayatri Spivak, the scholar who made Derrida accessible to the American scholarship, notes 
that there is “something Eurocentric about assuming that imperialism began with Europe”584. 
Victor Li took this debate to pose the question whether there is something Eurocentric even 
in the European auto-deconstruction of Eurocentrism, an auto-deconstruction seen as 
originating only in Europe?585  The question that I extend here is essentially whether auto-
criticism is essentially different from criticism? Whether auto-deconstruction is essentially not 
deconstruction? What agent speaks of either of them, and what agent defines the difference 
between the two? What is the difference between reading Derrida from scholars well-
embedded in the European faculty on the one hand, and from L. Ling’s Daoism of World 
Politics, Cristina Inoue’s Nature’s Duality and the Challenges of the Anthropocene, Anna 
Agathangelo’s Thinking about freedom or any other scholarship to which ‘European cosmology’ 
is not central on the other hand? I find it imperative to bring this discussion forward without 
being obliged to ‘announce’ Derrida as a (non)Eurocentrist. In keeping faith with his 
deconstruction I maintain that a deconstruction of his intellectual persona should equally maintain 
even though the ‘answer’ to that might be as aporetic and undecidable, thus impossible to 
achieve.  
The second limitation relates to Derrida’s inclusion in FPA and IR at large. In the 
introduction I raised a discussion of what happens when schools of thought, theories and 
methodologies are transposed from one field to another? Is there something lost in 
translation amid the transfer? Has something similar happened in bringing Derrida to FPA 
and EU studies in this case? The mainstream IR scholarship is canonized as a field of study 
to prescribe solutions, offer alternatives, provide orientation. Derrida, his concepts and post-
structuralism at large questions, critiques and problematizes, but it does not give forward 
(obvious) solutions or alternatives. This is the ‘curse’ of post-structuralism and Derrida, if I 
may, in the canonized mainstream IR and FPA. I understand the hesitance of agreeing with 
post-structuralism, but it is imperative to give credits for what it has done to the philosophy 
of social sciences and the patterns of knowledge production. Embarking on with Derrida 
one has to accept the humiliation of not being able to provide models, alternatives or 
solutions. One has to learn how to live with ghosts, in Derrida’s words, in living with the 
unknown, with the uncertainty. What Derrida offers is the possibility to open up everything, 
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everything that has become established, canonized and given. On this openness, we can 
engage with deconstruction of cosmologies and metaphysics.  
This in turn, brings me to the last point in regards to Derrida’s thought. In the last decade of 
his life, Derrida is quoted to have said: “I’m no good for anything except taking the world 
apart and putting it together again (and I manage the latter less and less frequently)”586. The 
camp of Derrida’s critics argues that deconstruction does nothing more than dissolving 
foundations and leaving the pieces for other to put back587, that the continues dissolvent of 
totalities leads to cynicism and parody588, and that deconstructionists lose their sense of 
reality by arguing that there is nothing outside text589.  What ‘there’s nothing outside of text’ 
refers to is the impossibility of comprehending non-linguistic phenomena other than through 
discursive practices. Dan Bulley, arguably Derrida’s most articulated scholar in Foreign 
Policy Analysis, asks whether deconstruction leaves us in a moral wasteland where all ethical 
action is fundamentally impossible. His question is directed to the possibility of abandoning 
or ignoring ethics as foreign policy because it has shown itself to be an unachievable goal?590.  
In this Derridean wasteland, where we are ceaselessly exposed to the impossibility and the 
undecidability of ethics as foreign policy, of interventions and missions as foreign policy, it is 
precisely within these undecidabilities that I see and retain the ethical. For it is their 
impossibility (impossibility of democracy, ethics etc.) that inherently makes them possible.   
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2. The Gordian Knot: knowledge production, cartographies of power and 
missions 
In the outset of this thesis, a lengthy discussion situated the positivist and interpretivist 
debate to map cartographies of power in knowledge production. In addition to engaging with 
this debate for methodological purposes, this thesis maintained that there is an almost 
uninterrupted connection between positivism and the Western metaphysics whose 
implications are to be seen in how ‘the West’ perceives itself and its ‘others’, and how it 
constructs its relations with ‘others’. In The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences. Positivism and 
its epistemological others, Steinmertz talks about positivst haunting in describing the surprising 
longevity of positivism – especially in latent, unexamined, or unconscious forms in the 
human sciences591. Patterns of latent positivism, objectifying and experimenting on subjects 
of study in academic scholarship, are in turn traced in the materialization of interventions 
and missions. In tackling the problematics of the intervener/intervened relationships I am 
not only calling for a de-missionzing of spread for democracy at the implementational level. I 
am first calling for humanization of social sciences and more specifically the spectrum of IR 
and FPA, in methodological and theoretical levels. Second I am calling for a more hospitable 
scholarship of the EU studies and IR in general by disrupting the degree of ‘Eurocentrism’ 
and ‘Western metaphysics’ in EU studies and more broadly in IR and FPA. By hospitable, I 
am referring to non-European, non-Western cosmologies.  
2.1 Interpretivism in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and EU Studies, and the Humanization 
of social science  
In Foreign Policy Analysis and EU studies, interpretivism opens up new modes of engaging 
with research especially for studies who take a more normative and conceptual stance at the 
EU foreign policy and EU’s relations with ‘third parties’. The so-called ‘narrative turn’ in IR 
with Shapiro, Edkins, Campbell, has already introduced this as one of the formative 
approaches that can be further extended in the EU studies.  
Methodologically, the humanization of social science is quintessentially linked with de-objectifying 
the other in studying relations between two or more subjects. This would first imply a shift in 
the ‘scientific focus’ from controlled experiments and testing models of study to engage with 
stories, narratives and other modes which acknowledge people’s sociological attribution. 
Second, by turning the gaze to locals, to the subaltern, to the marginal/the oppressed not 
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simply to bring a ‘perspective from within’, but to also deliberately call for attention to the 
subaltern and to acknowledge its agency in faculties of knowledge.  On a more theoretical 
pursuit, the humanization of social science is to be looked at as bridging the gap between the 
mania for detached, neutral and universally scientific inquiries on the one side, and 
particularities and inter-subjectivity on the other. I am not suggesting subjectivity as a 
replacement of objectivity. What we need to think through is an understanding of objectivity 
that is far removed from the logic of positivism. In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche talks 
about a different objectivity as an approach to knowledge that can embrace the necessity of 
perspectivism.592  This methodologico-theoretical nexus of turning the gaze to the locals 
while deconstructing discourses and narratives aligning with what is otherwise marginal, 
oppressed, provides this niche of an epistemological retreat in studying settings of 
interventions and missions.  
In making the EU studies and FPA at large more hospitable, as a response to 
Eurocentrism/Wesphalian-centric, I have given forward Derrida and four of his concepts. By 
hospitable I am referring to the welcome, the openness, openness both as a virtue and 
vulnerability towards complementary/contradictory alternatives of reality which are more 
rooted in the lived experiences of people in Africa, in the Amazones, in Asia, the aborigines, 
the native Americans etc. Speaking on Eurocenstrim, Dabashi argues that as inheritors of 
multiple empires, the Europeans have come to believe that their particular philosophy is 
‘philosophy’ and their particular thinking is ‘thinking’ and everything else is ‘dancing’593. This 
sense of ‘universality’ of European’s ‘thinking’ has also been attacked by Grosfoguel who 
argues that in-front of this universal, scientific Western/European ‘thinking’ the rest 
(Islamic, non-hetero, Maya, Hindu) are downgraded into particularisms, subjectivism etc. 
causing this way an epistimicide in knowledge production.594  In calling for a more hospitable 
environment beyond Eurocentrism, I should clarify this is not a call for anti-Eurocentrism, not 
because as a strategy that would be very predictable but because it is equally missionary and 
equally totalizing. Below I will provide how Derrida’s accounts of making FPA and IR at 
large more hospitable, offer or at least provoke a more democratic way in studying interventions 
and missions in FPA and IR at large.  
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2.2 Derrida and the Hospitality of Foreign Policy Analysis  
 
“The ethics and the future of the academy require hospitality”. 
Jacques Derrida595 
 
Talking about deconstruction, Derrida said himself there is no democracy without 
deconstruction and no deconstruction without democracy596. “They are indissocable, 
inasmuch as they each entail the right to criticize anything”597. Each of his other concepts in 
addition to deconstruction, such as hospitality, autoimmunity, home, are all ceaselessly open and 
inviting to de-totalize their self-enclosed meanings. Each of them is hospitable to disrupt its 
establishments to the point that they become impossible to exist. Each of their parts de-
totalizes themselves further leaving almost no trace of their initial form. And it is in this form 
that Derrida in general offers new space for a more democratic discussion.  
Although deconstruction has been elaborated and used in foreign policy analysis, especially 
in EU external relations,598 other concepts conceptualized and used by Derrida remain largely 
unexplored. Hospitality, is primarily important as a concept in IR and foreign policy studies at 
large, especially given the trend of xenophobia, the rise of right-wing movements, anti-
immigration laws and not at least racism. In particular with regard to EU enlargement, 
Derrida’s conceptualization of hospitality and its two laws (conditioned and unconditioned 
hospitality) provide a new spectrum in getting to the fundamentals of enlargement policies, 
whom is invited and welcomed to join Europe, who is refused etc. Because it is 
quintessentially linked with the concept of home, hospitality touches upon dimensions on 
EU’s subjectivity as a host and its consequent guests. What has probably ‘shadowed’ 
hospitality in these discussions (at least in typical Western scholarship) is its lesser (acting 
like) substitute – tolerance. Tolerance in particular has demarcated studies on multiculturalism, 
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religious and ethnic conflicts, migration etc. Derrida distinguishes between ‘tolerance’ and 
‘hospitality’. For him the word tolerance first of all is marked in a religious war between 
Christians and the non-Christians with the Edict of Nantes (1598) in which the Huguenots 
were permitted to worship as long as they wouldn’t question king’s authority. As such, 
Derrida argues, tolerance is a Christian value in which the Christian must tolerate the non-
Christian 599.  In Philosophy in a time of terror, Derrida and Habermas engage in a debate with 
Giovanna Borradori, with Habermas arguing that tolerance is a paternalistic term that would 
be better off being replaced by the concept of  “hospitality” or “friendship”, as the very act 
of ‘tolerance’ retains an element of doing mercy 600.  Derrida adds that ‘tolerance’ is the 
opposite of hospitality, as it is always on the side of “reason of the strongest” in which “I 
limit my welcome, to retain power and maintain control of my ‘home’, of my sovereignty. It 
is careful hospitality” 601. So far, non-mainstream theories were tolerated in social sciences 
labelled as particularistic, provincial, indigenous etc. marking this way their detachment from what 
the codified ‘universal’ knowledge. In this regard, rather than tolerating other spectres of 
engaging with knowledge production, even though they are defined non-scientific and non-
rigorous in one particular epistemology, offering hospitality to these strands can actually 
provide a more all-encompassing and democratic way of producing knowledge602.  
 
Tolerance’s ultimate project is ‘multiculturalism’. Much like tolerance is the opposite 
hospitality for Derrida, multiculturalism is the opposite of the idea of embededness of 
differences. For Žižek, multiculturalism represents the ideal form of ideology of the global 
capitalism, in which each local culture is treated the way the colonizer treats colonized people 
– as ‘natives’ whose mores are to be carefully studied and ‘respected’. He argues that 
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multiculturalism involves patronizing Eurocentrist distance and/or respect for local cultures 
without roots in one’s own particular culture.  
 
It is a disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism, a ‘racism with a distance’ – 
it ‘respects’ the Other’s identity, conceiving the Other as a self-enclosed ‘authentic’ 
community towards which he, the multiculturalist, maintains a distance rendered 
possible by his privileged universal position.603  
 
As such, for him multiculturalism is a racism….as it does not oppose to the Other the 
particular values of his own culture, but nonetheless retains this position as the privileged 
empty point of universality from which one is able to appreciate properly the other/particular 
cultures. The respect for the Other’s specificity is the very form of asserting one’s own 
superiority. In turn, when I call for a more hospitable environment, I am not doing it for the 
goal of multiculturalism rather than for what Derrida calls friendship604 or what Ling calls 
embeddedness.605   
 
Derrida’s conceptualization of autoimmunity is another concept that is to provide insightful 
dimensions in studying democracies and democratic systems of governance. This research 
has taken a step further in employing autoimmunity to the study of ‘democracy promotion’ 
in Kosovo. In evidencing the suicidal tendency of ‘democracy promotion’ with the 
application of autoimmunity, the findings seems to ally themselves with other literature who 
partakes in the criticism of the substance and form of democracy promotion.606  The niche 
and the difference of the argument is that unlike other strands of literature, autoimmunity 
interrogates first and foremost the very concept of democracy as such, arguing that 
democracy itself has the tendency to be suicidal. Autoimmunity falls in a much broader scope 
of FPA and IR, particularly in international interventions, international state-building, post-
conflict studies, development aid. Its obvious importance with regard to EU studies and the 
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EU external relations/EU enlargement is given the EU’s tendency to ‘reproduce itself’ – its 
system of governance – outside of its own borders. While in Article 3 democracy’s 
autoimmunity might seem to have been demonized, autoimmunity as Derrida reminds us is not 
an absolute ill or evil. Because it enables an exposure to the other, to what and to who 
comes, it remains incalculable. Without autoimmunity nothing would ever happen, or arrive, 
we would no long wait, await, or expect, no longer expect one another or expect an event.607  
For me, autoimmunity is a self-destruction which enables life to continue and enables the 
welcoming of the other. It is not inherently ‘an end’ and a permanent destruction rather than 
an interruption of something that opens space for a new beginning. Only by opening itself 
up to the other, threatening to destroy itself, the organism has the chance to receive the 
other.608  
 
Lastly, home is another concept that can be further employed in EU studies literature. While 
Campbell deserves most of the credit for codifying this concept in IR,609  it is Bulley who has 
used it extensively with regard to EU external relations and EU enlargement in his account 
Ethics as Foreign Policy. Like hospitality, home is inherently linked with the inside and the 
outside, with the host and guest, the sovereign and the non-sovereign etc. Because it has to 
do with borders it offers new insights into studies on sovereignty, post-national/post-
modern structures, supra-national entities. Although home is as aproetic, as impossible and as 
undecidable as the other concepts used by Derrida, it is precisely Derrida who reminds us to 
protect home because without home ‘there is no door nor any hospitality’.   
All of these concepts provide an openness to welcome the outside, the other. They all equally 
expose their ceaseless vulnerability in being attacked, threatened while welcoming the other. 
It is by allowing this sort of threat and openness that Derrida with his concepts offers this 
liberty and openness to engage with questions, to question, disrupt, destroy and construct. It 
is with openness, openness as embededness, openness to the point that threatens the very 
core of our own, of our own cosmology and metaphysics that we can make sure a more 
hospitable environment. At the level of knowledge production, this hospitality speaks to inviting 
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other labelled particularistic, non-scientific, non-objective modes of knowledge production, even 
though they may threaten the universalist, objective knowledge. Disregarding openness and 
hospitality, we essentially revert to the easiness of closing ourselves in the comfortable shells 
that in turn creates rigidity and morass. At a more political level, it is this disregard of hospitality 
and more broadly the concept of embeddedness that explains failures to understanding the 
logic of the Arab Spring(s), the patterns of Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Arab conflict, and 
essentially how interventions and missions abroad fail to understand the failures (simply put) 
of their own missions and interventions. 
What is to follow the de-misisonizing, de-pathologizing, de-objectifying missions and in turn 
a more hospitable environment in policy and academia? Why should we bother with any of 
these? This essentially implies not tolerating but embedding, not ‘evidencing’ ills but 
understanding patterns or simply put, not constructing others and creating unequal 
relationships. Is looking at the other as equal, associated with looking at oneself as non-
superior? When the other is not the other but is a simple other not much distinct from you, 
but embedded in you and the other way around, how will the concept of missionizing 
change? Why would you missionize something that is awful a lot like yourself? Where does 
the legitimacy from missionizing then is going to spring? Can we dare to imagine the 
usefulness of interventions and missions, whatever their noble cause, after we have 
established that maybe they (others) do not necessarily need to be democratized, 
modernized, purified, because on the hand whatever the system of culture they have is not 
pathologically corrupt and on the other hand, whatever our values are, are not necessarily the 
best and/or superior.  
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ANNEX I  
‘The Belgian Congo’. Colonial Museum Tervuren, Belgium (Visited in April 2012)  
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ANNEX II 
“If they can be tolerant, so can you….Become tolerant”. Retrieved from: 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Reklamat-e-KFOR-it-ma-shajn%C3%AB-
inteligjenc%C3%ABn-me-nan%C3%AB/356605516279?sk=photos_stream&tab=photos 
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ANNEX III 
‘What is heritage; An alien concept?’ Council of Europe, Pristina. 2011. Retrieved from 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/cooperation/kosovo/Publications/Comics-
ENG.pdf> 
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ANNEX IV 
‘Voyage en UNMIKISTAN. Udhëtim në UNMIKISTAN’, 2004. Available from: 
<http://www.laprocure.com/voyage-unmikistan-daniel-lemahieu/9782915037081.html>. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
185 
 
ANNEX V  
‘EULEKSPERIMENT’, 2010. Avaliable from: < 
http://www.demotix.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/a_scale_large/1200-
7/photos/1296447.jpg>. 
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ANNEX VI 
‘EULEX has done nothing to fight corruption and serious crime….’  
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